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Iron and the Bloody Shirt: Leadership in the West Virginia Republican Party 
1872-1896 
 
Stephen A. Smoot 
 
 
The electoral upheavals of 1894 and 1896 resulting in Republican Party dominance 
within West Virginia and around the nation were not just a sudden occurrence. They 
resulted, in part, because voters in key border states shifted their votes from the 
Democratic to the Republican Party.  West Virginia’s Republican Party had the greatest 
success in maintaining its long term influence after 1896 despite the fact that since 1872 
it enjoyed little success.  To build up to triumph in 1896 took a quarter century of 
painstaking work that started after electoral disaster in 1870.  That election, the first since 
West Virginia removed restrictions on former Confederates, brought Democrats into a 
position of dominance.  This dissertation tells the story of how West Virginia’s 
Republicans rebuilt their party between 1872 and 1896. 
 
Nathan Goff, a Union Army major during the Civil War, used the same methods            
as other party authorities around the country.  He used his talent for public speaking and 
access to federal patronage to mobilize and reward the faithful as much as possible.  State 
Republican newspapers battled their Democratic counterparts in conflicts over not only 
issues of the day, but also anger over measures taken during the Civil War.  Goff’s work 
helped to restore a working party organization in the 1870s, but did not put West Virginia 
Republicans into a position to return to competitiveness, much less power.  Money, 
manpower, and organization do not ensure success without a relevant message. 
 
The Republican Party across the country started to fashion a more appealing vision after 
the difficult Grant and Hayes Administrations.  They advocated sound money and a 
protective tariff as cornerstones of national prosperity more often during the 1880s.  Goff 
emerged as a national spokesman for protectionism at the same time as the Second 
Industrial Revolution started strongly transforming West Virginia’s economy.  However, 
national economic conditions in this decade did not result in massive movement towards 
the Republican cause.  Instead, the country experienced partisan deadlock.  West Virginia 
Republicans made gains during this decade.  In 1888, Goff came very close to capturing 
the office of governor.  The Democratic legislature successfully counted out enough 
votes to seat the Democratic nominee, but the results demonstrated a shift in party power. 
 
Goff would not be able to take West Virginia Republicans to their eventual triumph.  The 
year 1888 also saw Goff unseated as party chief by the nationally known Stephen Benton 
Elkins.  Elkins built up a fortune in land speculation, railroads, and other ventures.  Along 
the way, he married the daughter of former Senator Henry Gassaway Davis, a prominent 
West Virginia Democrat and industrialist.  Elkins brought a new kind of leadership style 
to West Virginia Republican politics.  He concentrated on building a stronger and more 
effective party organization more than relying on personal appeal in speeches and 
debates.   Elkins was exceptionally good at keeping divisive issues and potentially 
conflicting personalities from interfering with party goals. 
 
The economic crisis that gripped the nation during the election year of 1894, a time of 
plummeting production and employment figures, made the Republican economic vision 
more appealing to voters.  Grover Cleveland and his party did not seem to have the 
answers to the problems that many faced. West Virginia’s Republican organization built 
by Elkins was able to take full advantage of the national party campaigns.  They did not 
simply convince West Virginians to vote for Republican candidates, but to trust the party 
to direct state affairs for the next generation.  This dissertation helps to put West 
Virginia’s Republican Party experience into a national perspective while also explaining 
why the state shifted into the GOP column so strongly after 1896.  Leadership, message, 







A dissertation, like most worthwhile endeavors, is less of a work and more of a 
journey.  Sometimes one breaks into open country and easily makes substantial progress.  
However, all too often the traveling becomes slow and difficult as obstacle after obstacle 
forms to block your path.  Mountains form before your eyes and swamps extend beneath 
your feet.  Some of this is related to the work.  Much of the rest comes when you have to 
find the right balance between work and life.  There are no rules, nor are their guidelines.  
None who make this journey, at least in the humanities, do so because there is a pot of 
gold at the end of the rainbow.  Were we solely looking for that, most of us would have 
gone to law school.  Instead, we put ourselves through this so you, the researcher or 
casual reader, have a convenient way to access the subject and (hopefully) a thought 
provoking point of view. Of course we are also looking for professional position and 
respect. 
Those of us who are lucky embark on the journey with excellent guides.  In my 
first few years, I studied under Ronald Lewis, Mary Lou Lustig, Robert Blobaum, and 
Jason Parker.  Though the fields varied tremendously, I could always see threads of 
thought in some that helped give perspective to others.  I especially appreciate the advice 
from Professor Lewis when trying to think of where this dissertation would go.  
Additionally, my dissertation committee’s advice and guidance was vital to making this 
dissertation clear and concise.  I appreciate the contributions of Kenneth and Elizabeth 
Fones-Wolf, Tyler Boulware, Kevin Barksdale, and Jack Hammersmith, especially the 
eternal patience of Professor Ken Fones-Wolf as he and I worked through revisions. 
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I also could not have completed this journey without the love and support of my 
fellow travelers.  Sometimes it shocks me that they elected to see it all through, but they 
shared the excitement and the anxiety of this whole process and I am forever grateful.  
My wife, Crystal, has always given me her complete love and support in this endeavor 
and my children, Jared and Emily, have had to come along for the ride.  Jared is twelve 
and probably has no memory of my not working on this.  My parents’ support, moral, 
financial, and otherwise, was also vital in making sure that we could continue our travels. 
West Virginia University’s Department of History took a chance on me in 2003.  I am 
deeply thankful that they did. I received a top notch education and had the privilege of 
working with outstanding faculty and graduate students.  Finally, I would also like to 
acknowledge two professors from Marshall University to whom I looked to as mentors, 
David Woodward and the late Robert Maddox.  I borrowed most of my teaching style 
from their examples.  They also are the reason that I decided to go into higher education 
rather than some other field.  There are also too many friends to name here whose help 
and support have been tremendous. 
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West Virginia has never seen an extended period of two party competition.  In 
some decades the Democratic Party dominated registrations and filled most elected 
positions while Republicans controlled other eras.  The first thirty years after the 
conclusion of the Civil War saw two major party shifts within the state of West Virginia.  
Republicans founded West Virginia, then tried to strengthen the new state and the party’s 
hold on power at the same time.  They succeeded in establishing the state and its 
government permanently and even sold most voters on issues such as development and 
education, but could not maintain their dominance.  By 1872, the Democratic Party had 
regained control and even ratified a new constitution.  Democrats controlled state politics 
for the next twenty years until Republicans once again successfully challenged for 
ascendency.  How did Republicans lose the support of the electorate in the early 1870s, 
then regain it two decades later?  What effect did it have on the early development of the 
state up to the turn of the century?  In what ways did the West Virginia Republican 
Party’s push for dominance in the 1890s have an effect on national political shifts? 
Two historians have largely contributed to creating the framework of 
understanding late nineteenth-century West Virginia politics.  One, Gordon McKinney, 
has emphasized how the mountain experience shaped politics from West Virginia to 
northern Georgia.  According to McKinney, people in the mountain sections of southern 
states experienced geographical prejudice, lived in “destitute” conditions, and tended to 
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perceive the Civil War in personal terms.1  Splits over black voting and the Civil Rights 
Act of 1874 destroyed party unity.2  McKinney argued that West Virginia Republicans 
responded by rallying behind a war hero, Nathan Goff Jr., and modeled their party along 
military lines.3  With this new organization they revamped their approach, focusing less 
on national and more on local issues   Reconstruction’s end helped to close the door on a 
difficult issue for Republicans to defend as the Civil War receded into history.4  By the 
1880s, according to McKinney, Goff’s decisions about patronage and his campaign tactic 
of false reluctance to run for office created strains between him and other party leaders.  
Stephen Elkins, a wealthy operator in national presidential politics, took advantage of 
Goff’s weakening position and established himself as a more reliable dispenser of 
patronage.5  West Virginia was unique, however, for Republicans, concentrated in the 
mountains of the other southern Appalachian, states found it difficult to combat the 
increasingly entrenched authorities in lowland state capitals.6  The lowland versus 
highland dynamic did not exist in West Virginia to the same degree as in other 
Appalachian states that had not split.   
 The other major interpretation comes from John Alexander Williams, who 
succinctly presented his interpretation of West Virginia’s Gilded Age political 
developments in the first sentence of West Virginia and the Captains of Industry: “In the 
last third of the nineteenth century, the gods of war and commerce created a new 
                                                 
1 Gordon McKinney, Southern Mountain Republicans, 1865-1900: Politics and the Appalachian 
Community, (Chapel Hill:  University of North Carolina Press, 1978), 13, 19, 24. 
2 Ibid, 43. 
3 Ibid, 64. 
4 Ibid., 86. 
5 Ibid., 151, 153. 
6 Ibid., 9. 
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American commonwealth in the heart of the Appalachian highlands.”7 This dramatic 
opening leads into a discussion of how party mattered little as West Virginia 
industrialized.  Industrial leaders drove both parties towards the same goals.   His book 
goes on to describe a tightly interwoven relationship between West Virginia’s political 
system and its emerging industrial economy.  Williams’ highlights the impact of 
industrial politicians Elkins, Johnson Camden, Henry Gassaway Davis, and Nathan Scott 
on the economic, political, and social system of the state.  This group includes two 
Democrats and two Republicans; they and their peers in politics and industry, according 
to Williams, created a modern political system designed to create profit for themselves 
and “metropolitan industrialism.”8  Ronald L. Lewis in Transforming the Appalachian 
Countryside agrees with Williams that extractive industries and business in general 
dominated the political system of the state.  Lewis argues that “historians generally have 
not explained the political and legal changes implemented in the statehouses and 
courthouses of the region in support of the industrial transition.”9  Lewis also discusses 
the impact of a population that wanted jobs and development.   
 Williams and Lewis emphasize economics in these studies.  Williams especially 
implies that the political movements came secondary to the economic while Lewis 
discusses the transformation of legal interpretations.  This dissertation differs from their 
studies in asserting that the role of political parties with their leadership, ideas, 
organization, and supporters played a strong part in the development of the political 
system that emerged in West Virginia.   
                                                 
7 John Alexander Williams, West Virginia and the Captains of Industry  (Morgantown:  West Virginia 
University Libraries, 1976), 1. 
8 Ibid., 4. 
9 Ronald Lewis, Transforming the Appalachian Countryside: Railroads, Deforestation and Social Change 
in West Virginia, 1880-1920  (Chapel Hill:  University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 11. 
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 More recent studies have added nuance to these basic frameworks.  Randall Scott 
Gooden, in his 1995 dissertation, helped to explain the Republicans’ assumption of power 
during the Civil War and their loss of power by the 1870s.  He stressed the revolutionary 
nature of the changes that took place during the Civil War in West Virginia.  Gooden 
examined the early party movement as a whole, as well as individual differences within 
it.  Radically oriented Republicans needed Union Democrats to create a new regime in 
West Virginia, but alienated them with the postwar policies that shut out former 
Confederates.10  Tensions and schisms, even among the victors, threatened to undo the 
creation of the state and all the reforms that came with it, such as free public schools.11  
Many of these problems emerged from the presidency of Andrew Johnson whose lack of 
tact and brazenly pro-Southern policies divided the ranks of the Union coalition by the 
end of his presidency.  Democrats and Republicans almost completely split along party 
lines over the important issue of President Johnson’s possible removal from office.  The 
growing weakness of the Union movement helped to propel state Republicans and 
Governor Arthur I. Boreman toward more severe measures, such as the imposition of test 
oaths for voting and even working in certain professions.12  West Virginia did 
successfully begin its revolutionary transformation into an industrial economy with 
northern style innovations, such as free schools.  Democrats even kept most of the 
changes when they created their own state constitution in 1872.  However, according to 
Gooden, the moderate “let up” Republicans found themselves cut adrift when ex 
                                                 
10 Randall Scott Gooden, “The Completion of a Revolution:  West Virginia From Statehood Through 
Reconstruction” (Ph.D. diss., West Virginia University, 1995), 25, 26. 
11 Ibid., 26, 31. 
12 Ibid., 136. 
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Confederates returned to the franchise.13 The splits created within the Republican Party 
hurt it almost as badly as the lingering negative memories among many Democrats about 
the postwar anti-Confederate measures. 
 Revolution admittedly is a slippery term.  In this work, the term is used to 
describe the elimination of a formerly dominant system through violence, then the 
implementation of a new order by leaders who generally come from outside of the old 
system.  Republicans in pre Civil War Western Virginia were very few in number.  
Industry remained a goal for certain selected areas.  No serious individual proposed 
independence for the counties of the future state in 1859.  The state leaders of the postwar 
period aimed West Virginia down a different path towards statehood, Republican rule, 
and new economic patterns. 
 Other scholars have helped put West Virginia’s partisan competition into a 
national perspective, thus highlighting its importance.  Robert Cherny’s study, American 
Politics in the Gilded Age, revolves around the idea that political gridlock defined a 
generation of American politics starting with Ulysses S. Grant and ending with Benjamin 
Harrison.  Presidents in this period specialized in administrating rather than initiating.14  
Political parties dominated American political life and thinking more than almost any 
other era.  Party identification included not only regulars, but factionalists, and brief 
appearances of third parties.  The difference between this era and the twentieth century 
was the lack of many other organizational distractions to seize the attention of people.  
According to Cherny, most voters would have agreed with Senator Roscoe Conkling who 
                                                 
13 Ibid., 309.  “Let up” Republicans favored the removal of restrictions on former Confederates. 




explained that “I do not know how to belong to a party a little.”15  Increasingly close 
elections, narrowing gaps between the major parties in Congress, and the ability of third 
parties to command influence beyond their numbers created conditions that made 
electoral victories extremely vital, even if they came at the expense of principles.  
Harrison and McKinley broke through the deadlock with their backing of the Republican 
economic program of sound money, admission of new states, an anti-trust act, and a 
protective tariff.16 
 The role of the Republican economic program lies at the center of Richard 
Bensel’s The Political Economy of American Industrialization.  Bensel asserts that the 
combined efforts of northern capital and the Republican Party functioned to redistribute 
resources away from the South into the industrial belt, thereby building an effective 
political coalition of northern businessmen and industrial workers.  Although 
industrialization for most countries was a painful process, Bensel argues that America’s 
path was rare because it took place in a relatively democratic state.  Other industrial 
societies used some form of authoritarian tactics, but the Republican Party in the United 
States had to recruit constituents and sell them on the benefits.17  The post Civil War era 
introduced conditions that would lead to an industrial explosion, such as the lowering of 
interstate barriers to commerce.18 The protective policy of the United States lay at the 
center of Republican economic and political ideology.  Most countries used the tariff as 
part of a foreign policy vision.  Republicans used it, according to Bensel, to fund Union 
                                                 
15 Ibid., 13. 
16 Ibid., 92. 
17 Richard Bensel, The Political Economy of American Industrialization: 1877-1900 (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2000), 3. 
18 Ibid., 349. 
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veteran pensions.  Those pensions helped to secure a generation of grateful voters.19  As a 
state on the southern border of an expanding industrial belt, West Virginia was poised to 
take advantage of this industrial economy, benefitting a significant population of Union 
veterans and workers. 
 This dissertation focuses on these past interpretations of state political history by 
examining the development of the state Republican Party.  It discusses its ideas, 
personalities, methods, and impact.  Williams examines the industrialist-politicians as 
representatives of a class rather than a political party.  Lewis and others focus on 
economics and society, leaving politics as a secondary discussion.  The research in this 
dissertation focuses instead on the leaders and mid level personalities who led and 
worked for the state party as well as the ideas and issues that motivated them.  It 
examines the changes and developments that were vital to the party’s success in the 
1890s.  The West Virginia Republican organization between the 1860s and the 1890s 
transformed itself from one reliant upon anti-Confederate restrictions similar to those in 
the South to a northern style party in the 1890s.  This transformation occurred because 
the people of the state increasingly supported industrialism and its defining issues, such 
as protectionism, bringing it closer to the northern agenda.  Shifting voter allegiances 
from the Democratic to the Republican Party had national ramifications.  West Virginia 
joined a core group of states that generally supported the Republican Party until the Great 
Depression. 
 This work will examine the inside stories of power and influence found in the 
personal papers of leaders, elected officials, and other parts of the party hierarchy.  
Admittedly several works touch on the details of these maneuverings.  Goff had to 
                                                 
19 Ibid., 457, 458. 
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sidestep the statemakers to get into power and find ways to keep strong personalities 
satisfied with his authority.  Goff had to deal with different administrations that had 
different priorities, but his state party’s struggles did not mirror the divisions of the 
Stalwarts and Liberals.20  He also learned that supporting the wrong presidential 
candidate brought political consequences.  Meanwhile, politically active Republicans 
tried to position themselves to receive federal patronage appointments.  These offices 
served to reward the faithful, employed the elderly who have rendered service but had 
trouble supporting themselves, and identified favorite lieutenants.  Patronage influence 
also identified which party leaders were in ascendancy and which were in decline.   
 West Virginia Republicans performed best when they could come to agreement 
on key issues.  Principles often, but not always, united otherwise contentious individuals 
in a common cause.  This dissertation shall investigate the importance of the issues they 
promoted as well as how they unified and divided the party.  Fear of losing their state and 
the changes they made in the initial constitution kept statemaker Republicans unified. By 
the late 1860s, anxiety over denying fellow Americans basic rights outweighed the 
apprehensions over what might happen if the Democrats regained power.  The demise of 
the ideological bonds that drove the first generation of Republicans coincided with the 
onset of Cherny’s period of political deadlock.  Republican control of the presidency and 
Congress could not help to build a state party organization capable of retaking power 
until it assembled a program compelling enough to interest state voters.  That came in the 
form of the economic program gradually formed by the 1880s.  Bensel argues that post 
Civil War industrialization amounted to a redistribution of wealth from the South to the 
                                                 
20 “Stalwarts” in the 1870s tended to support President Grant and the party bosses.  “Liberals” drew much 
of their leadership from journalists and other intellectuals who saw the Stalwarts as sacrificing the basic 
principles of the party. 
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Northeast.  National economic policy increasingly shielded manufacturing while 
exposing export oriented agrarian interests to retributive tariffs.21  Redistribution of 
wealth probably does not describe the situation as accurately as a reprioritization of the 
economy.  The program crafted by Republicans aimed at maintaining prosperity and 
creating a strong voter base.  In West Virginia, one sees an excellent example of creating 
a base of activists through patronage.  Those rewarded with federal jobs actively helped 
to promote the party and its candidates.  Furthermore the party relied upon partisan 
newspapers to promote its ideas and policy proposals.  In 1888 the Goff organization 
launched a major statewide test of its strength against the strongly divided Democratic 
Party.  Goff himself personified the effort by running (reluctantly) for governor and 
losing by a very slender margin after all investigations concluded.  The narrow setback 
compared to earlier examples of Democratic electoral dominance demonstrated the 
weaknesses and division of that party.  It also showed the limited ability of Goff to get 
the Republicans into a position of power in increasingly favorable circumstances. 
The regional impact of the new policies and the Republican message illustrated 
the complexity of the changing nature of different parts of the country during the Second 
Industrial Revolution.  Industries emerged in the old Confederacy, such as ironworks in 
Alabama.  The industrial belt’s extension across the Great Lakes and Ohio Valley 
coexisted with agriculture.  Making industry a priority, as Bensel described, had an 
impact in West Virginia and other border state regions.  West Virginia gravitated 
economically from its reliance on agriculture to one based on extractive industries and 
manufacturing.  Republicans in West Virginia gradually built strength as the Democratic 
Party started to fracture in the 1880s over the gold standard and the tariff.  At the same 
                                                 
21 Bensel, The Political Economy of American Industrialization, 467. 
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time, the Republican program was taking shape and the party organization was exploring 
better ways to disseminate its message.  Economic crisis in the early 1890s exposed the 
Democratic Party’s inability to govern.22  This allowed for a Republican political 
expansion into the border states and West in the 1890s.23   
The 1890s were a key milestone in West Virginia Republican development.  The 
party moved from an era of building a viable opposition into developing an institution 
capable of control and even dominance.  Earlier, Goff had maintained the party through 
charisma and patronage, but could not push it over the top.  Elkins came along at the right 
time in history with the right managerial strategies to keep Republicans relatively unified 
as they took over the state.  On issues of industrial development, West Virginia and other 
border states believed that the Republican Party had a stronger and more coherent 
message based on protection and sound money.  This dissertation uses West Virginia’s 
experience as a case study of political evolution from post Civil War issues to those of 
development.  This shift broke down what Cherny described as a “deadlock” between the 
parties.24  Elkins’ influence and leadership made West Virginia’s Republican Party a part 
of the process rather than an organization dragged along by history.  Not only did he 
continue to build on Goff’s successes, but Elkins also emerged as an important power 
figure representing a state now much more influential in the field of national politics.25   
The case study of the West Virginia Republican Party demonstrated that a state 
party and its leadership can find themselves confined by national problems and priorities, 
                                                 
22 Cherny, American Politics in the Gilded Age, 110. 
23 Bensel, The Political Economy of American Industrialization, 361. 
24 Cherny, American Politics in the Gilded Age, 41. 
25 Stephen Elkins occasionally came up in discussions over the vice presidency and the presidency, Albert 
Blakeslee White to Stephen Elkins, February 5, 1900, Stephen Elkins Papers, West Virginia and Regional 




but also make a national impact.  West Virginia’s Republican Party moved from 
dominance to near destruction, then gradually back to dominance.  Its return to power 
helped to create the foundation of party strength nationwide. Its story is one of leadership, 
ideas, perseverance, and old fashioned politics, good, bad, and ugly.  It is also a small, 
but important part of the grand narrative of how the United States rose to become the 






STATEHOOD AND PARTY DECLINE 
 
West Virginia’s birth and early statehood was as convoluted and unusual as the 
Civil War itself.  Formed from a mixture of sectionalist tradition and national crisis, the 
Mountain State’s birth was to the nation a pragmatic war measure.  To supporters of the 
Union starting in the spring of 1861, it represented their best chance at survival.  Strongly 
intertwined with the formation of the state and the changes it embraced was the Republican 
Party.  Its identification as a Union movement captured the loyalty of many in the 
mountain districts as well as those who might have preferred the more genteel old Whig 
party.   
 A psychological divide in Virginia prefaced the political and social breaks.  As a 
border area, the future state of West Virginia developed differently than the eastern 
section.  David Hackett Fischer’s Albion’s Seed tracks the movement of Scottish, 
northern Irish and northern English populations from their land of origin to the Virginia 
backcountry of the 1700s.  They settled chiefly in a “7” shaped mass that extended from 
the Monongahela Valley eastward to the Great Valley and southward along that land 
feature to the New River.1  According to Paul Salstrom, 2,150,000 lived in this region by 
1770.2  They brought in different ethnic and religious traditions that separated them in 
some ways from eastern Virginia.  Over time, economic ties connected the northern 
branch of this movement to trade on the Ohio River while those in the Valley of Virginia 
and the Shenandoah traded with the Chesapeake region.   The northerners’ economic 
                                                 
1 David Hackett Fischer, Albion’s Seed: Four British Folkways in America (New York:  Oxford University 
Press, 1989), 637. 
2 Paul Salstrom, Appalachia’s Path to Dependency  (Lexington:  University of Kentucky Press, 1994), 2. 
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interests, cultural ties, and traditions favored ties to Pennsylvania, and their exposed 
frontier before 1795 made many support the federal government.  Virginia failed, in the 
eyes of many in the western counties, to protect the people during frontier days or to 
provide economic development in subsequent decades.  They would not follow their 
eastern brethren out of the Union without a fight, given their long standing grievances 
against Virginia.3  As the radicalized Commonwealth made decisive moves toward 
secession in spring of 1861, westerners had to decide if they loved old Virginia or the 
Union more. 
 When the Republican Party formed in 1854, uniting Northern capital with great 
financial resources, the South saw a red flag.  This party had more potential than the Free 
Soil movement to win elections, and, unlike the Whigs, it did not hesitate to take a 
position on slavery.4  Furthermore Southerners saw its leadership as particularly 
frightening.  Its strategy of forcing the North to concede or face the unthinkable now 
came under challenge from men such as New York’s William Seward.  Seward, 
Governor of New York in the late 1850s, predicted that Republican control of the 
government would bring about an end to slavery.5  He was an aggressive and highly 
intelligent politician who grew influential in New York politics and also traveled the 
globe in anticipation of a presidential nomination. Likewise Northerners watched with 
confused anxiety as the South held the nation hostage through the latent threat of civil 
war.   
                                                 
3 John Alexander Williams, West Virginia: A History (Morgantown:  West Virginia University Press, 
2001), 52. 
4 Judge Samuel Foot of New York, when explaining his move from the Whigs to the Republicans,  asked 
rhetorically “What then is there left of public duty to which the old Whig Party stands pledged?  I see 
nothing except the principle for which we so earnestly contended in 1844, viz, the exclusion of slavery 
from free soil.”  New York Daily Times, 25 October 1855. 
5 New York Times, 28 October 1858. 
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 The American Civil War arose from a variety of causes converging into one 
massive historical catastrophe.  A single event lit the fuse.  Abraham Lincoln’s election to 
the presidency demonstrated the extremely rapid ascent for the Republican Party into 
national leadership. At the party convention of 1860, Lincoln contended with William 
Seward, among others, for the nomination.  Lincoln in 1858 won national attention with 
his effective rhetorical parries in debates with Stephen Douglas as they campaigned for a 
US Senate seat in Illinois.   
 Lincoln’s presidential victory convinced many Southerners that the North 
intended to crush their world and many responded quickly.  On November 5, South 
Carolina’s governor strongly urged the state legislature to consider secession before 
Lincoln was even actually elected.  After his win, federal buildings in Charleston 
ostentatiously displayed the state flag instead of the stars and stripes while federal 
officials resigned their posts.  The London Times reported in moderate tones that 
Southerners would express anger, then shift their message by stating “the extreme section 
in the Slave States have so long and so vehemently asserted their resolve never to submit 
to a Republican Executive that they could not without becoming ridiculous quietly 
acquiesce in their defeat.”6   
 Western Virginians viewed the looming storm with fear and anticipation.  Almost 
two thousand Virginians, nearly exclusively from the northwest, cast their ballots for 
Lincoln.  This gave him a little over 1% of the vote there, but support was concentrated in 
the northwestern counties.  Furthermore, according to historian Charles Ambler, Western 
Virginia Democrats more resembled the child of the frontier, Union-loving Jacksonian 
                                                 
6 Ralph E. Weber, ed., As Others See Us: American History in the Foreign Press (New York: Holt 
Rinehart, 1972), 117. 
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strain than those that had followed plantation elites like John C. Calhoun a generation 
before.7  A Hancock County farmer wrote to his family on November 11 expressing glee 
over both the birth of a baby boy and the election of Lincoln.  Exactly six months later, 
he lamented the possibility of having to live in the Confederacy.  He stated “we, the 
people of North Western Virginia will hold a convention the 13th May and declare our 
independence from our masters in the East.  Then what the result will be, God only 
knows.”  The writer finished by tossing the gauntlet towards Virginia, writing with 
bravado, “beware masters how you cross the Blue Ridge.”8  Waitman T. Willey, a man 
whose passion for change led him to crusade against alcohol prior to the war, found 
himself as one of the centers of Unionist sentiment in Virginia.  Willey possessed a streak 
of personal independence that earned him praise and criticism through much of his 
political career.  He was one of only two senators and eight congressmen overall who did 
not support over half of the Radical Republican agenda between 1861 and 1865.9 This 
tendency to oppose the majority in the cause of what he considered right led him to 
strongly resist calls for Commonwealth secession.  From Portsmouth, Virginia, to 
Morgantown, devotees of the federal government expressed to him their opposition.10 
 Many westerners rallied against the cause of secession while some of their 
friends, neighbors, and families flocked towards it.  Western Virginia slouched towards 
the violence of a civil war more recognizable to students of modern irregular warfare.  
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While armies fought in more conventional fashion in Virginia, Tennessee, and elsewhere, 
Western Virginia’s war often featured raids, bushwhacking, and guerilla style fighting.  A 
century and a half of history had created a cultural, social, and political divide.  This 
divide initially lay between peoples. Westerners kept some affection for Virginia and a 
primarily agricultural way of life.  It certainly did not initially provide a fertile field for 
the growth of the Republican Party, known among its Southern opponents as the “black” 
Republicans.11  Only the extreme horror of Western Virginia’s civil war could bring 
about these radical changes.  The first step towards radical change lay in a “restoration” 
that prefaced a new path. 
Virginia at first resisted the calls of the rest of the South to leave the Union.  
Upper South and border states feared the coming of conflict more than their more zealous 
counterparts farther south and north.  The popularity of John Bell and his conflict-averse 
Constitutional Union Party in the border regions testifies to that fact.12  Bell won 
Virginia, Kentucky, and Tennessee while performing well in Maryland and Missouri. If 
war came, these states would most likely bear the brunt of the violence. South Carolina 
and Massachusetts, by virtue of geography, could afford, at least for a while, their 
bellicosity.  Events, however, moved at a rapid pace.  All national institutions, from 
Protestant denominations to the Democratic Party, had split, removing any chance of 
reconciliation without violence or capitulation.    Between the election of Abraham 
Lincoln and the spring of 1861, the Deep South proclaimed its independence and waited 
in frustration for the response of the United States government.  The incoming president 
did not oblige them, frustrating aspiring rebels and zealous northerners alike.  Instead, 
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Lincoln worked to maneuver the South into firing the first shot, guaranteeing maximum 
public support and perhaps preventing the secession of upper South states.  The refusal to 
evacuate Fort Sumter led to that very result in April when the president issued the call for 
troops.   
Most importantly, at least for those in western Virginia, came the issue of how 
Lincoln would deal with their commonwealth and the desires of at least some of them for 
a new state.  After Virginia’s convention decided upon secession, some Unionist 
delegates such as John S. Carlile called for immediate secession of the northwest from 
the commonwealth.  He called together a mass convention at Clarksburg to advance that 
very idea.  The only concrete issue decided there was to meet again in May at Wheeling 
to try and defeat ratification of the ordinance.  When the voters decided to leave the 
Union, Wheeling’s convention called for a second meeting in June.  Waitman T. Willey 
and Francis H. Pierpont persuaded convention delegates to form a new loyal Virginia 
government before proceeding to the creation of a new state.13   
Lincoln and his Cabinet quickly saw the emerging Restored Government of 
Virginia in Wheeling as a possible model for what would later be called Reconstruction.14  
George W. Caldwell of Wellsburg urged Lincoln as early as April, 1861 to assist and 
protect the loyal government from Confederate Virginia once it assembled.15  Later, 
Attorney General Edward Bates discussed in a letter to A. F. Ritchie the position of Loyal 
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Virginia as a possible method of returning rebel regions to Union control.16  Subsequent 
developments proved problematic.  Encouraging other Confederate states with sections 
seized by Union forces to create Union governments could be a sound idea but for the 
fact that the original model went ahead and dismembered the state.  Most Confederate 
states, especially in the Appalachian Mountain region, experienced some degree of 
sectionalism before the war, with areas that felt neglected and treated as inferior much 
like western Virginia.17  Such issues could complicate a transition back to federal loyalty 
and control.  Of course Lincoln also warned the Confederacy that they might expect parts 
of their union to mimic their behavior and try secession themselves.18  The secession of 
West Virginia from Virginia reduced Restored Virginia to a few counties and a regime 
with very limited jurisdiction, undermining Lincoln’s plans and perhaps altering the 
future of Reconstruction.19   
Restored Virginia’s creation represented the first step in breaking down the bonds 
between the people and the political system they understood while creating the group 
known in West Virginia history as “statemakers.”  Historians often neglect the period 
between 1861 and 1863 in Wheeling, treating it with less than due significance.  This era 
witnessed a surge not only of regional leaders, but also of men who may have never seen 
themselves as influential prior to the war.  The Whiggish Willey served with other 
western notables such as diplomat and future Confederate officer Charles James Faulkner 
Sr. during the constitutional reform convention of 1850-51. The outbreak of the Civil 
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War counted him among the most prominent of the Unionist Virginians.  Francis H. 
Pierpont, through his support of Abraham Lincoln in 1860, might have sacrificed any 
political ambitions he held, but the war made him Governor of Virginia.  Thomas 
Carskadon, a young radical lawyer from western Hampshire (now Mineral) County, 
strongly opposed slavery and joined the Republican cause quite early.  A man with such 
sentiments (a low ridge in Keyser where his mansion was built still honors his legacy 
through the name “Radical Hill”) would have crashed his ambitions into the brick wall of 
Commonwealth conservatism had the war never started.  Instead he developed into an 
influential voice among the early statemakers.  The Civil War opened opportunities for 
many who might have otherwise remained outside of state level politics.  West Virginia’s 
statemakers who turned Republican did so in the context of war (and certainly many 
Democrats supported Restored Virginia and the creation o the new state as well.)  Not all 
necessarily supported federal and state support for commercial and industrial 
development, especially if it increased the state debt.20   
Part of the appeal of the Republican Party across the nation in the post Civil War 
decades lay in its vision of economic prosperity.  When it preached a strong and 
believable vision of development, it spoke to the interests of voters and gained support.  
In the periods where people perceived that the party looked more to its own interests, it 
lost electoral support.  Its economic vision was borrowed from Federalists and Whigs, 
then updated for the Second Industrial Revolution.  Clay and Adams in the 1820s 
articulated an American style of commercial development undergirded by federal 
investment and encouragement.  During Adams’ presidency, this translated into money 
for the construction of roads and canals while erecting a tariff to protect emerging U. S. 
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manufacturers.  Adams used the example of the Roman Empire.  He stated in his 
inaugural address that “The magnificence and splendor of their [Rome’s] public works 
are among the imperishable glories of the ancient republics. The roads and aqueducts of 
Rome have been the admiration of all after ages.”21  Western Virginians in antebellum 
years yearned for more roads.  After the war, many residents of the Mountain State put 
their faith in railroads and accompanying industry.22  They also desired other 
improvements, such as a free school system. Development that went hand in hand with 
widespread education would bring a more prosperous future.   Many voters would 
eventually back the party that best implemented their economic and social goals.   
Republicans dominated Congress after most Southern senators and representatives 
abandoned their posts and gravitated towards the Confederacy.  Only Andrew Johnson 
remained to represent his Southern home, although Restored Virginia named new 
Unionist members.  For the first time since the 1790s a party of commerce and industry 
held overwhelming control of the legislative and executive branches and it set to work 
creating an economic transformation.  They raised tariffs and started encouraging the 
construction of the transcontinental railroad. Manufacturing expanded from an already 
powerful base.  New York alone had more industry than Virginia, Alabama, Louisiana, 
and Mississippi combined.23  
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The year 1864 saw Lincoln trying to weld into one movement loyal Democrats 
and moderate Republicans into a Union Party.24  May 1864 saw Republicans, War 
Democrats, and even some southerners supporting a convention platform of no 
compromises with rebellion and no tolerance for the continuation of slavery.25  This 
added Democrats to the already tenuous Republican alliance of interests.  By 1864, 
Republicans divided strongly over the pace of emancipation, postwar treatment of the 
South, and the effectiveness of Lincoln’s leadership.26  War Democrats had gravitated 
towards the Lincoln Administration since its beginning, most notably Secretary of War 
Edwin Stanton.  Occasionally they had reservations about some of the Republican war 
measures.27 In retrospect, the Union Party movement succeeded politically in the short 
term because it brought war supporters of all stripes behind Lincoln.  It never had a 
chance to survive in the long run because the postwar winds of change demolished this 
“big tent” movement.  Too many differences separated Republicans from people like 
self-described “Union Conservative” Henry Gassaway Davis.28   
Naturally, the Union Party movement pleased moderates and irritated some 
Radicals.  Called “Unconditionals” in many states, these Radicals combined distaste for 
Lincoln’s moderation, dislike of his political style, discontent over lack of access to 
patronage, and disavowal of any measures that seemed generous to the South.  They 
wanted the South punished for the Civil War, not brought quickly back into normal 
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relations with the federal government.   William Lloyd Garrison, Wendell Phillips, 
Benjamin Wade, and Thaddeus Stevens were Radicals who initially supported the Union 
Party movement.  So did Sumner, who seemingly never saw a president that he ever 
liked.29  This set the stage for the party warfare less than a decade later in that a group of 
Republicans remained irreconcilable to presidential leadership of the party.  The Union 
Party movement also drove a wedge between Democrats that lasted well into the postwar 
era.  Some Democratic Party faithful remained antagonistic to the changes brought by the 
Civil War.  They also found it difficult to work with the “Union Democrats” who had 
remained loyal to the federal government, some of whom even joined Lincoln’s Union 
movement. 
Lincoln handled the different elements of his factionalized party with a deft skill 
matched by few over the next fifty years.  All the factors in the various meltdowns of the 
Republican Party existed in 1864.  Lincoln understood that finding an overall unifying 
theme while rewarding the loyal in all camps represented the key to holding together the 
Republican Party as originally constituted.  He possessed the political subtlety of a 
Bismarck, and, luckily for Republicans, he was followed by a president in Andrew 
Johnson who also demonstrated the ability to unify much of the party on a single issue, 
albeit unwillingly and in a completely different way.  One of the issues where Lincoln 
failed to create consensus was in the debate over admitting the new state of West 
Virginia. 
Although Congress lent its approval to the Restored Commonwealth of Virginia 
when it seated its senators and representatives, questions remained about its status as a 
genuine state.  Article four, section four of the United States Constitution requires that 
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each state maintain a republican form of government.30  In Federalist 10 Madison 
implied that a republican form of government requires some kind of democratic process, 
although it is not a pure democracy.31  At first, Restored Virginia did not meet this 
standard.  Its government consisted of self-appointed representatives from the western 
counties while its treasury contained money seized from a bank in Weston.  Only after a 
state-sponsored election could Virginia meet the Madisonian standard.  Critics, including 
Confederate President Jefferson Davis, claimed that Restored Virginia itself violated 
republican principles, claiming that the “State of Virginia was not a confederation, but a 
republic, a nation.”  The Wheeling Convention called by Union-supporting Virginians he 
dismissed as “disorderly persons in the northwestern counties.”32 
 In October 1861, the Restored government held a referendum on the 
dismemberment of Virginia and the voters who cast their ballots overwhelmingly 
supported the creation of a new state.  Constitutionally, when a new state is formed 
within the boundaries of the existing state, it needs that state’s permission.  Only if 
Restored Virginia met the constitutional qualifications of statehood itself could it assent 
to West Virginia.  Critics at the time and since have argued that since the majority of the 
people of Virginia did not assent to its creation, West Virginia’s establishment was 
illegitimate.  Jefferson Davis referred to it as “insurrection, revolution, and secession” as 
well as “the butchery of the mother of states.”33 Others assert that a majority had the 
opportunity to vote, but chose to not do so.  In modern times, when election participation 
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occasionally falls as low as 30% of registered voters, it is difficult to accept an argument 
that claims that an election is invalidated because less than half of the registered voters 
approve..  Politically it does remain troublesome that most of the voters and officials who 
supported Restored Virginia later gravitated towards West Virginia.  This forced 
Lincoln’s hand.  The president maintained all along that secession was illegal and that his 
war aim consisted of removing criminals from the Southern state capitals.  Had the 
federal government not considered the October 24, 1861 election valid, it would have 
been forced to consider the Restored government a sham as well.  This would have 
implied the legality of Virginia’s secession.  Moreover, Lincoln hoped to use Restored 
Virginia as a model to reconstruct other states.34  Lincoln feared greatly that responsible 
individuals inside and outside the United States would see secession as legal and consider 
the Confederacy a real sovereign nation.   
Many considered West Virginia’s creation vital.  Archibald Campbell, editor of 
the Wheeling Intelligencer, explained in a letter to Lincoln that “In the present prospects 
of our national affairs the expectation of a new state keeps thousands from falling away… 
Destroy the hope of a new state and our people see themselves remanded again to Eastern 
Va & again identified and committed to her fortunes. A crushed minority sentiment, 
thoroughly disloyal, would soon warm into life.”35  Campbell’s letter indicated that 
Union sentiment relied strongly on the hope that a new state government offered 
protection regardless of the outcome of the war.  Even a Union victory did not guarantee 
that the Wheeling government’s participants would always be safe.     
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The creation of West Virginia illustrated some of the issues dividing 
congressional Republicans.  Radicals opposed any sort of compromise with slavery, but 
West Virginia’s statemakers refused to immediately outlaw the practice.  Charles Sumner 
and other Radicals expressed dismay at the deference demonstrated towards an institution 
they intended to destroy.  Sumner stated that “my vote shall help no new State to take a 
place in this Union, with Senators in this body unless purged of this poison.”36 Fault lines 
over West Virginia statehood once again revealed the differences between the party 
factions that later battled for control of the Republican Party later on.  The debate in 
Congress even before the statehood bill reached the desk of Lincoln centered around the 
existence of slavery in the future state.  Senator Willey struggled to find grounds for 
compromise that most could at least accept.  An extension of the Willey Amendment 
provisions proposed by James Henry Lane provided that child slaves would become free 
by their 21st birthday.  This outraged the most zealous opponents and defenders of 
slavery.  Sumner led a handful of Radicals to oppose it while Virginia Senator John 
Carlile objected to any attack on slaveowners’ rights.  Attacks from both sides of the 
slave issue failed to defeat the measure and the bill hit the president’s desk late that 
month.37  The decision to create a new state, from Lincoln’s point of view, came from 
considerations of war.  Lincoln wrote that “More than on anything else, it [West Virginia 
statehood] depends upon whether the admission or rejection of the new State would 
under all the circumstances tend the more strongly to the restoration of the national 
                                                 
36 Charles Sumner, Charles Sumner: His Complete Works Volume IX (Boston: Lee and Shepherd, 1900), 
122. 
37 John Alexander Williams, West Virginia: A History, 76, 78. 
26 
 
authority throughout the Union.”38  Campbell appealed to Lincoln as a Republican 
supporter, but Lincoln saw the state’s creation as a war measure.  West Virginia, in 
modern terms, was a psychological operation, an “irrevocable encroachment on the cause 
of rebellion.”39  Lincoln intended to bolster Unionism and discourage Confederate 
Virginia.   
America’s Civil War changed more than just the political landscape of West 
Virginia.  While representatives of the various counties debated and formulated first the 
Restored Government of Virginia, then the new State of West Virginia, the people of the 
region suffered tremendously.  Even the leaders themselves experienced a glimpse of the 
fear and terror that gripped the region.  Thomas Carskadon of New Creek in Hampshire, 
later Mineral, County complained in spring of 1862 “I have not dared to go home since 
the adjournment of the convention though boarding 10 miles off.”  He added that pleas 
for assistance sent to local military leaders resulted in no help.40  Indeed the New Creek 
Valley experienced more destruction and privation, not less, within the following two 
years.   
The old Virginia authority system based upon county courts dominated by 
families and cliques suffered most during the war.  Any local leader identifying with the 
Confederate side received the tarnish of treason.  The county court system itself became a 
subject of debate in the new state constitution.  Abraham Soper, a prewar “Douglas 
Democrat” representing Tyler County in the West Virginia Constitutional Convention, 
proclaimed “I have nothing to say against the county court.”  He added that “Many of 
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them are very competent, respectable men in the performance of their duties.”41  Peter 
van Winkle disagreed, maintaining that “the old county system is repudiated” by the 
“feelings and wishes of our constituents.”  The county court, according to its detractors, 
resulted in an “evil” blending of its original judicial functions with those akin to a 
legislature.   
West Virginia’s constitutional convention’s solution lay in altering many of the 
governmental functions of counties, such as authority over schools and roads, and vesting 
them in newly created townships.42  Although Van Winkle accused some of leaning 
towards the ways of old Virginia by “hankering after the fleshpots of Egypt,” he did not 
hesitate to borrow Jeffersonian political advice when it suited him, in this case reminding 
delegates that Jefferson called for counties to be subdivided into wards in the manner of 
“the hundreds of Saxon Alfred.”43  Gordon Battelle argued that over twenty million 
people currently lived under township government in the United States.44  Some did not 
oppose the concept of subdividing counties, but objected to the word “township” because 
of its “Yankee” origin.  Some preferred “parish” because of its use in Virginia at one 
time, but others disagreed on account of the word’s ecclesiastical origins.45 Eventually 
the name “township” grew acceptable. It represented one of the key changes of the 
statemakers to transform local government in West Virginia.  Even the choice of words 
could produce intense debates.  Not only would the remainder of the power enjoyed by 
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the old dominant families be further undercut, but township government opened 
opportunities on the local level to some of the emerging elites. 
The debate over counties extended to how many to include in the new state.  The 
area north of the Kanawha and Teays Valleys and west of the Allegheny Front seemed 
safely Union.46  Historically the addition of hostile populations has caused political 
leaders concern when one of their primary functions lies in maintaining some level of 
social order.  Henry Dering explained that “I, for one, am not willing to embrace any 
people in the bonds of our new state who do not desire to come with us.”  Dering pointed 
out that “the presumption is a fair one that in these counties are a great many rebels.”47  
Including these counties brought forth powerful opposition from others as well.  Preston 
County’s John Brown literally warned of “counterrevolution” as a result of adding 
“unsound” counties.  Many delegates understood that a democratic form of government 
would emerge in a postwar West Virginia.  Interestingly, Brown used the phrase 
“defensible boundaries” which indicated a possible lack of faith that the Union would 
eventually win.48  In such a situation a state ruled by Confederate sympathizers could opt 
to leave the Union and rejoin Virginia.  Although Republicans in Congress desired a 
larger West Virginia to create a wider expanse of certain Union control (especially in the 
case of a Southern victory, an aspect of these machinations often forgotten in modern 
                                                 
46 One of the great “spin” victories of the Civil War lay in the increasing equivocation between the concepts 
of  “Union” and “Republican.”  This came to fruition in the campaign of 1864 where Republicans and War 
Democrats formed the National Union Party.  Meanwhile Democrats increasingly suffered from their 
party’s identification with rebellion and treason as is exemplified by the literal “waving of the bloody shirt” 
by Republicans in postwar political campaigns. 
47 Ambler, Debates and Proceedings I, 223-224. 
48 Ibid, 274-276. 
29 
 
times), Copperhead Democrats also supported the inclusion of these counties because of 
the likelihood of making West Virginia an eventual Democratic Party stronghold.49 
Within the convention, Union Democrat Daniel Lamb countered with the 
argument that the counties to the south and east were “naturally part of Western 
Virginia.”  He asked if the delegates proposed “to abandon the scheme of instituting the 
new state because the people of Calhoun County say they are unwilling to come in.”  The 
delegates already included Nicholas and Fayette, despite known opposition.50  Lewis 
Ruffner of Kanawha County questioned how the opinion of any county under 
Confederate control could be ascertained, and Thomas Carskadon argued that knowing 
the questioned county’s public opinion did not matter in terms of “the spirit of the 
ordinance.”51  Others pointed out that the counties in dispute represented “garden spots of 
western Virginia for wealth and the revenues that flow out of that wealth should 
necessarily flow into the treasury of West Virginia.”52  Eventually the state included an 
extended arm of counties bordering the Allegheny Front and the Potomac River for the 
purpose of keeping the B&O in the jurisdiction of a friendly government.  As the war 
wound down, state leaders increasingly felt pressure to deal with the consequences of that 
inclusion. 
 The potential name of the new state revealed strong attitudes about the opinions 
of its leaders.  Originally the name “Kanawha” incurred general agreement.  This name 
reflected a pragmatic desire to help wed a doubtful, yet potentially important region to 
the Pittsburgh-influenced northwest.  One delegate argued “I am a Virginian; I was born 
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and raised in Virginia and I have ever been proud of that name.”  Others referred to the 
ancient lineage of the name in reference to Elizabeth I and the Virgin Mary.53  Jettisoning 
Kanawha in favor of West Virginia revealed a reluctance to abandon all of the area’s past 
and tradition while also acknowledging the power that the Virginia ideal still held over 
many of these men.  Sentiment for the Old Dominion inspired real fear among some of 
the state constitutional convention delegates about the permanence of their endeavor.  
Peter van Winkle believed that “several gentlemen intend to be Virginians after we have 
separated from Virginia.”  Van Winkle added that he hoped the idea that “they did not do 
so in Old Virginia” would not form an impediment to developing the new state.   
The statemakers in Wheeling could not simply debate from their podiums in Ohio 
County, but also found ways to extend their influence into their jurisdiction.  Simply by 
doing their jobs, West Virginia’s new leaders solidify the perception of the new state’s 
existence.  As the war continued, Senator Waitman T. Willey’s correspondence  
contained more practical questions about governance and business.  Prior to the war, 
Willey had served the Whig Party with a special emphasis on the temperance movement.  
He made his name speaking to huge crowds and was well known in Virginia, Ohio, and 
elsewhere.  The Civil War saw him become a strong opponent of secession and, with 
some reluctance, a supporter of the new state of West Virginia which he would serve in 
the U.S. Senate.  Along the way he joined the Republican Party.  While he did not 
become the most influential leader in that party, Willey did serve in a position of 
prominence during the early history of the state.   
This Morgantown lawyer served as one example of an authority figure that would 
have to help establish trust in the new state.  He was part of the process that established 
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West Virginia as a permanent entity that could perform all the usual, mundane functions 
of government.  Willey answered questions about how to do business in West Virginia.  
One minister needed to know if his license to perform marriages in Virginia was valid in 
the new state.54 An out of state resident with a farm near Romney asked about the 
possible disposition of his slaves.  He understood that emancipation would come, but 
wondered about compensation.55  A small group of citizens in January of 1863 held valid 
concerns about an election that would send West Virginia’s first congressmen to 
Washington.  They wanted copies of the governor’s proclamation about the election and 
information about the location of polling places.  They also asked who would receive the 
votes and judge their legality, and finally enquired as to whether citizens could select 
their own election officials in the absence of regular authorities.56  According to one 
historian, the “’middle class, law and order, well-behaved folks’ they seem to have gone 
with the prevailing authority, as law and order people usually do.”57   
This does not reflect the distinct possibility that formerly “well-behaved folks” 
might have shed their law and order demeanor given a stressful circumstance.  A 
Harrison County man who reported on the activities of a military occupation official to 
Senator Willey serves as an example.  The Union officer was accused of taking property 
and gambling while administering the occupation near Clarksburg.58  Writing one’s 
congressman to express a grievance represents almost quintessential middle and upper 
class values in America.  People with trust in a civil society believe that senators and 
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representatives want to make circumstances better for their constituents.  Of course the 
letter also carried an implied threat to the well-being of the officer, normally an action 
that lies outside acceptable bounds of civil society.  This specific officer also represented 
the most direct prevailing authority in Harrison County and apparently not all of the fine 
folks undertook to submit to it cheerfully. That being said, the state of West Virginia 
could not have survived without the acquiescence of a large number of people to its 
existence.  The same goes for the Republican Party which increasingly dominated the 
early state government. 
Not everyone peacefully accepted the dramatic changes taking place.  West 
Virginia eventually absorbed counties in the east and the south that had not shown 
enthusiasm for inclusion.  By 1864 the Republican Party, temporarily calling itself and its 
allies the “National Union Party,” looked to consolidate its hold in West Virginia.  Willey 
himself received numerous invitations to speak to “Friends of Lincoln” or “Friends of 
Lincoln and Johnson” rallies.  In contrast to modern politics when national figures often 
come to stump for candidates for Congress, Willey became a foot soldier in the cause of 
Lincoln’s reelection.  Supporters of Lincoln counted on the idea that Willey had grown 
into a man the people trusted.  However, despite the often pessimistic Preston County 
Reverend John Drummond who wrote in the fall of 1864 “the McClellanites show more 
strength here than was expected,” Lincoln did carry the state.59 
According to John Alexander Williams, conditions forced the statemakers “to 
proceed in arbitrary, undemocratic ways” despite the effort to ground the state’s system 
in republican and democratic principles.60  Such measures reassured Republican 
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statemakers, but created the context of bitter rhetoric and campaigning between the 
parties for the next twenty years or more.  Governor Arthur I. Boreman wielded the 
sword and the shield of West Virginia in its initial years as a state.  To modern minds, 
Boreman appeared almost dictatorial.  Before rendering judgment on the governor, one 
must understand his position.  The chief magistrate of any government must, first of all, 
defend his state and enforce its laws.  In the context of the Civil War, Governor Boreman 
followed the model of President Lincoln who would not allow the nation to fracture into 
oblivion to protect certain rights.  The inclusion of the more Confederate leaning counties 
formed a danger to Republican Party control and the state’s existence.  To Boreman, 
Republican Party control was all that ensured the continued existence of West Virginia.  
Especially as hostilities ceased, Governor Boreman and state Republican leaders believed 
strongly that returning ex-Confederates could tip the electoral balance into the 
Democratic column.  Randall Scott Gooden’s dissertation indicates that Boreman also 
feared the effects of Andrew Johnson’s Reconstruction policies and creatively used 
states’ rights arguments to attack the president’s pardon power.61  The Governor had to 
take steps, as far as he was concerned, to protect his fledgling state.   
West Virginia emerged from its Civil War experience intact.  It had a strong 
governor assuming vast powers to protect the state and direct its development.  West 
Virginia broke radically from its Old Dominion past.  This sharp movement towards 
northern style government combined with the harsh proscriptions against former 
Confederates gave those opposing the original Constitution issues to rally around.  In 
Boreman’s inaugural address of June 20, 1863, he called for “the indulgence of a 
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generous constituency.”  His first major point justified the movement of West Virginia 
towards independence.  Citing “unfairness and inequality of legislation” he described the 
perceived neglect by the eastern oriented government.  Then he argued “there has been 
little intercourse between” the peoples of the east and west.62  Although some historians 
such as Ron Eller have built upon that theme, others such as Ronald Lewis maintained 
that commerce and economic ties historically linked at least some of these areas to 
eastern Virginia.63  Certainly commerce on the Potomac as well as the Northwestern and 
James River and Kanawha turnpikes linked parts of Trans-Allegheny Virginia to the 
eastern region.  However Boreman stated that “the mountains intervene between us, the 
rivers rise in the mountains and run towards the northwest.”64  The governor’s argument 
certainly helped to defend the creation of the state itself, although not necessarily the 
inclusion of the eastern panhandle. 
 Next, Boreman set up the strict measures his administration eventually utilized by 
condemning the rebellion.  The Confederacy was “like the poisonous fruit of the Upas 
tree that blights and withers everything that comes within its influence” and was “fraught 
with evil.”65  He blamed Confederate leaders for spreading malicious alarm about the 
election of Abraham Lincoln “by fraud and by falsehood” and fooling the people of the 
South into taking up arms.  The people of Trans-Allegheny Virginia, however, “took our 
position with our eyes open.”  That did not protect the people from being “invaded by 
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traitors . . . [that] applied the torch to public and private property; they have murdered our 
friends; they have robbed and plundered our people; our country is laid waste, and to-day 
gaunt hunger stares many families of helpless women and children in the face.”66  This 
statement, that doubtless inspired tremendous outrage, should not be seen as simply 
calculation.  Boreman very likely spoke his convictions and emotions here.  All too often 
statesmen get too much credit for Machiavellianism in their motivation for giving 
addresses.  Here West Virginia’s governor did not create the hatred but tapped into it, not 
only in the souls of the audience, but also most likely himself.   
 The inaugural address helped to create “the enemy.”  On one hand, the 
Confederate States obviously represented an enemy.  Loyal citizens receive instructions 
to remain vigilant and purge undesirables.  Also, the population must believe in the 
existence of the enemy.  A leader cannot simply pull the strings of the people, they must 
already have an idea that their society faces threats.  It did not take much to convince the 
Unionists of West Virginia that rebels bore them ill will.  The animosity that lingered 
after the war, particularly in areas touched most by it, mobilized both Union and 
Confederate veterans and supporters politically.67 
 Boreman hinted at what measures the state would take to protect its existence.  He 
blasted those that continued to “carp and cavail at everything that is done by the 
administration in Washington to put down the rebellion,” agreeing specifically with 
Lincoln’s occasional suspensions of habeas corpus.  Boreman maintained that ceasing 
the war meant submission to the Confederacy, which loomed as a real possibility in West 
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Virginia.  According to Confederate Virginia, West Virginia statemakers had committed 
treason and John Brown’s fate illustrated what lay ahead in the case of defeat.  West 
Virginia’s inclusion of several counties that had overwhelmingly supported the 
Confederacy meant that threats would emerge against the Unionist power structure.  
According to John Edmund Stealey, Jefferson County sent sixteen percent of its 
population to fight for the South.  After West Virginia introduced proscriptive measures 
against former Confederates, only forty-three out of 1,500 in the county seat were eligible 
to vote.68 
Finally, Boreman proposed a new path for the new state.  Destruction of the “old 
regime” with all the violence and chaos that attends such actions requires that the new 
government offer positive change to legitimize itself.  Boreman proposed a new 
economic plan that promised significant changes from the prewar agrarian economy, 
advocating for the advancement of industry in West Virginia.  Unlike Republican 
political power or the northern-influenced constitution crafted during the war, this proved 
to be the heart of the transformation of West Virginia in the 19th and 20th century.  The 
Second Industrial Revolution completely altered the landscape as well as the society.  It 
wrenched county governments from the seats originally established into towns more 
convenient to business interests.  Significant benefits accrued to the people, but so did 
growing pains, environmental damage, and other problems.  A tremendous influx of 
capital investment and societal change poured into West Virginia between the end of the 
Civil War and World War I.  Many of the statemakers believed that the new industrial 
economy needed an educated population.  Governor Boreman’s inaugural address 
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promised that “it shall be my especial pride and pleasure to assist in the establishment of 
an education system throughout the state that may give to every child among us, whether 
rich or poor, an education that may fit for them respectable positions in society.”69   
Some debate the origin of these postwar aspirations described by Governor 
Boreman.  Ken Fones-Wolf has argued that the priorities of the statemakers reflected the 
social goals of Wheeling residents and leaders.  Wheeling supported modernization, 
which to them meant protection of industry and expansion of railroads, as well as public 
education.70  Northwestern Virginians prior to the Civil War pushed strongly for free 
schools.  Delegate Robert Hagar of Boone County complained that a “large quantity of 
native ability” was present in the western counties but could not thrive due to the “almost 
complete absence of schools.”71   
Like the rest of the country, West Virginia benefited from the Morrill Act that 
helped to establish colleges and universities in each state.  By 1867 West Virginia used 
federal funds to establish the “Agricultural College of West Virginia” later renamed West 
Virginia University.72  However the primary commitment to education for early 
Republicans and their allies lay in the creation of a free public school system. The 
Constitution of 1863 required that the “Legislature shall adopt as soon as practicable for 
the establishment of a thorough and efficient system of free schools.”73  The subsequent 
1872 Constitution mirrored this commitment.  Prewar Virginia originally established a 
system of free public schools due to the interest demonstrated by Thomas Jefferson.  
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Funding cuts in 1817 forced many to start paying tuition to attend school in very 
rudimentary structures.  Illiteracy in such conditions actually increased in the 1830s.74   
The legislative acts creating the free school system passed in 1864 and the state 
appointed William R. White to direct implementation.  Within one year twenty counties 
had full school systems and eleven more had partially met the requirements.  Almost 
16,000 children attended 431 schools.  Despite opposition in some regions to the concept, 
most West Virginians remained “friendly to the free public school.”  Each township had 
its own board of education while superintendents presided over counties.  By 1866 over 
34,000 students received a free education.75  White also successfully advocated for the 
establishment of teacher training facilities.  By the 1870s, six normal schools trained 
teachers for the state school system.  In 1872, Governor William Stevenson proudly 
stated of free education that “it now may be regarded as part of our fixed policy and 
rightly so.”76 Advocates saw free education as a way to save children “from a life of 
infamy” as a New York City Board of Education president explained in 1865.77  This 
sense of purpose dovetailed with federal policy represented briefly in West Virginia by 
the Freedman’s Bureau. It operated in the state until 1868 so its effect remained limited, 
but it did succeed in helping West Virginia create a system of schools for black children.  
State Superintendent of Schools and Methodist minister William Ryland White argued 
that “if a common school education is necessary to make a good citizen of a white, may 
surely it is equally necessary in the case of the black.”78  Participation in the 
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establishment of these schools varied from initial hostility in Jefferson County to sullen 
acceptance in the Kanawha Valley to relatively good support in other areas.79 
 In addition to the state university, teaching institutions, and free schools, West 
Virginia before 1872 also established a penitentiary, insane asylum, and facility to teach 
sensory deprived children.  Historian Charles Ambler explained that state traditions 
allege that Moundsville preferred getting the prison over the state university, although the 
fact that a suitable structure already existed may have helped state officials to locate the 
penitentiary there.  He also claimed that prison officials “have been politically acceptable 
to the dominant party.”80  These new institutions provided sources of patronage for 
Republicans as they tried to sink roots into the West Virginia political system. 
A major influence on the early development of West Virginia and that state’s 
Republican movement lay in the Methodist Episcopalian Church.  Although statemakers 
did come from other denominations, Methodist influences have been cited by historians.  
Statemakers Senator Willey, Thomas Carskadon, Abijiah Dolly of Grant County, Boone 
County’s Robert Hagar, and many others worshipped in that faith.  Many of the 
Methodists had served in the abolitionist or temperance causes prior to the war and 
zealously pressured the state to advance public education.  Gordon Battelle, Hagar, and 
Upshur County’s Richard Locke Brooks (a descendent of John Locke), among others, 
served as ministers.  Battelle served as the chair of the committee on education during the 
formation of the original state constitution.  They saw public education originally as a 
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means to not only improve the knowledge and character of children, but also to teach 
them how to defend the state.81 
As with other changes this took place within a national context.  Railroad 
development expanded tremendously in the North before the Civil War.  West Virginia 
attempted to catch up in the decades following peace.  Investment in mining and 
manufacturing during the Civil War rose considerably in the northern states and 
continued in the 1870s and 1880s despite an overall economic depression.  Protective 
tariffs prevented foreign competition in coal production.  Another extremely important 
emerging influence in West Virginia lay in industrialists and their faith that development 
could enrich their region as well as themselves.  According to John Alexander Williams:  
An important premise of the men who founded West Virginia was that political 
autonomy, coupled with the ‘boundless resources’ locked in the West Virginia 
hills, would guarantee a future as rich as could be found in any other American 
commonwealth. 82 
 
Arthur I. Boreman, Union Democrat and future U.S. Senator Henry Gassaway Davis, and 
their contemporaries likely would not argue with Ken Fones-Wolf and Ronald Lewis’s 
assertion that “resource extraction has become synonymous with the state’s capitalist 
transformation.”83  Many in western Virginia before the conflict shared the belief that 
Richmond intentionally held back economic development.  They additionally held a faith 
that development equaled progress.  Peter van Winkle served as president of the 
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Northwestern Virginia Railroad for a time.  He shared with Davis a strong belief in the 
power of railroads to access resources and develop the region.  Economic development 
directly benefited industrialists, but also stood to satisfy the needs of other professions, 
such as the law.  Lawyers had never existed in short supply in West Virginia prior to 
separation.  They served as a large pool from which state leadership emerged.   
 Ronald Lewis argues that many of the most influential statemaker Republicans 
shrank from fully pursuing large scale industrialism.  They supported some 
manufacturing and farming, but did not entirely embrace the idea of full scale 
industrialization. Historian Oscar Doane Lambert noted that the Legislature chartered a 
large number of oil companies, turnpike and bridge building firms, and lumber 
companies during the 1860s.84  Many switched from the Democracy and Whiggery to the 
new Republican Party to take part in building a new state and influencing its direction.85 
Others followed the lead of Henry Gassaway Davis and left the Union movement to 
return to the Democratic Party, taking their development ideals with them. Republicans 
between the Civil War and the 1870s did not oppose investment and development, but 
concerned themselves more with consolidating their party position and serving existing 
constituents.86  The 1870s saw the regular factions of both major parties supporting 
industrial development; this represented the most striking change to occur within West 
Virginia in the 1860s.  West Virginia and the United States as a whole experienced a 
continuing evolution of problems throughout the Civil War into the Reconstruction 
period.   
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Education and economic development formed a large part of the positive vision 
that Republicans sought to bring to the state.  Many remained fearful that whatever 
forward movement occurred might be erased by a Democratic “Redeemer” government 
that would restore antebellum conditions as much as possible, or even return the state to 
Virginia.  Former Confederates returning from the war potentially had voting strength in 
the eastern and southern sections of the state.  The first generation of Republican Party 
and other Unionist movement leaders in West Virginia maintained an iron watch over the 
affairs of their new state.  Nothing rankled the defeated Confederates and the Democratic 
Party in West Virginia more than the “voters’ test oath” implemented on February 25, 
1865.  Any voter coming to the polls faced the possibility of a challenge from any other 
citizen.  Upon hearing the challenge, the individual had to affirm by oath that he had not 
taken up arms voluntarily against the United States, the Restored Government of 
Virginia, or West Virginia.  Additionally he had to promise that he never held any office 
in any government hostile to the aforementioned entities and that he without reservation 
supported the United States and the Constitution of West Virginia.  Citizens who failed to 
serve in the armed forces of the United States and also failed to recite the oath could find 
themselves at odds when seeking government positions or justice in the courts.  For 
example, voters in the Ninth Judicial Circuit selected Samuel Price of Greenbrier County.  
The elected judge could not take office because he could not recite the test oath in 
honesty or conscience.87  The law tightened in 1866, forcing all attorneys to recite the test 
oath upon challenge.  Charles J. Faulkner Sr., former diplomat and staunch Confederate, 
refused the oath and did not return to the bar for some time.88  In 1867, boards of 
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registration appeared to enforce the oath upon voters, often going well beyond their stated 
powers in removing suspect names from the rolls.89  Every township had its own 
registrar.  West Virginia Attorney General A. B. Caldwell instructed Governor William 
E. Stevenson (who was pragmatically edging away from a hard line against former 
Confederates)  in 1870 that “It matters not what oath an applicant offers to take, he 
should not be registered unless the registrar and board of registration are satisfied.”90  
Gooden argued that these actions encouraged the cooperation of Union Democrats and 
former Confederates.91 
By the late 1860s the atmosphere across the state and nation warmed towards 
former Confederates as most realized they could not be forever kept in citizenship limbo.  
Post-Civil War challenges to the practice of test oaths moved slowly through the federal 
court system.  In another border state, Missouri’s Unionist government created an oath 
featuring over thirty disavowals, including one that asserted that the speaker never acted 
or spoke in favor of anti-federal individuals or groups.  Eventually the Supreme Court 
heard the case and decided against the Missouri oath, finding that it was a “bill of 
attainder” and an “ex post facto law.”  The Constitution prohibited both practices whether 
enacted by the federal or the state governments.  Citizens could not be punished for 
actions without trial nor held in violation of the law passed after the fact.92  Supreme 
Court action combined with public sentiment likely fueled the “let up” movement that 
attracted more West Virginia Unionists as the new decade commenced.   
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 West Virginia’s let up Republicans had two goals.  They wanted to return 
Confederates to the polls while passing an act to allow black suffrage (a moot act due to 
passage of the Fifteenth Amendment.)  The Wheeling Intelligencer saw the expansion of 
citizenship rights to both parties as “judicious” and “necessary.”93  Some Republicans, 
such as Stevenson, were bowing to reality rather than conviction when supporting 
changes in the laws.  Democratic Party leader Charles J. Faulkner Sr. expressed his 
personal appreciation to the Intelligencer for its “attitude on the subject of disabilities” 
and claimed that articles on the subject of Confederate citizenship disabilities “exhibits 
statesmanship and political sagacity.”  Faulkner even pledged to assist two Republicans 
in their House of Delegates campaigns.94   
At the time, some Republicans saw the return of Confederates to the franchise as 
a way to broaden the base and secure a majority when the inevitable return of thousands 
of Democratic voters occurred.  Fear of their potential power formed part of the reason 
for the postwar stripping of their citizenship rights.95  The gamble failed as the issue of 
rebel voting, in part, split the party.  Emerging Republicans, such as Nathan Goff 
(Andrew Johnson’s appointee to the office of United States District Attorney), challenged 
the authority of the statemakers.  The year 1870 ended in disaster for the party.  One 
major newspaper lamented that defeat came from an unenlightened viewpoint on black 
suffrage, “the so-called liberal movement, and personal ambition.”96  The West Virginia 
Republican Party’s chances to retain power diminished greatly after 1871.  Former 
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Confederates returning to political life meant that the constitution created in 1863 had 
very little time remaining.  Democrats swarmed the polls to vote against the victors from 
six years prior, sweeping the statemakers from office and commencing the Bourbon age 
in West Virginia politics.97  A Democratic Party barely able to hold itself in one piece 
unified its efforts to kill off the hated “Yankee” Constitution of 1863 as its first order of 
business.   
Crafting a constitution influenced more by northeastern states than the Old 
Dominion was, after the creation of the state itself, the primary achievement of the mostly 
Republican statemakers.  Democrats grew to appreciate the opportunities available with 
the new state, but still despised the northern influenced system created by the 
statemakers, so the Constitution of 1863 fell under threat.  Measures originally seen as 
necessary to defend the state itself appeared more tyrannical when the object lay in 
protecting a set of laws from the (possible) majority of the voters.    West Virginia’s chief 
executives before 1872 faced an interesting problem.  They took an oath of office that 
required them to defend the constitution, but by the early 1870s a large section of the 
electorate sought to eliminate the basic legal structure of state government. 
The return of the Democratic Party into power in West Virginia followed a 
Southern and border state pattern.  Clearly one must not consider West Virginia an 
officially reconstructed state since its own government applied all the prohibitions with 
minimal federal intervention.  Like other border states, it suffered through the problem of 
what to do with ex-rebels and had to start making choices about its economic 
development.  Bourbon style regimes came to power as Republicans faltered in the 
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border and regions deeper in the South.98  Southern states saw that the “new governments 
neither won the acceptance of most white Southerners nor found the funding to turn 
impoverished states into prosperous ones.”99  The border states also saw the defeat of 
Republican led governments.  West Virginia’s Republican demise followed that of 
Maryland’s Union/Republican movement.  In that state, Democrats relied on control of 
local political machines and hysterical pronouncements against black political 
participation.100  Missouri’s Republicans lost power in 1872, shortly after West Virginia. 
Remarkably, Republican rule in West Virginia ended prior to the removal of civil 
sanctions against former Confederates.  This came despite confidence from the top of the 
ticket.  Governor William E. Stevenson boldly stated that “there has never been a time 
when the spirit of improvement was so earnest or so extensive as at this moment.”  He 
cited the expansion of free schools, the thousands of men building the Chesapeake and 
Ohio Railroad, and other accomplishments as proof that the Republican Party represented 
progress.101  Governor Stevenson’s January 1870 plea to restore former rebels’ right to 
vote galvanized Democrats and divided the Radical from the Liberal Republicans in the 
months leading up to the election. Radicals generally supported harsh measures against 
ex-rebels.  Liberal Republicanism started as a reconciliation movement, but later evolved 
into a party faction that opposed President Grant and patronage dispensing bosses. 
Possibly to make their own violent statement on the issue, Ku Klux Klan terrorists 
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brazenly attacked a jail near Charleston, releasing prisoners and threatening jail officials.  
This incident coincided with outbreaks of Klan activity in Kentucky and former 
Confederate areas.102  Two months later, the Democratic State Convention nominated 
John J. Jacobs to run against Governor Stevenson and pledged to maintain the white race 
as “the superior and ruling race.”  The convention emphatically voted down Johnson 
Camden’s recommendation to endorse the proposed amendment proposed by W. H. H. 
Flick and its release of former Confederates from political prohibitions, revealing strains 
between the party leadership and its rank and file. 103  In response, the Republican State 
Convention later produced a platform praising the Fifteenth Amendment as “essential to 
justice between men, the consistency of the Government, and to the harmonious relations 
between the races.”  The platform also called for the removal of voting restrictions on 
former Confederates “who now frankly and honestly co-operate with us in restoring the 
peace of the country.”104  When the final tally eventually appeared in December, 
Democratic winner John Jacobs beat Stevenson by around 2,000 votes and Republicans 
lost both houses of the Legislature even without the participation of former Confederates.   
The party that smashed the West Virginia Republican Party into near-annihilation 
in 1870 had its own troubled factions.  West Virginia historians categorize the factions as 
Regulars (faithful to party leadership in all cases), Redeemers (desiring to restore 1859 
conditions as much as possible), Agrarians (obviously the farming interest) and the 
Kanawha Ring of lawyers with less ideology than ambition.  Many party Regulars had 
supported the post Civil War dreams of economic development; some tried to work with 
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the Union Party years before, but drifted back to the Democrats due to the treatment of 
former Confederates and Republican stances on race.105  Powerful Democrats, such as 
Henry Gassaway Davis and Johnson Camden, shared dreams of prosperity based on 
industrial development.106 By the late 1860s, the restrictions imposed upon Confederates 
and the 1863 Constitution unified their efforts.  Meanwhile, the Republican Party’s 
defense of disabilities and their ability to keep the old constitution collapsed. 
This process started in the spring of 1871 with passage of the Flick Amendment.  
A year before, Republican Governor William E. Stevenson urged the Legislature to 
remove all civil sanctions against former rebels.  Test oaths for certain professions 
disappeared within a month.  W. H. H. Flick and others backed legislation to expand 
male suffrage rights to include blacks and former Confederates.  In the Constitution of 
1863, amended in 1865, Article III specified that white males “shall be entitled to vote at 
all elections.”  This excluded paupers, minors, men of “unsound mind,” felons, or those 
convicted of treason or bribery of elections.  It also distinctly excluded anyone who gave 
assistance to the Confederacy from the vote and citizenship in the state itself unless they 
subsequently enlisted into and were honorably discharged from the armed forces of the 
United States.107  Flick’s proposed Amendment sought to bring West Virginia law in line 
with the Fifteenth Amendment by striking out the provision on color while also 
advancing Governor Stevenson’s desire to bring former Confederates into full 
citizenship.   
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Voters passed the Flick Amendment in April of 1871, with national and state 
Republican publications in full support and the New York Times calling the question an 
“abstract principle.”108  As predicted, the amendment passed with an extraordinarily light 
turnout.  The Wheeling Intelligencer lamented that the lack of participation was “a not 
very healthy indication” because it showed that voters showed no interest in elections that 
involved neither money nor personal interest.  The editor may have spoken more 
accurately when he described how the amendment antagonized both parties.  It required 
Democrats to positively affirm the verdict of the Fifteenth Amendment’s passage while 
expecting the GOP to approve of adding former Confederates to the voting rolls.109  Light 
turnout combined with the passage of the law indicates resignation in the face of the 
events rather than enthusiastic acceptance of change. 
Within four months the state put to the voters another major issue, that of forming 
a constitutional convention.  Once former Confederates got the vote, Democrats stormed 
back into office and vowed to undo the system crafted by the statemakers.  The scale of 
deconstruction divided them.  Most agreed on creating a new Constitution, some stating 
that the plan of government was created by men of narrow minds.110  However they 
strongly differed on what their new West Virginia ought to look like.  They hated the 
northern style township system and feared innovations such as voter registration.  
Republicans accused them of also opposing good roads and free schools, “if hostility to 
slavery, the advocacy of a free and general education, the repudiation of the dogmas of 
Old Virginia, and a hearty and sincere loyalty to the United States” were narrow sorts of 
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views, the Wheeling Intelligencer was glad to claim them on behalf of the Republican 
Party.111    
Firebrand former Confederates within the constitutional convention wished to 
reverse almost all of the innovations in the 1863 constitution.  The most aggressive 
fought to symbolize their victory by renaming Grant and Lincoln counties after Davis and 
Lee.  Eventually a more discrete proposition to change the county named after the 
eighteenth president to that of the first was even voted down.  “Secession” Democrats 
also demanded that “white” be placed in the new Constitution so as to inform the world 
which race controlled the government of West Virginia.  Convention president Samuel 
Price scored a victory for social coercion of voting by striking down the secret ballot 
(even a voluntary one!) as leading to “fraud and dissimulation.”112  Union Democrats and 
moderates, despite their initial inability to grasp positions of power, checked most of the 
more extreme moves by the “bitter ender” element that tried to erase most of what the 
statemakers created and the Republicans perpetuated.  The Wheeling Intelligencer issued 
a faint gasp of praise for their political opponents by February 19, asserting that “the 
Democracy have been making progress in spite of themselves now.”  It went on to say 
that the Democratic dominated convention finally started to look for “broader ground.  
They find it occupied by Republicans.”113  Republican proposals that received the same 
treatment included a plan for proportionate representation that might have benefited them 
in the short term more than the long run.   
 At the end of the day, many West Virginians remained suspicious of the 
document hastily produced by the convention, and it passed with a less than impressive 
                                                 
111 Ibid. 




margin.  Congressman John J. Davis, father of the 1924 Democratic nominee for the 
presidency John W. Davis, reported to Jonathan Bennett that “I do not wonder at the 
dissatisfaction with the convention on the part of the people.  It failed to meet public 
expectations in its work and I fear it has done no good.”  He went on to describe himself 
as “not impressed with its great superiority over the old one.”114  Others feared the 
potential of a Democratic government and a constitution created by the same.  The 
Preston County Journal warned of attempts by the Legislature to gerrymander districts to 
reduce Republican voting strength.115  Democrats divided over increasing government 
intervention and also the scale of industrial development.  Western leaders long awaited 
the industrial development that had awakened economies in neighboring states even 
before the Civil War.  J. H. Diss Debar, a promoter of West Virginia industrialism, 
developed a state seal that reflected the agricultural past, but also a confident future in 
mining and industry.   
The Civil War continued to cast a dark shadow over the Democratic Party and its 
supporters.  Union Democrats found themselves left out of leadership positions in both  
the Constitutional Convention of 1872 and the State Legislature.  A Parkersburg 
newspaper complained that out of twenty-five officers, not one comes “from north of the 
Parkersburg Branch of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad.”116  One can see the near 
disintegration of the state Republican Party in the hope that “the Republicans are quietly 
looking on and, may, through the division of their opponents, seize some little 
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advantages.”117  Going into 1872, Republicans were split over the “let up” movement and 
had their development ideals co-opted by the Camden and Davis faction of the 
Democratic Party.  They could not muster even a feeble challenge to the dominance of a 
party strongly divided against itself. 
Besides the constitution of the state, another major issue consuming the attention 
of state leaders lay in the physical location of government.  The location of the state 
capital as well as several county seats sparked debate and even violence in this era.  West 
Virginia’s “capitol on wheels” consumed tremendous political energy and real resources 
every time it switched between Charleston and Wheeling.  For obvious reasons, the 
statemakers originally established the seat of state government in the northern panhandle 
city of Wheeling.  Farther south, Union and Confederate forces struggled to seize control 
of the Kanawha Valley and its important salt resources for the first half of the war.  One 
Confederate raid came as far north as Morgantown.  No other city promised safety to a 
government that could have faced trial as traitors against the Commonwealth.   
Charleston developed into an industrial town with the advent of the salt industry 
in the early 1800s.  Mills to the east of the new and growing city churned out salt that 
eventually dominated trade in the Midwest until the 1850s.  The city in the decades after 
the Civil War attracted speculators and promoters.118  Some of its original families came 
from the Greenbrier region, strongly connected to old Virginia.  Others, such as the 
prodigious Young family, started their existence in America by settling west of 
Philadelphia, eventually making their way into Maryland and then to the Kanawha 
Valley.  This mixture of people from different cultures and place helped to create a 
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border region mentality.  So did the trade patterns extending east along the James River 
and Kanawha Turnpike into Virginia as well as those extending northwest up the 
Kanawha into Ohio and the Great Lakes region.  Charleston first established itself in the 
gray borderlands that separated an unsteady America from the world of the Shawnee 
Nation and its angry allies.  Interestingly, the city itself took on a genteel aspect, 
especially after becoming the seat of state government while historically the industry 
thrived in independent towns on the urban periphery.  These aspects of blending and near 
contradiction highlight the border existence of Charleston and many other parts of West 
Virginia.  Of course a border existence meant that it experienced a full measure of 
violence during the Indian and Civil Wars.   
By 1869 Democrats and moderate Republicans, including the “let up” faction, 
sought to ameliorate scarred feelings in the Kanawha Valley over a perceived lack of 
attention to internal improvements in the southern part of the state.  Gooden asserted that 
economic development at least partially motivated moderate Republicans.119  Charleston 
was officially designated as the capital in 1870; records and other materials soon arrived 
in April of that year by steamboat.  According to Charles Ambler, “this removal gave 
many Charlestonians their first real interest in their new state.”120  Establishment of the 
new capital coincided with the construction of the Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad that 
loosely paralleled the old James River and Kanawha Turnpike from the southeastern part 
of the state through Charleston and Guyandotte into Ashland, Kentucky.  Developer 
Collis P. Huntington was able to get incorporated in 1871 a new city on the Ohio River 
bearing his name to dominate the trade that eventually flourished there.  Charleston’s new 
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role as the seat of state government symbolized the shift from Wheeling Republican goals 
and aspirations to a new recognition of the southern and Democratic powers.121 
The Constitutional Convention’s location in Charleston seemed to serve as a 
signal of that city’s permanent status as capital, but in 1875 the Legislature voted to 
remove the capital to its former home in Wheeling.  Promises of newer and better 
facilities swayed opinions.  Charleston businessman John P. Hale constructed a four story 
hotel in his home city to serve as an elegant home away from home (except for the 
inclusion of only one bathroom.)  To top Charleston, Wheeling wooed the Legislature 
with an $80,000 statehouse.  Charleston Republican George W. Atkinson growled 
“Under no circumstances and for no consideration will they [people in the Kanawha 
Valley region] vote for any man for any office who votes to take the seat of Government 
from Charleston.”122  By the next session, the would-be state capital received a thanks, 
but no thanks resolution by the Legislature and started a process to move the capital 
again.  In 1877 the Legislature finally placed the issue before the people.  Charleston won 
the balloting over B&O centers Clarksburg and Martinsburg.  By 1885 the capital 
returned to its present and permanent seat.  Indecision over the site of the capital 
paralleled uncertain notions about the direction of the state and its government.  The 
battle over the capital in the 1870s and 80s was part of the context of the political battles 
of the period. 
The year 1872 forever changed the state.  Its new constitution created a 
government to satisfy Jeffersonians of the past, and, allegedly, lasseiz-faire style 
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capitalists of the future.123  Limited government suited the Bourbons in West Virginia and 
elsewhere who feared the heavy hand of authority.  The governor enjoyed a single term 
with no chance of re-election.  Some patronage did exist, but not always enough to build  
power within his state party.  Power within the Executive Branch was divided between 
the governor and his elected Cabinet, the combined assemblage known as the Board of 
Public Work, which included the auditor, treasurer, attorney general, and superintendent 
of free schools.  The office of secretary of state at this point was an appointed position.  
Eventually, it would be chosen by voters and serve as an unofficial springboard for those 
with aspirations to the Governor’s Mansion.  The authors of the Constitution tried to 
include safeguards to prevent the combining of state power with that of railroads by 
declaring them to be public highways and banning their officials from election to the 
State Legislature.  This reflected a potentially more powerful than recognized anti-
corporate element in West Virginia during the 1870s.124 
Later governors, especially after the Republican takeover in 1896, expanded the 
authority of the position as much as they constitutionally dared.  New fields of endeavor 
for the state, including expanded school and mental health facilities, provided more 
patronage opportunities as well as ways to build voter confidence in state services.  That 
lay in the future.  A procession of Democratic governors would own the office until 1896, 
often helping to advance the industrial development desired by Republicans while also 
frustrating that party’s political ambitions. 
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Another major change lay in the elimination of the despised township system, or 
rather the superimposition of county government over top of the 1863 townships.  
Renamed “districts,” they functioned for many decades, especially in larger counties for 
many years as convenient subdivisions.  Preston County is one of the few left in which 
citizens still make reference to their districts of residence.  Power returned to the county 
court system which featured three commissioners granted financial, administrative, and 
judicial authority.  This reflected the practice of old Virginia and would remain in place 
for almost a century. 
The Constitution of 1872’s ratification did not come easily.  Even with the new 
heavily Democratic majority, the margin of passage did not reflect confidence int heir 
work.  Republicans, of course, despised the changes.  Governor Stevenson warned in a 
letter to the State Journal, “As an index to the reckless fanaticism which controls the 
majority of the current Legislature, it is only necessary to know the character of the laws 
they are enacting.”125  It did accomplish a significant goal of the Democratic Party, but 
acknowledged at least the perpetual independence of the state and a permanent break 
from Virginia.  Agrarians and Redeemers worked to build a system centered around 
Jeffersonian yeoman farmers and white male government.  They undercut the basis of 
executive branch power, but in the long run failed to preserve their cherished principles 
of natural rights based law.  The statemakers and subsequent Republican administrations 
did not see all their work undone. 
Ready acceptance of the Camden and Davis supporting “regular” Democrats to 
seize the helm of the Unionist economic vision rendered irrelevant the first generation of 
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the Republican Party.126  Without the economic issue, they had little beyond patronage 
with which to mobilize the party or its voters.  The Chesapeake and Ohio trunk line as 
well as a multitude of branches and connectors spider webbed across West Virginia with 
the blessing of Democratic industrialists who built much of it themselves.  At first, this 
facilitated logging and later the mining of coal.  Republicans had to settle for a “me too” 
stance on state economic growth while struggling to use the protective tariff to 
differentiate themselves from their rivals.   
Although Republicans lost their constitution and their grip on power by 1872, 
they could still look at the first years of statehood with a sense of accomplishment.  The 
party itself still existed, which was better than the North Carolina Republicans could say 
after they vanished in the 1870s.  Democrats did come to power and return state law to a 
more Old Dominionlike condition, but did not undo the free school system.  Their 
“Regulars” also tended to support industrial development.  Finally, the state itself 
continued to exist.  Democrats returning to power decided that they preferred the idea of 
running their own state to a return to Richmond-based rule.  This provided little comfort 
to Republicans who found themselves in opposition for the first time since before the 
war, but it did mean that some aspects of their achievement would remain intact. 
                                                 




NATHAN GOFF AND THE PERILS OF PARTY RULE 
 
1872 looked dismal for the Republican Party nationally.  It controlled Congress 
and the White House, but stared into the abyss of schism.  The brief dalliance of the 
Democracy with the quasi-abandonment of racial politics ended with Horace Greeley’s 
campaign, and so the bickering Regular and Liberal Republican factions sullenly 
reunited.  “Parties,” a Republican editor wrote, “live and die as they are devoted to 
measures.”  Although he wrote this in a spring 1872 defense of Grant, the message 
remains important.  It also indicates the division between the Liberals and Regulars.  
Political parties must accomplish goals in the real world to remain relevant.  The Preston 
County-based writer noted that the Whigs had failed to meet this standard.1  Those 
accomplishments needed to benefit both people and party.  Regardless of the rightness or 
wrongness of the moderate West Virginia Republican moves to allow former 
Confederates back into politics, they did go a long way towards healing the people, but 
they did little for the party.  Republicans expressed frustration over the passage of the 
constitution and their own impotence to form any obstacle to Democratic Party designs. 
 West Virginia’s Republican Party experienced almost complete collapse in the 
1870s.  Republican Senator Peter Van Winkle placed principle above politics when he 
opposed the removal of President Johnson.  Internal dissention between hard line 
Radicals and “let ups” ended with the rush of former Confederates back into full 
citizenship.  The remaining collection of former Whigs and statemakers quickly faded 
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into almost irrelevance, except in certain pockets of strength.  Some remembered the 
passing of certain statemaker luminaries from power as a disaster for West Virginia 
Republicans and other original state supporters who “ungratefully turned their back on 
their greatest.”  Historian and journalist Granville Davisson Hall specifically referred to 
Unionist Democrat Daniel Lamb and his quest for the U. S. Senate, saying he was “the 
profoundest student of government problems since Madison.”2  Certainly Hall 
exaggerated somewhat, but the strong possibility exists that he meant to compare his 
favorite to Nathan Goff, who had assumed party leadership. 
West Virginia Republicans’ low point came in the gubernatorial election of 1872 
when they chose simply to endorse a Democratic candidate rather than field their own, 
mimicking the Democratic Party’s strategy on the presidential level.  With electoral 
victory and implementation of the “Bourbon” constitution, state Republicans looked to be 
drifting towards the fate of other Southern party organizations in the 1870s.  Many in 
Southern states, such as North Carolina, found their bases terrorized by violence and 
immobilized by apathy.  The North Carolina Republican Party eventually dissolved 
itself.3  Although West Virginia voted for the first Union officer to hold the presidency, 
Ulysses S. Grant, once again in 1872, they did not vote for another Republican chief 
executive until the final Civil War veteran was elected president in 1896.   
 Grant’s presidency defined the 1870s.  Debates over corruption and his ability to 
function as chief executive divided Republicans even at the state level.  He consciously 
built his fortune on the boss system already in place.  Trusting in self-interest trumped  
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idealism to Grant.  His administration’s mentality reflected a desire for loyal and 
effective commanders.  On one hand, a Republican magazine that drifted into strong 
opposition during his first term admitted that “General Grant appears to be one of the 
most popular presidents that we ever had.”4  It based its disappointment with the “Hero of 
Appomattox” on the fact that Grant did not, or thought he could not govern without the 
help of “rings, lobbies, and back stair influences generally.”  They disliked his 
appointments, his foreign policy, and the fact that his personality was “plain as an 
average private” and “silent as a model picket.”5   
Many define the significance of the Liberal Republican revolt in terms of its 
eventual defeat.  Mark Wahlgren Summers asserted that “Greeley never had a chance of 
beating Grant” because national prosperity assured general contentment with the 
president.6  Jean Edward Smith in his biography of Grant called the victory in 1872 the 
climax of that presidency because it crushed both the Democratic opposition and the 
Liberal Republican rebellion.7  David Jordan, biographer of Grant supporting “Stalwart” 
Roscoe Conkling, described the Liberal Republican efforts as impossible.  Jordan 
emphasizes the bizarre alliance of the Democrat baiter Greeley with the party he once 
hated, all in the name of the ideal they shared with Liberal Republicans of anybody but 
Grant.8  Some who were separated by a few decades saw the party revolt as a minor 
event.  William Allen White, a journalist whose career lay a generation after Grant’s 
presidency, described the movement as a “slight crack” and a “minor rebellion” against 
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the “reactionary corruption” of Grant’s administration.9  That being said, the idea that this 
represented a minor rebellion in American political history did not occur to those fighting 
it out at the time.  The Wheeling Intelligencer led an aggressive West Virginia 
Republican charge against Grant in spring of 1872 and campaigned just as hard for him 
by August.10   
 The 1870s saw the zenith of the power of political “bosses” and their “machines.”  
Bosses such as Roscoe Conkling in New York, Matthew Quay in Pennsylvania, and even 
Goff offended the sensibilities of a large faction of the Republican Party.  Bosses utilized 
influence to obtain jobs and other favors for hardworking party men.  This provided the 
foundation of their power, but failed to inspire the more idealistic members of the 
Republican movement.  The party’s bipolar nature from the beginning included a lofty 
minded reform set and a pragmatic business oriented group.  In between the two sprouted 
the savvy political operators able to work honestly (and sometimes dishonestly) within 
the loose rules and standards of the time.  Both parties had such men who found 
prosperous niches to develop political power and sometimes wealth.   
Bosses found staunch opposition from idealists within the Republican Party 
across the country. These formed a small, but very vocal faction, that nipped the heels of 
President Grant and state party authorities. “Liberal Republicans,” as George W. Julian 
artfully explained, “asked [for] the expulsion of political corruption and the restoration of 
the party to the purity which had signalized its early life.”11  Conkling noted that “their 
vocation and ministry is to lament the sins of the people.  Their stock in trade is rancid, 
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contrary, self-righteousness.”  He pointed out that “parties are not built up by deportment, 
or by ladies’ magazines.”12    
At what point does any political party or its supporters act in a manner which one 
may describe as “pure?”  The job of a party lies in creating support and explaining issues 
in such a way as to convince people to donate to the cause and vote for candidates.  
Julian’s career as a writer and a congressman reflected a desire for a cleaner brand of 
politics based on ideas and ethical practice.  He rejected the blatant appeals to self-
interest, such as patronage distribution.  Historian Heather Cox Richardson illustrated 
further divisions, describing how liberal Republicans did not accept the idea that 
inequalities by themselves prevented an individual from achieving success.  Regulars 
responded by claiming their intent, especially under President Grant, was to develop the 
country for everyone, including blacks and Indians.13  However, as Paul Leland Haworth 
argued, the crushing defeat of Grant’s opposition both inside and outside his party 
resulted in the “pleasant belief that the question of dispensing the loaves and fishes of 
political patronage was settled forever and that it was wholly unnecessary to carry 
through measures of reform.”14  These policies likely were more overlooked than 
endorsed by a nation grateful for the prosperity of Grant’s first term.  
Republican struggles nationally created temporary tensions within the West 
Virginia party in 1872, but did not create the same kinds of lasting animosities and 
dissentions as elsewhere.  West Virginia Republicans in 1872 found themselves 
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temporarily divided over the issue of renominating Grant.  The national party never fully 
fused the two sides of its original personality.  The self-proclaimed liberal, formerly Free 
Soil wing, could not tolerate Grant.  His hard-edged policies in the South and lighter 
touch with the western Indians won him few friends outside of the groups that directly 
benefited from his actions.  Within the state, a seemingly strong Grant majority struggled 
against a vocal set of powerful figures in media and politics.  Party leader Nathan Goff 
had to contend with a serious debate over national party affairs just when he was trying to 
construct an organization from the rubble of the recent state Republican collapse.  Even 
worse, party divisions undermined the sometimes less than steady source of patronage 
that Goff relied upon to help reward the faithful and build the party.  Prominent 
Republicans, such as former Brigadier General Benjamin Kelley, assured other party 
leaders that “if the committee are permitted to appoint the delegates, that they will all be 
opposed to the renomination of Grant.”15  By 1872 one could call into question whether 
or not this statement reflected the accurate state of the party or Kelley’s fragile health 
since he still suffered from the after effects of a serious war wound.   
The Wheeling Intelligencer emerged in the first half of 1872 as a resounding 
voice against the renomination of Grant.  His party’s main press organ lobbed shots 
towards Grant’s friends in March by proclaiming “to renominate (Grant) is to renominate 
all the barnacles that unfortunately have attached themselves to his administration and to 
his personal fortunes.”16  Generally, much of the Republican criticism of Grant confined 
itself to the President’s friends and advisors.  Grant himself remained the “Hero of 
Appomattox,” still worthy of having a county named for him, despite the unease 
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surrounding his presidency.  By the end of April, the newspaper called upon “Liberal 
Republicans” in the city to meet.  It discussed the sending of delegates to the Liberal 
Republican Convention in Cincinnati and whether the delegation would support Horace 
Greeley or Charles Francis Adams.    Although it claimed a “large amount of Republican 
support in this city with the Wheeling movement,” unsubstantiated partisan paper claims 
should often be taken with a grain of salt.  Then again, 32.8% of Wheeling’s 1860 
population came from the same country as outspoken Liberal Republican Senator from 
Missouri Carl Schurz.  Pre-Civil War meetings of Germans at times echoed 
proclamations of the Revolution of 1848 of which Schurz was a veteran.17  This could 
indicate one of the reasons for more Liberal Republican support in the Wheeling area. 
West Virginia Republican Party “regulars” failed to appreciate the anti-Grant 
stance of the Intelligencer.  In the broader context of the political year of 1872, they saw 
a national party ripping itself apart while the most hated element of the Democratic Party, 
former Confederates, tried to grab power within the state.  They saw for themselves in the 
Constitutional Convention of 1872 what a “bitter ender” government could look like.  
Division gave opposition an opportunity.  Republicans worked diligently along the 
political lines of the time to enlarge their numbers at different conventions.  The 
Intelligencer complained “The machinery of the party throughout the country is so 
completely in the hands of the interests of Grant that his renomination has been a thing 
virtually accomplished for months.”18  That statement reflected the lingering bitterness 
from the Grafton Convention two weeks before to nominate delegates to the Republican 
National Convention.  At that gathering, former Virginia Governor Francis Pierpont had 
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argued against sending a delegation with instructions to support Grant.  He pleaded that 
“the Republican family, sir, has been rent asunder to a large extent” and proclaimed that 
“there is a powerful disaffection,” and the crowd hissed and voiced its discontent with the 
liberals.  Most West Virginia Republicans chose their affiliation due to their love for and 
loyalty to the Union.  Grant still symbolized that sacred bond to many of the soldiers, 
home guards, and people who risked all by simply taking a stand.  Meanwhile, the 
Wheeling newspaper admitted that the state Republican Party had no chance at winning 
state elections without divided opposition.  From a weakened position, the Republicans 
had to tailor their candidate selection to the possible strengths and weaknesses of their 
opponents.  It advised the Grafton delegates not to nominate a state ticket before the 
Democrats chose theirs.19 
The Cincinnati Convention of Liberal Republicans, called by one historian “a 
weird conglomerate,” gave liberals the option of voting for Horace Greeley.20  
Eventually, Greeley won the nomination after what one historian called “three days of 
backroom maneuvering that would have made a Tammany Democrat envious.”21  The 
splinter movement grew into a threat when Democrats strangely joined in his nomination.  
Republicans at the very least united behind a candidate, whether or not they completely 
approved of him.  After Greeley’s failure in the Republican Philadelphia Convention and 
success in Baltimore, many party faithful wearily trudged back to the Grant banner.  
Greeley’s increasing slide towards the Democracy gradually unified most of the 
disaffected elements.  By August the Intelligencer called Greeley’s campaign a 
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“complete failure” and pointed out that blacks found his “guidance” to be 
“patronizing.”22   
Still, complete unity behind Grant proved elusive.  As late as November 2nd, the 
editors pleaded with Republicans not to mirror “the reluctance of Governor Pierpont” 
because a Greeley presidency meant a Democratic Cabinet.  Francis H. Pierpont 
grumbled in 1874 that then Senator Arthur I. Boreman had convinced him to eventually 
support Grant, but only to gain the goodwill of the administration.  Pierpont argued that 
West Virginia never saw any benefit from supporting Grant.23  As it turned out 
independent Democrat Thomas Hendricks won forty two electoral votes, giving him 
thirty-nine more than Greeley. 
West Virginia Republicans attempted a similar ploy to that of the Democrats with 
Greeley.  Regular Democrats ran Johnson Camden as a regular “Greeleyite” candidate for 
governor.  Incumbent John Jeremiah Jacob ran as an independent whose candidacy was 
seconded by state Republicans.  Some saw Jacob’s strength as a sign of Republican 
ascendency.  The Cincinnati Gazette hailed the apparent significance of the triumph of 
Jacobs’ victory which, it thought, produced fatal divisions in the West Virginia 
Democratic Party.  Divisions did exist, but Democratic Party factionalism was still years 
away from producing results dangerous to their continued hold on power.  Ambler 
believed differently in terms of any kind of Republican victory.  Low turnout could have 
also indicated voter apathy.  Ambler stated that the slim margins that Jacob and Grant 
earned in West Virginia came from those who felt utter disgust with their party’s 
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nomination of Greeley.24 Historian John Alexander Williams suggested that the blame, or 
credit, for Jacob’s victory went to Charles James Faulkner, whom he identified as both 
the driving force behind the new Constitution and the defeat of Camden.25  Like the 
national election, this united unlikely interests.  Few Republicans waved the bloody shirt 
and hated Confederates more voraciously than rank and file Mountain State Republicans.  
It must have galled them considerably to sit on the same side as the former Confederate 
diplomat.   
 The election of 1872 gave West Virginia Republicans few reasons to rejoice.  
Democrats swept the Board of Public Works and maintained control of the Legislature.  
Jacob’s gubernatorial administration between 1872 and 1876 reflected the dissentions 
that consumed the Democratic Party during the election, yet in those four years the GOP 
failed to gain traction.  All they could accomplish was cooperation with Union Democrats 
like Henry Gassaway Davis in fighting a rearguard action against Redeemers or disliked 
Regulars.  The party needed a leader, and it turned to Nathan Goff.  
West Virginia’s charismatic political boss, Nathan Goff Jr., seized the reigns of 
party leadership in the early 1870s and commenced the long and laborious task of 
rebuilding the shattered organization.  Like many of his generation, Goff’s Civil War 
experience provided instant credibility.  He grew up in a prominent Clarksburg Whig 
family that had played a role in attracting the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad to the state.  
They condemned Virginia’s secession ordinance and saw their son, Nathan, enter the 
Union Army.  Clarksburg’s central location ensured Union control, so the Goff interests 
did not suffer tremendously during the war.  Goff served as an officer, seeing action 
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under Generals Robert Milroy and John Fremont.  Most of his active service consisted of 
either engaging conventional forces coming west from the Shenandoah Valley or 
counterinsurgency actions in the hills and valleys of eastern West Virginia. 
 During the winter of 1864, Major Goff was captured along with thirty nine other 
members of the Fourth West Virginia Volunteer Calvary.  Like most officer prisoners, 
the Confederacy sent Goff to Libby Prison in Richmond.  At first the conditions ranged 
from acceptable to very unpleasant.26  His experience there only enhanced his postwar 
reputation and gave him the right credentials to lead the “bloody shirt” generation of 
Republicans.   
 The historiography of the post-Civil War industrial period has less to say about 
Goff than some of his contemporaries.  Perhaps his story paled in comparison to those of  
the statemakers or the industrialists.  Goff’s sometimes nearly illegible handwriting and 
reluctance to share emotions and details in correspondence make him somewhat less 
accessible than some others.  He led the state party during a time of extreme collapse, 
carefully resetting the foundation upon which future Republican leader Stephen Elkins 
would eventually triumph.  However, Goff bestrode the narrow Republican world as a 
Colossus in some ways.  He did not make other men seem petty, but few conversations 
about the West Virginia Republican Party before 1900 failed to include him.  The 
Wheeling Intelligencer in 1884 called him “the Plumed Knight of the Little Mountain 
State,” an obvious comparison to the charismatic senator and occasional presidential 
candidate James G. Blaine of Maine.27  Goff bridged the gap between the statemakers and 
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the industrialist, served as the undeniable leader of the state party, and built a national 
reputation. 
 Goff entered public life soon after the Civil War, building a future constituency 
by working with veterans.  He chaired the Committee on Organizations of the Soldiers’ 
and Sailors’ State League starting in February of 1866. .28  By 1867, Goff won election to 
the West Virginia House of Delegates, then received appointment as United States 
Attorney for West Virginia in 1868.  As U. S. Attorney, Goff spent a great deal of time 
dealing with the state registration laws and violators of whiskey revenue acts.  The future 
party leader raised eyebrows by unseating an incumbent Republican Representative, 
former brigadier general Isaac Duval, in the nominating convention of 1870, only to lose 
to a Democrat.  Goff’s rapid rise and brash action alienated the statemaker generation of 
Republicans, an attitude reflected by the post-election condemnation of “personal 
ambition” by the Parkersburg State Journal.29  
Goff’s political style lay in creating the image of the reluctant statesman dragged 
away from his business commitments by the glaring needs of people and party.30  In 
reality Goff’s ambitions focused strongly on the most prominent political plum, the 
United States Senate.  However, he needed a Republican legislature to accomplish that 
goal.  Goff had political resources in the 1870s not available to modern political 
authorities.  While the West Virginia Republican Party in the late twentieth century and 
early twenty first struggled to build beyond their core of traditional and ideological 
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Republicans, Goff offered the “plums” of office to respected and hard-working figures.  
Early in the 1870s, Goff did have power, but not an iron grip on dispensing patronage.  
Arthur I. Boreman held a United States Senate seat from 1869 until 1875.  From there he 
tried to influence decisions on federal jobs, as when he implored President Grant not to 
allow Benjamin Kelley to interfere with the appointment of Isaac Duval as collector in 
the West Virginia First District.31  Some reason exists to speculate that relations may 
have been strained between the first governor and the newcomer in the 1870s.  Boreman, 
for example, backed Isaac Duval’s candidacy for the collectorship in 1873.  This was 
only a few years after Goff unseated incumbent Duval for the Republican congressional 
nomination, then promptly lost the general election.  If strained relations existed, they 
probably did not last.  Goff tended to support Duval later. 
Goff may have actually benefited from Democratic control of the state legislature 
because it eliminated Boreman as a potentially competing center of power when it voted 
in one of their own upon the expiration of the former governor’s term.  Even as late as 
1876, Goff did not seem to have the full backing of Grant as he was unable to protect 
Hedgeman Slack’s position as United States Marshal.  If acrimony existed between 
Boreman and Goff, it did not emerge in this issue because those two plus Isaac Duval 
enthusiastically supported Slack.  None of the West Virginia Republican power figures 
prevailed.  Instead the job went to George Patton, a friend of Simon Cameron.32  This 
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demonstrates that Goff had substantial, but not complete control, over this vital means of 
constructing a political party. 
Goff received appointment as a United States Attorney after his stint in the West 
Virginia House of Delegates.  This represented the most prestigious in-state position of 
the patronage jobs open to West Virginia political figures. The state Republican Party 
recognized Goff’s combination of name recognition and ability. As a result, it 
consistently pushed him towards progressively higher offices while he honed his political 
skills.  When men such as Goff and George W. Atkinson rose in importance, they gently 
pushed aside the Republican state fathers with the power of patronage.33  The newer 
generation of Republicans tended to support business and industrial development more 
than the older agrarian oriented leaders.  Friendly media outlets also helped to construct 
popular images of candidates and leaders as well as tear apart the opposition.  When 
running for the House of Representatives in 1870, one newspaper supportive of his 
ambitions referred to Goff as “a fine scholar, well informed on current political topics.”  
The paper insisted Goff “will reflect credit upon our State in the halls of our National 
Congress.”34   
 Interestingly enough, many of these jobs handed out as rewards do not show on 
the surface the direct involvement of Goff.  The recommendation packets that 
accompanied most applications for patronage positions include many from politicians out 
of office in the 1870s, such as Willey.  Goff only rarely wrote in favor of an applicant, 
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and, even then he expressed himself even to the president in tones of unquestionable 
authority, as when he seemed to dictate several years later to President Chester Arthur, “I 
trust you will continue Gen. Duvall of the 1st District and not Collector (former Loyal 
Virginia Governor) Pierpont of the 2nd.”35   In 1877, Secretary of War Alphonso Taft 
wrote a letter to Goff, referring to a “suggestion” that the latter made concerning the 
possibility of Clarksburg native, Colonel Henry Haymond, serving on the West Point 
Board of Visitors.   The word suggestion seemed overly emphasized, as if Goff, as per 
usual, had tried to dictate his wishes.  Goff seemed eager to get his man into the office 
with Grant’s administration still in place, but received word that no new appointments 
would receive consideration until April.36 Goff supported Maine Republican Senator 
James G. Blaine over Hayes for the nomination in 1876, earning initially cool treatment 
from the president.37 His apparent apprehension about Hayes and his policies on federal 
employment seemed confirmed a few months later. Goff, as well as other appointees 
across the nation, received instructions from the president that “no officer should be 
required or permitted to take part in the management of political organizations, causes, 
conventions, or election campaigns.”38  This might account for the dearth of political 
correspondence for long periods in Goff’s papers. 
Goff’s goal lay in fusing the original Union Republicans with those more 
concerned with establishing industrialism in the state.39  He used his name recognition 
and the fact that he had never advocated Confederate persecution as a way to try and 
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build support for a weak minority party.  His leadership position over a party with few 
other big names meant that Goff occasionally found himself in “hopeless, but necessary” 
campaigns.40  Goff traveled extensively and spoke often.  These efforts were 
supplemented by a rather disorganized party where the work of a few carried most of the 
burden.41  Local Republican leaders saw Goff as a foil for charismatic Democratic 
presenters.42  Between 1870 and 1876, West Virginia Republicans did not even hold a 
state convention.  In the bicentennial year, Goff employed one of his favorite methods of 
gaining nomination, stating emphatically that he did not care to run while subordinates 
lined up the necessary votes in convention.  Historian John Alexander Williams described 
the tremendous odds he faced; “entrenched in the interior counties and in tradition 
minded districts along the Virginia border was a pre-industrial political system.”  
Campaigning in this environment placed high value on oratory, face to face contact, and 
capable proxies carrying the party message.  Travel, especially in the 1870s, to remote 
mountain districts required time and stamina.43  Nathan Goff had just the right 
characteristics to succeed in such an environment given time, but state Republicans 
needed about ten of him.   
 Goff’s influence came from a variety of sources, of which patronage represented 
one of the most important.  Financial support or hard work on behalf of the party earned 
one a path into “the kingdom” as one Republican Party Executive Committee Chair and 
state governor, William Mercer Owens Dawson, described it.44  Goff benefited from a 
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good relationship with Grant, but occasionally had to struggle against the patronage 
policy of Rutherford B. Hayes.  Hayes’ campaigners waved the bloody shirt for the Civil 
War general, but the emphasis after victory was on practical reconciliation.45   
 Goff used patronage as effectively as he could.  During the 1870s and most of the 
1880s, no other state Republican held his level of authority over federal hiring of the 
party faithful.  Other elements of his incremental approach helped to quietly reconstruct 
party strength.  Goff understood the necessity of remembering the voters.  He pushed 
appointees and elected officials to work hard for their constituency.  Individuals wanted 
action on pension applications, access to the free products of the Department of 
Agriculture, business subsidies and access to railroad connections.  By cultivating a 
reputation of attentiveness, the West Virginia Republican Party could start to reverse the 
avalanche of the early 1870s and move towards legitimate electoral challenges again.46  
Goff also shied away from controversial national issues, an attitude shared by others in 
the party.47  The 1870s divided the Republican Party nationally, and Goff wanted to limit 
the damage to his own organization.   
 Questions of patronage sometimes extended beyond a simple request for political 
reward.  In 1876, former Brigadier General Benjamin Kelley sent an appeal to Goff for a 
federal position. Kelley’s job for much of the war had been to keep in operation the 
mountain traversing section of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad.  His command also sent 
out patrols to search for guerilla forces in the area.  Kelley, along with General George 
Crook, was captured by Confederate partisan rangers from a seemingly secure hotel in 
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Cumberland, Maryland.  After the war he immersed himself in Republican politics and 
eventually secured a position as Collector of Internal Revenue.  Many sent pleas on 
Kelley’s behalf throughout the early 1870s.  Rutherford B. Hayes and Archibald 
Campbell cited his advanced age and disability from war wounds as a reason to give him 
an office.48   
Senator Boreman had previously gotten Kelley removed from office.  Boreman 
complained to President Grant in March of 1873 that Kelley interfered with the 
appointment of General Isaac Duval for a collectorship position.49  Complaints followed 
Kelley’s removal.  Moderate Democrat John J. Davis called the firing “an act of injustice 
to Genl. Kelley.”  He further explained that the former collector had won the respect of 
both political parties, and, most importantly, was “an unflinching and active supporter of 
the administration and I have never heard his fidelity to the Republican Party called into 
question.”50  Three years later, the formerly proud commander at Fort Fuller, now a 
broken old man, penned a sad letter to Goff.  Kelley explained that he had tried to retire 
to his farm to support his wife and two grandchildren left to him by his son who was 
killed in the war.  After paying taxes and other expenses, no money remained to support 
his family.  Kelley begged for any open position, even with an Indian agency that would 
take his family far from their home.  Toward the close of his letter he added as delicately 
as possible the fact of his personal acquaintance with Grant, despite his fierce opposition 
in 1872 to the president’s renomination. 51  Others in the past had recommended him due 
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to his “patriotic service.”52  Eventually he did receive a position on an Indian reservation. 
Kelley’s story shows the human side of Republican patronage.  In the absence of 
sufficient pensions for soldiers, job openings could go to reward not only loyal 
Republicans, but also men who had sacrificed for their country during the war.  One 
cannot imagine the pain of General Kelley, first from a permanent war injury, and, 
secondly, having to beg for a government job because he was physically unfit to support 
his family otherwise. Kelley was one of all too many former soldiers in that same 
situation.  His story also reflects some of the different factors that entered into decisions 
about who received the limited number of jobs available for distribution. 
 Goff had powerful influence, but not a complete stranglehold on federal 
patronage.  In 1871 he relied upon Hedgeman Slack, United States Marshal based in 
Charleston, to serve as his right hand.  Slack faithfully reported, for example, the level of 
Kanawha County support for a constitutional convention.  He also advised Goff on 
courthouse construction in Harrison County.  Letters from Slack always ended with an 
informal “your friend, Slack.”53  Slack was appointed marshal on the recommendation 
that he was a “good sound unadulterated Radical Republican.”54  At the end of Grant’s 
second term came a movement to remove Slack.  Goff protested in the spring of 1876 
that Slack was “a good soldier, is a true Republican, [and] has been a faithful and 
efficient officer.”55  Others argued that Goff’s friend had been negligent in terms of 
supporting the efforts of the party and that their candidate, George W. Patton, would 
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exert himself more politically.56  Slack’s supporters included Arthur I. Boreman, who 
emphasized Slack’s actual job performance.57  Patton eventually got the job, perhaps in 
part due to his personal connection with Simon Cameron.58  Despite a few occasional 
setbacks, Goff generally could tug on executive branch strings and obtain positions.  
About six weeks before leaving office, Secretary of the Treasury Benjamin Bristow 
informed Goff that he had found a position for Miss Alice Jeffries of Charleston and that 
she could start work on June 1, 1876.59 
Goff tried to expand Republican efforts into every part of the state.  As one source 
described it, state Republicans “carried on in every county a sort of guerilla warfare,” 
supporting independent candidates, trying to undermine Democratic control while “in not 
more than a half a dozen counties in the State has a regular republican organization even 
existed.”60  Goff did rely on a network of friends throughout the state to keep him alerted 
on local developments.  Charleston lawyer H. C. McWhorter kept Goff apprised of 
developments in the Kanawha Valley and the state government after the capital relocated 
there.  McWhorter did not mince words to his friend on his town of residence and 
business, claiming it was “not fit to have the capital until its people become civilized, 
partially at least.”61  Hedgeman Slack’s service as Marshal did not prevent him from 
“electioneering for three days night and day” in 1871.62  Future Governor George 
Atkinson remained one of Goff’s strongest supporters and political workers.  The 
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Columbia Law School graduate won election to the Republican State Executive 
Committee in 1876 and was elected chair in 1880.  
Goff’s associations with Johnson Camden led some to accuse him of membership 
in the Democratic machine.  Goff was no Democrat, but he did share with some Regulars 
in the Democratic organization the goal of industrializing West Virginia.  Also he 
understood the reality of leading a party whose registrations had fallen far behind the 
opposition.  Differences existed between Goff Republicans and Democrats, especially 
over the Constitution of 1872.  Personal support from Goff’s friends and appointees 
helped him forge the beginnings of a Republican Party that would take a long time to 
revitalize.   
Undeterred by his 1870 setback, Goff ran again in 1874.  Sitting out of the 
governor’s race in 1872 most likely cost the West Virginia Republicans prestige.  Some 
Republicans in 1874 still argued for an alliance with Democratic supporters of Jacobs, 
considering an offer of support for him if he chose to run for U. S. Senate.63  Goff 
launched an aggressive campaign, banking on his oratorical skills and attacking “ring 
democracy.”64  Privately, Republicans saw an opening as Jacobs and Camden Democrats 
relentlessly pursued their political feud.65  Democratic nominee William L. Wilson 
seemed to run more against the controversial President Grant than the young and popular 
Civil War hero, Goff.  Despite “lack of organization and effort,” Goff came close to 
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victory.66  The New York Times actually declared on October 15 that the returns slightly 
favored Goff, but in the end he lost by 168 votes.67 
Sometimes Goff’s own ambitions ran counter to his need to maintain relations 
within the party.  He loved to play the reluctant tribune, dragged into elections 
unwillingly by the love of the people.  The gubernatorial election of 1876 put Goff at 
odds with the Berkeley County Republican Executive Committee when Goff pledged his 
support to their county’s “favorite son” Colonel Lamont, then accepted the nomination 
himself.68 He eventually lost to former Confederate officer Henry Matthews.  Goff 
pledged to that county’s Republican committee that he “would not accept the nomination 
under any circumstances.”69 Goff tried to reassure Evans that “no one regrets the 
nomination more than I do myself.”  He claimed that he had to relent in the face of the 
wishes of “leading Republicans from all parts of the state.”70  If Goff intended to deceive 
Evans, he played the role across the state, telling Judge E. Maxwell, and one George 
Brown that he had no desire to be governor and no time to campaign.71  Berkeley County 
aside, some Republicans expressed the belief that Goff enjoyed better support than the 
party itself.  Atkinson assured Goff that the Kanawha Valley backed Goff more than the 
rest of the Republican ticket.72  Goff lost that election in a season that saw the Democrats 
surging dramatically, compared to their showing of four years earlier when they did not 
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even nominate one of their own for president.  Machine politics exasperated the country 
after the various scandals under Grant.  Historian Heather Cox Richardson illustrates the 
problem facing Goff, Hayes, and almost any other Republican in the bicentennial year.  
She writes that the Republican Party “had little to offer voters other than the destruction 
of slavery and defense of ‘government by the people, for the people, and of the 
people.’”73  Republicans also suffered from the political fallout of the recession and a 
popular belief among many that the party handed governing power over to blacks and big 
business.74 
What did Goff and the Republican Party actually offer the voters in the 1870s?  
Richardson’s arguments that the 1870s Republicans offered little of substance does not 
entirely hold true at the state level.  Certainly West Virginia Republicans did remain 
proud of emancipation and victory in the Civil War, but they saw their party as more 
important than simply existing as a living monument to those issues and statehood.  They 
fought, but for what did they fight?  Some battled to ensure that gains made during the 
1860s remained in place.  W. M. O. Dawson, editor of the Republican Preston County 
Journal, advocated the continued improvement of schools, complaining in 1873 about 
low pay leading to a deficiency of qualified teachers.75  Other Republicans encouraged 
rail expansion, but also blasted the state government for poor roads.  The Wheeling 
Intelligencer noted that bad conditions were “a great drawback, not only to the attraction, 
but also the profit of country life.”76  Republican rhetoric in general expressed fears about 
Democratic leaders working to slowly deconstruct the results of the Civil War.  “The war 
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is over,” proclaimed the Intelligencer in response to complaints about “bloody shirt” 
campaigning “and if its results were in good faith accepted, there would be no need for 
reviving or keeping alive its recollections.”77  In West Virginia, tangible evidence of that 
desire to diminish Republican achievements came in the form of the Constitution of 
1872, a document blasted as expensive, vague, a source of conflict between branches of 
government, and a restoration of local self-rule that only worked to the benefit of 
“courthouse cliques.”78  Probably the best summation of the Republican position in that 
decade came in January of 1872 when the Intelligencer defended the party against 
accusations of contracted and narrow viewpoints.  It admitted guilt “if hostility to slavery, 
the advocacy of a free and general education, the repudiation of the dogmas of Old 
Virginia . . . and a hearty and sincere  loyalty to the United States” could be defined in 
that fashion.79  By the 1880s this list of values included a strong defense of the protective 
tariff and even advocacy of women’s suffrage.80   
Republicans promoted these issues and mobilized voters in their defense.  The 
1870s also was an era of political personalities.  Conkling, James “the Plumed Knight” 
Blaine, and other similar figures paraded across the national stage.  They put a face on the 
party in a time when political oratory represented both art and entertainment.  It could 
sink or save a movement because it represented most Americans’ connection to the 
political process.  Goff mastered the art of public presentation and pulled strings to obtain 
jobs to become a powerful leader of the state party by the mid-1870s.  He utilized a 
charismatic style of public speaking to reach voters.  At this time much of the electorate 
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lived in isolated areas and had insufficient education to understand one of the many 
partisan newspapers flourishing in the late 19th century.  One editor suggested “public 
speaking is the only kind of campaign work that accomplishes anything.”81  Even when 
called upon for impromptu talks, Goff retained a large repertoire of prepared material in 
his mind that centered on basic themes such as the perpetuation of Republican power and 
the positive aspects of the protective tariff.82  Goff’s political talents and leadership led 
William MacCorkle, Governor of West Virginia from 1892-96, to claim later that “for 
twenty-five years, he was the Republican Party in West Virginia.”83   
Goff’s generation looked to continue creating a different West Virginia.  Both 
Democrats and Republicans in his generation responded to the vision of industrial 
development.  Newspapers and elected officials in the 1870s often looked to “boom” 
development, particularly in railroad construction.  The Phillippi Republican gushed, “no 
event will ever deserve a prouder place in her history than . . . the formal opening of the 
Grafton and Greenbriar Railroad.” 84 Gaining access to modern transportation, whether 
an 1870s railroad or a twentieth century divided limited access highway, has often been 
seen \as a sign of progress and a step towards prosperity.  Sometimes that progress was 
defined not just as a step towards an industrial future, but a step away from the “old ruts 
of a dead and past civilization.”85 This statement took a double shot at road travel and the 
Old Dominion.  In both cases the arrival of infrastructure sometimes exceeded 
expectations and, in other instances, produced considerable disappointment.  Also the 
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effect on the surrounding area in both instances produced volatile political reactions.  
Eventually the debate on industrialism fatally divided Democrats in West Virginia. Lewis 
points out that even the four major factions of the Democratic Party often spawned 
further factions at the local level, hindering cohesive operation.86 In the 1870s, many 
leading Democratic Party figures supported development, especially with the 1873 arrival 
of a major trunk line (the Chesapeake and Ohio) right through their areas of strength in 
the southern part of the state.   
Johnson Newlon Camden and Henry Gassaway Davis, industrialists themselves, 
maintained a precarious hold on party leadership. As time passed, their hold on 
Democratic affairs deteriorated.  Part of the problem lay in the “large army of the 
discontented . . . Irish voters (who) were perhaps the most clamorous.”  They demanded 
their “fair share” of patronage handouts when Democrats controlled the presidency.  
Their anger boiled over in the senatorial election of 1886 when they advocated “anything 
to beat Camden.”  Of course these immigrant industrial workers had to join hands with 
the agrarian faction to do so.87  Those days lay in the future, but the seed of revolt against 
the industrialist leadership started germinating in this decade.  In the 1870s Democrats 
seemed better able to cobble their different factions into coherency while the Republicans 
struggled to unify themselves at home and around the nation.  
  One of the more divisive issues at the time was the rapid expansion of railroad 
networks after the 1870s. It helped divide Republicans along lines already drawn in the 
election of 1872.  Regulars favored development, while the smaller Liberal faction tended 
to be in opposition.  On the Democratic side, Agrarians organized opposition to 
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Democratic Party factions that promoted development.  Agrarians opposed taxation of 
farmers to subsidize rail construction.  They also feared the effects of rail traffic on the 
nearby countryside.88  Agrarian political revolts against Democratic Regulars would help 
boost Republican chances in the 1880s.  Railroad entrepreneurs tried to enter mercantilist 
style relationships with individual counties.  According to Lewis, Jefferson County 
courted disaster by entering into a relationship with the Shenandoah Valley Railroad.  
County voters approved a quarter million dollar subscription with the promise of more 
jobs and business.  This development failed to materialize when the railroad imported 
workers from outside and opened its own stores.  Lower transportation costs never 
happened, except where circumstances allowed for real capitalistic competition with the 
S. V. R.  Jefferson County received a large amount of worthless stock in the debt 
saturated company and, in return, gave substantial tax breaks to the railroad.  In this case, 
the combination of government and capital once again undermined the free market 
economy and individual property rights while saddling the county with overwhelming 
financial burdens.89  According to John Alexander Williams, “It is difficult to think of 
anything in Appalachian life that the coming of the railroad did not change.”90  In this 
case, railroads helped to change politics, economics, and even the concept of justice by 
emphasizing the greater collective good over natural rights based law.  These 
transformations formed a key part of the world that Goff and his party wished to lead and 
guide. 
  Appalachian political historian Gordon McKinney tries to place Goff within a 
regional context.  “Mountain Republicanism,” according to McKinney, emerged as a 
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regional bond forged from pride, outside prejudice and fear during the Civil War.91 
McKinney claims that this militarized politics to the extent that volunteers obtained 
military type ranks.  He commented that in style the mountain based Republican 
organizations superficially resembled armies, but they operated more like Tammany 
Hall.92  Goff, as party leader, received the rank of General.  Rankings were a typical 
method of bringing together southern highland Republican organizations according to 
McKinney, but the documentary evidence of such methods in the case of Goff is rather 
scanty.   McKinney does point out that John Mason called politics “the battlefield of 
life,” but does this reflect the musings of an individual former officer or an entire political 
culture?93 Goff benefited much more from his actual position as United States Attorney 
than from a political “generalship.”  He also did not often seem to indulge in the habit of 
at least writing out orders to other party officials in the state.  Only those higher up 
received that kind of “consideration.”  More accurate is the assertion that the organization 
ran somewhat like a city machine.  Patronage represented the lifeblood of Goff’s 
movement, but some presidents tried to build the party in breadth and not depth.  
President Hayes, for example, tried to use patronage to woo former Whigs and Union 
Democrats instead of Republicans in an ultimately futile attempt to construct a majority 
southern party.  George Wesley Atkinson, later a Republican West Virginia governor, 
complained that this action would kill the state Republican organization.94   Atkinson’s 
assessment did fall short of the mark.  The Republican Party limped through the 1870s, 
but it did survive.  Goff’s position as US Attorney combined with his personal wealth 
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gave him influence over what federal jobs were available to the state party.  These 
included not only the prize positions of collector of internal revenue, U. S. Marshal, and 
others in the U. S. Attorney’s office, but also every postmaster position in the state. 
Goff and state Republicans saw positive developments in the 1880s, both for Goff 
and the party itself.  The damage to the Republican Party seen in the 1870s came as often 
from personalities as from issues.  President Hayes, not exactly enamored with the power 
and position of his office, chose not to run for re-election in 1880.  Although this 
probably stemmed from a natural distaste for power, Stalwart opposition to him could 
have created an embarrassingly complicated renomination process.  Blaine expressed an 
obvious interest in the presidency in 1880.  He faced several possible contenders 
including Ulysses S. Grant.  Powerful leaders such as Senator Conkling gave substance to 
the possibility of Grant’s returning to the White House. The St. Louis Globe Democrat 
predicted that “a man of iron” would replace “a man of straw.”  Another writer claimed 
that looking back to Grant represented “the natural reaction of the Republican Party 
against the insipidity and imbecility of the present Administration.”95  Of course, this 
glossed over the scandals that had occured on Grant’s watch.  The Hero of Appomattox 
neither pushed for nor against his own nomination.  Grant did want to run and return to 
the presidency; he enjoyed presidential power.  He tried to dissemble by saying “I am not 
a candidate for any office, nor would I hold one that required any maneuvering or 
sacrifice to obtain.”96   
When the voting started at the Chicago convention, Grant led all candidates.  At 
the state level, the contenders maneuvered to try and gain the backing of delegates to the 
                                                 




national convention. Goff personally supported James G. Blaine, representative of a 
group derisively called “half-breeds” (those favoring some civil service reform) who took 
second place in the initial balloting. His support for a candidate who has backed reform 
of the patronage system must have come as a surprise to some. Others in West Virginia 
also strongly supported Blaine.  Goff’s future rival Stephen Elkins, still not yet a West 
Virginian, advised John Mason to “control the preliminary organization” of the state 
convention so as to assure their candidate of West Virginia delegate support.  A Blaine 
victory, according to Elkins, was “your chance to make the state Republican in the next 
four years.”97   
Hayes’ presidency rewarded Goff with one of his few exposures to the national 
spotlight before he achieved fame in the 1890s as the truly elected, (at least as far as 
Republicans were concerned) governor of West Virginia.98  In the waning days of his 
only term, Hayes elevated Goff to the Cabinet as Secretary of the Navy. At the time, this 
was more about politics than national defense.   Between 1865 and the mid-1880s, 
Congress approved very few naval related expenses, outside of keeping over five 
thousand patronage positions in the Navy Yards funded.  Hayes subsequently accepted an 
unoffered resignation from that secretary after learning of corruption in his office.  
Presidents sometimes appointed Cabinet positions based upon political strategy as much 
as filling an advisory need.  Goff represented an important state and got something of a 
reward for services rendered to the party, but had no real opportunity to make a strong 
mark.  Goff’s support of Blaine ended his chances of staying on after Hayes left 
Washington, despite the president’s assurances.   
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 Hayes had appointed Goff to the Cabinet with the understanding that his 
successor would continue Goff in the job.  Along the way, Goff developed a coherent 
understanding of national issues with which he could hammer his Democratic 
competition.  Although his Cabinet experience acquainted him with the necessity of 
supporting a strong navy, Goff’s real passion lay in his support of the protective tariff.  
He claimed to support a “moderate protective tariff as is absolutely essential to protect 
the American laborer in the pursuits of his business.”99 Many manufacturers supported 
the tariff as well.  Goff’s quick exit from the job helped him in that he was free to finally 
triumph as a candidate for office again.  In 1882 Goff secured election to the House of 
Representatives after serving his short stint as Secretary of the Navy.  He had President 
James Garfield to thank for that “boost” to his career.   
  The two Republican presidents of the 1880s, Garfield and Chester A. Arthur, had 
to contend with mounting public debate over the patronage issue.  The direction that their 
presidencies would take had an impact on almost every state party organization.  
Garfield, like many nominees in the pre-primary days, started off as a peripheral 
candidate and ended up the compromise solution.  Certainly, his ability to charm a crowd 
helped win him the role as party nominee for president.  Future Speaker of the House Joe 
Cannon recalled that Garfield “was a handsome and magnetic man, and one of the most 
eloquent orators who ever sat in the House.”100  Garfield’s speaking ability, affable 
manner, and long political tenure made him a good compromise candidate.  His choice 
for Vice President, Chester Arthur, brought dismay to those who thought the former 
president of the Eclectic Institute would be a serious reformer.  Garfield’s nomination and 
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election returned the country to debates over patronage.    Inevitably disaster would come 
from such a system where there were more men with such high opinions of themselves 
than there were rewards and plums.  Garfield possibly enraged a deranged office seeker 
named Charles Julius Guiteau enough to get shot.  He proclaimed to the world that, as a 
Stalwart, he preferred Arthur as president.  The involvement of the issue of patronage in 
the murder of President Garfield stirred American anxieties on the issue to the proper 
point where reform was inevitable. 
 Arthur shocked the country by pushing hard for civil service reform.  He said 
“For the Vice-Presidency I was indebted to Mr. Conkling, but for the Presidency of the 
United States my debt is to the Almighty.”  Arthur’s late blooming reform impulse ran 
him afoul with Congress.  He vetoed pork barrel spending and a law prejudicial to 
Chinese, but found himself overridden.  More successful were efforts in this period to 
modernize the navy and begin a building program that eventually made it one of the best 
in the world.101  The new president may not have admitted to any restraining earthly 
obligations, but he did go after past political opponents within the GOP.  Goff’s dogged 
support of Blaine in 1876 and 1880 cost him as Arthur used patronage to try and 
undermine the Republican leader.  Although the president alienated some, he charmed 
others.  A Marion County native and Kansas judge found Arthur the “most polished, 
suave, and courtly gentleman that has occupied the presidential chair in my day.”102   
Goff did have influential opponents within the West Virginia Republican Party 
during the 1880s. Francis H. Pierpont (who had returned from Virginia) and others found 
themselves on the outside looking in.  He worked against Goff, but alienated Republicans 
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also.  Pierpont wrote President Arthur an endorsement of Mason, who was Goff’s 
personal preference to succeed him as United States Attorney.  Three days later Pierpont 
switched his endorsement to George Sturgiss, nominee for governor in 1880, with no 
explanation.103  Others described Pierpont in particular as a prickly and almost bitter 
character. Future Governor Atkinson (sometimes a sensitive person himself) asked “am I 
to be forever quiet and allow that old man to hound me to distraction?”  Atkinson stoked 
the anger of the former governor and asked Mason to “please muzzle him.”104 Mason 
rebuffed opponents of Goff; the year before he tried to convince President Garfield to 
retain Goff as Secretary of the Navy to please West Virginia and the Southern states in 
general.105  Arthur himself refused the entreaties of both Pierpont and Goff by choosing 
W. H. H. Flick, who fell to paralysis during a court case in Martinsburg in March 
1888.106   
The president attacked campaigns as well, but ran up against the strong 
reputations of those he would keep from office.  Arthur marshaled resources against Goff 
during his successful congressional campaign in 1882.  Also, Goff’s lieutenant John 
Mason, fell to defeat in his own congressional race.  Mason’s reputation among 
nationally known Republicans helped to make him one of the preeminent party men 
within the state, but he seemed to never contend for leadership of the West Virginia 
Republicans.  Elkins extended an invitation to Mason to visit himself and Grant in 
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1883.107  A year later, Blaine asked Mason to “please advise me as soon as you can as to 
the best method of making the fight in West Virginia.”108 
 One of Goff’s problems during the 1880s lay in the Republican Party’s inability 
to use Democratic divisions to gain majorities in the Legislature or win the Governor’s 
Mansion.  Business minded Democrats found themselves displaced by an agrarian surge 
in 1884 that elected “the fiery, but humorless orator,” E. Willis Wilson, governor.109  
Wilson championed the rights of farmers and promised to address the issue of railroad 
price discrimination that always seemed to hit farmers the hardest.  Wilson’s election and 
maneuvering to block the re-election of Camden to the U.S. Senate lay bare the widening 
rift between Democratic factions within the state.  Goff’s Republicans failed to exploit 
the de facto division of their opponents into almost two separate parties.  In 1888, this 
failure took on a personal aspect when Goff himself failed to win the battle over 
gubernatorial election results that originally declared him the winner.  The Republicans 
still suffered from their own divisions, but were not nearly as afflicted as their foes.. 
 The issue of patronage created complex political situations within the Republican 
Party.  Chester Arthur was a Conkling Stalwart, a former chief of New York patronage, 
who became a Half Breed upon ascending to the presidency. Nathan Goff built up a West 
Virginia Republican organization loyal to himself through patronage, but strongly 
supported the Half Breed Blaine.  The sudden civil service reformer, Arthur, tried to use 
patronage to weaken Goff because the West Virginia patronage king supported the 
candidate who was trying to lessen the impact of patronage.  What looks confusing is 
actually the typical gap between personality, self-interest, and principle. If one looks for 
                                                 
107 Stephen Elkins to John Mason, August 13, 1883,  Mason Papers. 
108 James G. Blaine to John Mason, June 18, 1884, Mason Papers. 
109 Williams, West Virginia: A History, 122. 
92 
 
ideological purity or consistency, this would not be a good time period in which to 
search.  Political self-interest normally gets priority and this was certainly a prime 
example.   
 Although at the time 1884 appeared to represent a failure for Goff and his party, 
in retrospect that year set the stage for eventual triumphs.  The national party had 
tremendous confidence in its chances of “turning” West Virginia in 1884.  It had a vision 
that coincided with its perception of Mountain State interests, a popular nominee in 
James G. Blaine, and energetic organizers such as Stephen Elkins.  How could this team 
fail to attract a majority of supporters in West Virginia which, after all, was more of a 
border state than an offspring of Dixie? 
 The national party planned to divide the solid Democratic bloc in the South by 
focusing on economic issues.  One party rule established itself very quickly in a region 
that saw partisan competition in many areas prior to the Civil War.  Republicans had seen 
Blaine as a figure who could reconcile at least part of the South with the GOP, despite the 
fact that Southerners tended to prefer the incumbent Chester Arthur and his fount of 
political life giving patronage.110   
 James G. Blaine had a roman candle-like effect on the Republican Party in the 
1870s and 80s.  Every so often he launched a feud or campaign that lifted himself into the 
light of public opinion and scrutiny, but always fell to earth and flamed out. Rivalries and 
connections to corruption damaged Blaine’s image throughout his political life.  No one 
worked harder to obtain the presidency in this period and few perennial losers inspired 
such deep loyalty and enmity.  Individuals might run afoul of Blaine, such as Roscoe 
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Conkling did, but he saw the party itself as sacrosanct, somewhat along the lines of a 
political church.  Blaine waded through railroad scandals and feuds with other 
Republican leaders because of the almost universally acclaimed magnetism of his 
personality.  Supporters called him unblushingly “the magnetic man” and even more 
ostentatiously “the plumed knight.”  Privately, Blaine indulged in powerful neuroses such 
as hypochondria and intense self-pity.  His ambition masked insecurity and a wide range 
of powerful emotional responses.  The nominee in 1884, like many party men, had little 
vision.  However he understood the value of political work and gained a reputation for it 
like few others.111  Blaine failed to best Hayes and Garfield for the nominations in 1876 
and 1880, but won nomination in 1884.   
 Blaine believed that a vision of economic prosperity could breach the walls of the 
Solid South.  The Civil War left many districts destitute and poverty remained a defining 
feature of many ravaged areas until at least World War II.  No Marshall Plan helped to 
rebuild this region until Cold War defense and space appropriations made their way there.  
Promises of development represented a reasonable path to rebuilding the GOP image 
there.  West Virginia appeared to Republicans as an ideal target for its economic message 
of development and protection because of the expanding extractive industries.  Historian 
Charles Calhoun called this campaign to sever West Virginia from the Democratic bloc a 
failure.  He was right about 1884 itself, but in terms of its impact on West Virginia it 
constructed the foundation for successes in the 1890s.112   
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Protectionism was one way to pry Democratic votes away by appealing to the 
people’s interest.113  It made sense to both labor and business, if not always consumers.  
In 1884, Republicans reaffirmed their identity as the party of protection, helping to attract 
voters and divide the opposition in states such as West Virginia.  Nathan Goff embraced 
the issue as his own and delivered thundering addresses on the subject, such as when he 
used the topic as a weapon against President Grover Cleveland in the House of 
Representatives in 1888.  In a speech entitled “American Markets For American Labor,” 
he stated that “the moment one of our industries is self-sustaining” it “receives the 
President’s enmity and he at once suggests the pruning knife of the tariff reform.”114  
Even state level Republican leaders pushed the tariff issue.  Atkinson produced a 
pamphlet on the issue that exhorted in Wesleylike language that “he that provideth not of 
his own household is worse than the infidel.”  The future governor also summoned the 
specter of Anglophobia, accusing Britain (the main competitor to American industrial and 
mining interests) of pretending to be a Christian nation while committing “all crimes in 
the calendar of crimes.”115  Protectionism gave Republicans an issue to gain votes at the 
same time as it initiated a severe schism among West Virginia Democrats.  Henry 
Gassaway Davis had helped to elevate William L. Wilson to the House of 
Representatives, but the industrialist soon broke with the emerging leader of the “tariff 
reform” movement.116  Goff’s position as one of protectionism’s front line warriors also 
earned him valuable roles in the national Republican hierarchy.  Democrats feared Goff’s 
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growing clout, expressing to their leadership that “Genl. Goff as Chairman of the 
Republican Congressional Committee will have unlimited means at his disposal and will 
spend it freely.  They are all thoroughly in line and organizing well.”117  Money and a 
popular position helped Republicans mount their best challenge in nearly two decades. 
 Goff followed the trends of political party construction, trying to use what 
patronage he could access to build the organization.  He differed from other bosses 
mainly in the poverty of the tools with which he started his work.  The force of his 
reputation, charisma, and wealth helped maintain him in his position despite the presence 
of perpetually irritable chieftains, some of whom dated to before Goff’s leadership.  
Unfortunately Goff played the role of the coach who carefully built the program during 
trying years, got fired, and found that his successor enjoyed almost immediate success 
from the foundation he built.  His greatest challenge would come in 1888.  In this year 
Goff found himself maneuvered into a gubernatorial contest he did not seek by a 
challenger to his authority over the West Virginia Republican Party. 
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THE REPUBLICAN PRESS 
 
Republican activities in the post-Civil War period did not only center around the 
party moves and personalities.  They needed allies to help carry their message to the 
voters.  Media and politics may appear to be entirely separate institutions, but interactions 
with the public and each other in a free society result in an intricate and sometimes very 
intimate intertwining.  In the case of nineteenth century West Virginia, this effect 
becomes closely evident.  Sometimes the goals of the press triumphed, sometimes those 
of politicians did, but often these ambitions are one and the same particularly among the 
partisan press.  Very few newspapers sat on the proverbial political fence in those days; 
they sided with either of the major parties. Republican press in West Virginia often 
reflected the first part of the Preston County Journal’s motto “Onward and Upward,” but 
not always the second half “True to the [party] Line.”1  West Virginia Republican editors 
enjoyed establishing their own lines which they regarded as “true,” but this did not 
always reflect the national or state party interest or goals.  Editors came from a variety of 
backgrounds, held different perspectives, and harbored ambitions of their own.  They 
assisted and clashed with politicians of their party based upon how they viewed the world 
and their own responsibilities.   
Newspapers across the country in the mid to late 19th century relied upon political 
news and party assistance to survive.  In an era before professional sports and soap 
operas, the trials, tribulations, and outright spectacle of political life provided 
entertainment clad in the gowns of civic virtue and participation.  Journalism rarely in 
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American life rose to the idealistic level of the objective “fourth estate.”  Some 
newspapers later in the century proudly embraced the concept of crusading on issues 
certain to draw public attention through sensationalism.  Others tried to draw readers by 
encouraging “humor, sentiment, and originality.”2  Journalist William Allen White 
described his own business as “beggar and blackmailer” in country towns, but also “one 
of the major industries” in these same villages.3   
Even though political partisanship remained important, direct ownership of 
newspapers by the parties declined by mid-century.  However parties and papers existed 
in a symbiotic relationship because prior to the Second Industrial Revolution, they did not 
generate profits without assistance.  As part of the “spoils system,” papers allied 
themselves with presidential administrations to receive lucrative printing contracts.  The 
parties themselves might patronize papers in the same fashion.  A lucrative market 
existed for the printing of fliers, brochures, and other advertising materials.  
Industrialism’s byproduct of more money and better education helped the newspapers 
eventually become increasingly financially independent.  In 1840 2,200 newspapers 
circulated every day.  By 1904 that number jumped to 8,007.4  During this time the figure 
of the editor-publisher emerged.  By 1869 many Republican papers had released 
themselves from dependence on the party and adopted a more independent line.  Men 
such as Horace Greeley, “a strange combination of fuzzy idealist, fighting reformer, and 
crusading journalist,” built metropolitan dailies into political forces that increasingly 
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bucked the regular party line.5  Greeley himself, as was earlier described, ran for the 
presidential nomination against fellow Republican Ulysses S. Grant in 1872.  The 
independent powerhouse newspapers of the post-Civil War era gave way to the 
syndicates ruled by William Randolph Hearst and Joseph Pulitzer who wielded influence 
across the nation. 
West Virginia’s Republican partisan press performed a variety of functions that 
helped it build and maintain the party organization.  First it helped to introduce the party 
into a region that was strongly Whig and Democratic.  It elevated members of its own 
profession into important party and elected positions, while also assisting the 
advancement of approved political figures from outside of journalism.  Newspapers 
played a role in lobbing rhetorical ammunition against the Democrats and their press 
while also trying to maintain unity in the Republican cause.  This system did not always 
work perfectly as “kickers” sometimes appeared in various times and places to disrupt the 
will of the party leadership.6  Often they found some press support for their rebellion.  
Newspapers generally adhered to a partisan ideology, usually supporting similar state and 
national issues such as the retention and expansion of a protective tariff and continued 
industrial development.  In their shaping of the political and by extension economic 
destiny of the state, the Republican partisan press played a tremendous part in helping to 
produce the West Virginia that greeted the twentieth century.  Comparing West 
Virginia’s partisan press with other publications such as the New York Times does not 
present much of a contrast when it comes to tone and methodologies. However, historians 
only rarely have examined the role of the press in early West Virginia politics including 
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the extent of its ability to shape opinion, the roles it filled, and the influence it held over 
state political development.   
 The Republican press began in West Virginia when Archibald Campbell and John 
McDermott assumed control of the Wheeling Intelligencer from Democratic ownership in 
1856.  Campbell was one of a few figures in the region who represented a “notable 
exception” to the general consensus that abolitionists were to be hated and their influence 
feared. Many northwestern leaders such as Waitman T. Willey, who did not sympathize 
with the South or rebellion, tended to support John Bell’s Constitutional Union Party of 
former Whigs.7  By 1860, Campbell had cast his allegiance with the Republicans.  This 
reflected principle more than an accurate calculation of power.  His newspaper 
consistently attacked the “slave power” and the “spirit of the old cavaliers” that Campbell 
claimed retarded the growth of western Virginia.  The Intelligencer specifically targeted 
the new German community which it hoped would convert to Republicanism.8  Although 
some have asserted that the newspaper was not a Republican organ at the very beginning 
of Campbell’s editorship, it is important to note that the paper came into his hands during 
the year of the first Republican presidential campaign.9  The publication demonstrated its 
early Republicanism by expressing strong opinions against the Lecompton Constitution 
granting slavery in Kansas, calling itself the “opposition” paper, and by 1859 comparing 
itself to the Republican Boston Bee.   
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Prior to the Civil War, the Intelligencer provided western malcontents with a 
forum to air their grievances against the eastern dominated state government.10  Certainly 
by the time Abraham Lincoln ran for the presidency the Intelligencer had developed into 
the “right arm of our [statehood] movement.”11  Campbell himself joined the Lincoln for 
president movement, representing Western Virginia in the Republican National 
Convention in 1860.  Unthreatened by combat operations, Wheeling and its paper 
developed free from the fear and terror of marauding armies and desperate guerillas that 
gripped the remainder of the state. 
The Wheeling Intelligencer promised to be “independent and liberal” and the 
postwar period saw some signs of this.12  Independence to Campbell did not mean 
remaining objective in politics.  Like Greeley and Whitelaw Reid, Campbell looked to 
become in Reid’s words “the master, not the tool, of party.”13  Newspaper editors joined 
with magazine publishers such as George William Curtis of Harpers Weekly to form a 
quasi-intellectual conscience for the Republican Party.  Such men often bucked the 
“Regular” line, and, in 1884, went so far as to form the “Mugwump” movement and 
support Grover Cleveland for president; of course in that year, Roscoe Conkling quietly 
joined reformers in their opposition to Blaine.14   
Like other editors, Campbell developed into a powerful figure, serving on the 
Republican National Committee from 1864 to 1868 and on the Electoral College that 
ushered Grant into the White House in the latter year.  Campbell relinquished his duties 
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as editor of the Intelligencer in the late 1860s, but did remain active in Republican 
politics.  Even without Campbell, the paper continued as a commanding voice of state 
Republicanism.  The Intelligencer’s “liberal” inclinations led him into an 1872 conflict 
with the national party leader, President Ulysses S. Grant.  In the weeks leading up to the 
splinter convention, the paper argued that a Grant machine had manipulated county 
nominating conventions by “packing” them with delegates not elected by their townships.  
It also published speeches by Senator Charles Sumner proclaiming that “if the campaign 
can be made a personal one between the Big letter G and the little letter G-I am for the 
Big G-Horace Greeley [one of the main candidates promoted in Cincinnati].”15  The 
Intelligencer also posed the question “is it a crime for a citizen of the United States to 
believe that GRANT ought not be the next president and to labor to defeat him?”16   
Much of the opposition to Grant came from an elitist upper crust of newspaper 
editors and writers, intellectuals, activists, and the perpetually antagonistic Adams family 
“who had tired of cigar smoke in the White House.”17  In this case, the Intelligencer did 
not serve the Regular party organization as much as a faction trying to win control.  
Liberals wanted to reconcile quickly with the South, and many agreed with Democrats 
that the freedmen had not proved worthy of the cost paid for their release from bondage.  
It is easy to understand why the Liberal movement found traction in the border states like 
West Virginia, although the Intelligencer did not generally articulate the malevolent level 
of racism expressed by Greeley who told Southern blacks “Root, hog, or die.”18  Its 
editors still saw the support of West Virginia blacks as crucial to state Republican 
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candidates.  Grant did not personally campaign, but his supporters flooded areas like 
West Virginia and rendered his nomination and eventual reelection a formality.  In June 
1872, the Intelligencer complained that “the machinery of the party throughout the 
country is . . . completely in the hands of Grant.”  However, after the national convention 
nominated the general, Campbell obligingly placed the official ticket on the editorial 
page masthead and began to support the party.  When it came down to it, this publication 
put party first, helping to maintain the organizational structure even by supporting a 
figure, Grant, whom it did not like.  By November, the Intelligencer even chastised 
recalcitrant Liberals such as Francis Pierpont to “support the reelection of President 
Grant.”  It argued that “a President Greeley would have a Democratic candidate” and 
despite admitting “we felt the same reluctance [for Grant] and gave it free expression” it 
now endorsed “the brave, honest, modest, able man.”19  Later the paper gave free 
expression to other ideals that may have struck some as radical, but did come to pass in 
the next century.  Not only did it support the temperance movement, but it championed 
woman’s right to vote and spoke of that development’s inevitability. In 1888, the 
Intelligencer informed its audience, “the hand that rocks the cradle today wields the 
power that may bring about a great revolution tomorrow.”20 
While the Wheeling Intelligencer represented the party at the state level, partisan 
newspapers had exploded in support of the Republican Party in the years after the Civil 
War.  Many smaller operations in isolated regions, “one horse, pap-fed bureau edited 
sheets” continued to rely upon subsidies.  Some small town papers literally lived and died 
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based upon whether or not their party held the presidency and small town editors often 
were rewarded with postmaster positions.21 
 One of the most respected of the local publications was Kingwood’s Preston 
County Journal.  It proved another example of how a newspaper editor with ambition can 
rise from obscurity into power.  Press outlets could help build the career and reputation of 
politicians and party leaders, and the Journal produced one of the Republican Party’s 
most able, William Mercer Owens Dawson.  The Journal started circulation in 1866 and 
did fairly well.  Its subscriptions included the “leading citizens of Kingwood” and 
operated out of a rent free office in the courthouse. Its initial editorial by Levi Klauser 
stated that “our paper is calculated to benefit every man in the county by having the 
interest of the whole county constantly, earnestly advocated and its mineral, agricultural, 
and other wealth pointed out to capitalists at a distance.”22   
Initially, the Journal adopted the philosophy of development common to many 
Republican and Democratic papers of the period.  In this and other ways, the newspaper 
served the purpose of promoting the party principles to the general public.  Like many 
other local papers, the Journal leapt into the struggle over the redeeming of the state by 
the Bourbon Democrats in 1872.  In February of that year, the paper published 
complaints about the Democratic Legislature changing the name of towns such as 
“Averill” because it was named after a Union general.  It also defended itself and the 
county party against general accusations of “corruption in office” and establishing a 
“ring.”  An editorial explained another general function of the partisan press, “it is our 
simple duty to defend that party and its representatives against the base calumnies of its 
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enemies.”  Of course, when possible, it launched attacks against the Democrats and their 
advocates.  On February 29, it cried “Fraud! Fraud!! Fraud!!!” and published an intensive 
expose about irregularities in the publishing of documents pertaining to the 1872 
constitutional convention.  The next month it blasted a Democratic plan to divide Preston 
County and included the partisan accusation that such a division was proposed to weaken 
Republican strength in that area.23  As spring turned to summer, the Journal maintained 
its opposition to the Bourbon constitution. It also did not fight the state party’s executive 
committee decision to pursue a passive party in state elections that November.24 
Klauser died of typhoid in 1871 and the paper fell into neglect until its publisher, 
James B. Chaffin, handed the editorship to  Dawson in 1873.  Dawson brought dynamic 
editing to the Journal and used it as a vehicle to advance what were then called 
progressive causes three decades before they grew fashionable to the majority of the 
Republican Party.  This serves as one example of individual political figures using the 
press to try to shape the party itself.  He also advanced his own political ambitions 
through the constant expression of his ideals.  In this manner, he emulated men such as 
Greeley, Grant’s Vice President Schuyler Colfax, and James G. Blaine.  Dawson, an 
“unusually efficient” self-made man grew up working in the Cranberry (later Terra Alta) 
region of Preston County.  Throughout the 1860s he worked as a cooper’s apprentice and 
a clerk while making contributions to the Journal.  At the age of twenty he became 
editor.25  Dawson soon showed a wit not uncommon to local partisan editors by 
promising that “No man who pays regularly and in advance for his county paper was ever 
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bitten by a mad dog.”26  More importantly, he quickly proved to be an advocate for 
progressive causes when he blasted the Board of Education for allowing “a deficiency of 
fifty qualified teachers.”  Even twenty years later he still showed an interest in public 
education when he chided local leaders that “the best men are not too good for presidents 
and members of the Board of Education.”  Dawson also encouraged the schools to 
increase attendance and decrease “incompetence and inefficiency.”27   Newspaper 
advocacy of better education ought to come as no surprise as it presents the ultimate 
example of enlightened self-interest.   
The editor brought other issues to the pages of his newspaper.  In 1880 Dawson 
responded to a Democratic attack on Republicans’ inclusion of blacks in the state 
convention by saying, “Oh brother, it is only a case of sour grapes with you.  The 
Republican party elevated the colored individual from being a thing to a man with all the 
rights that belong to manhood.”28  He also used his editorial bully pulpit to press for 
better roads and temperance.  Interestingly, Dawson campaigned against the smoking of 
“paper cigarettes.”  He stated “some law should be enacted whereby the manufacture and 
sale of this article could be prohibited.”29 
Dawson’s political career only started eight years after his first full time stint as 
editor.  While some in later times might see a conflict between running a moderately 
circulated partisan newspaper and taking a role in state government, Dawson did not.  
Upon entering the state senate, he immediately started proposing reforms in the 
regulation of rail traffic.  He offered a resolution to ask the state congressional delegation 
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to regulate railroads on a national level.30  Dawson served as state senator for eight years, 
but also dedicated his efforts to working in several capacities for the state party 
organization. This advancement in the party hierarchy coincided with the general rise in 
the fortunes of Republicans as the Democrats split into industrial and agrarian factions 
represented by 1888 in the persons of Standard Oil associate Johnson Camden and 
Governor E. Willis Wilson, respectively. 
 In 1896 Dawson, now heading the state party, could assure Republican chief 
Stephen B. Elkins that Senator William Stewart of Nevada would have several good 
places to speak in the Mountain State and guaranteed large audiences.31  Dawson 
continued to play a role in the formation of reliable press outlets, aligning himself with 
the notoriously corrupt Kanawha County “Hog Combine” ring to help form the 
Charleston Mail Tribune.32  By 1900 he had become chairman of the state Republican 
Committee and could send detailed reports to now U.S. Senator Elkins about prospects 
for candidates all over the state.  Dawson warned Elkins that the Republicans would not 
carry several counties and also advised him on matters of patronage when he penned, 
“We got Lew Martin . . . He wants an office very, very, very, bad . . . I cannot make it 
badder than it is; and he wants it instanter [sic].”33  Dawson retired from his editorship in 
1891, supposedly for health reasons, but his stature had developed and the state party 
regarded him as a capable leader.  In 1904 his turn came; according to a later journalist, 
“there seem to be two paths that lead to the governor’s seat in West Virginia.  One is by 
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the newspaper route and the other is by the law profession.”34  Dawson ran for the office 
with both achievements under his belt, and he succeeded.  His career ended with political 
power, but started with his assumption of the Preston County Journal bully pulpit.  
Interestingly, upon his resignation of the editorship he drew that rarest of compliments, 
one from the Democratic town rival.  The West Virginia Argus in a story about a 
supposed Dawson gaffe, printed that they had “no desire to misrepresent Senator Dawson 
for, apart from his politics, he is a clever gentleman and one whom this reporter esteems 
as a friend.”35 
West Virginia’s partisan Republican press did not merely elevate members of its 
own profession into political leadership.  Stephen B. Elkins cast a large shadow over 
West Virginia politics from the moment he stepped upon the state stage in 1888, but it is 
difficult to disentangle whether the press influenced his rise or vice versa.  Certainly the 
press worked hard to promote Elkins as an effective leader for the state party.  Elkins’ 
entry into state politics drew strong and enthusiastic responses from Republican editors in 
public and behind the scenes.  The Wheeling Intelligencer editorial staff desperately 
wanted to use an economic development convention in February of 1888 to promote 
Elkins.  One of the editors, Charles Burdett Hart, strongly advised Elkins to attend and 
offered to have the Chamber of Commerce “arrange for the scheme.”36  He assured 
Elkins that the railroads had offered assistance (presumably by providing passes for 
VIPs) and that the turnout would be huge.  Hart emphatically stated “you will fit in very 
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snugly.  This thing you must do.”37  Of course Elkins had hedged his bets by obtaining a 
substantial share of the stock of the Wheeling Intelligencer, thus purchasing the good 
graces of the most influential Republican paper in the state.38  The convention attendance 
of Elkins marked his entrance into state politics (the Intelligencer saw fit to publish his 
speech there in five languages) and also announced an increased economic presence.  It 
helped to initiate the relatively congenial struggle with reigning party boss Nathan Goff 
Jr. that eventually ended in Elkins’ triumph and saw him also pledge to increase 
investment in the state.39  Almost immediately afterwards, he established the terminus of 
his West Virginia Central Railroad at the future town of Elkins in Randolph County and 
looked for avenues of expansion, making good on his promise.   
Editors tirelessly, especially near elections, tried to maintain party cohesion as the 
election contests took place.  Those who broke party lines in legislative affairs could find 
themselves called out by an editor, an example being Dawson’s leveling of criticism 
towards Republican “traitors and scoundrels” supporting Camden’s bid for the U.S. 
Senate.  Although the Preston County Journal orchestrated the attack, the impact was 
doubly blistering because of Dawson’s position in the state party apparatus.   Years later, 
the Charleston Daily Mail warned two months prior to the election of 1902 that 
“harmony among the leaders as well as the rank and file must be the watchword from 
now on to the end of the campaign.”40  The Kingwood New Era, a brief Republican 
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competitor of the Preston County Journal promoted the cause of unity more succinctly 
by stating “death to kickers and bolters.”41   
Some editors worked behind the scenes to try and promote party unity, such as 
when the Fayette Journal’s G.C. McIntosh in 1900 tried to help Elkins patch a feud that 
had erupted between Justus Collins and out of state landowner Thomas McKell, 
supposedly over the placement of a post office.42  Republican editors carefully warned 
their readers about supposedly nonpartisan news outlets that might sway public opinion 
and readership, such as when the Preston County Journal alerted its readership to the 
Grafton Sentinel by attacking its motto; “independence in all things, neutrality in nothing 
is a cover for Democratic leanings.”43  On the other hand, Republican papers gleefully 
encouraged divisions in the opposing side, as reflected in this Daily Mail editorial that 
read, “you can’t fool even Democrats all the time . . . in the past few years the boys have 
been dropping out of the Democratic procession in numbers and joining the Republican 
parade.”44 
Many newspapers after the Civil War tried to walk a fine line between party 
loyalty and editorial independence.  They did not want to be seen as ciphers for the party.  
Just as the Intelligencer in 1872 supported large kicker movement against Grant, state 
papers could do so as well.  When Romeo Freer in 1900 launched his kicker campaign 
for governor against Regular Republican A. B. White, he had the support of the Horton 
Courier which stated that “enthusiastic” West Virginians went to Washington “for the 
purpose of booming Representative Freer for Governor.”  It was quick to quote State 
                                                 
41 Kingwood New Era, October 5, 1888. 
42 G.C. McIntosh to Stephen B. Elkins, April 30, 1900, Elkins Papers. 
43 Preston County Journal, March 7, 1874. 
44 Charleston Daily Mail, September 25, 1902. 
110 
 
Senator Stark Baker’s claim that “there is no anti-administration nor anti-Elkins 
sentiment.”45  A.B. White complained that “the course of the State Journal is very hostile 
to me by creating the impression that Freer is having a walkover.”46  Newspapers 
expressed dissention over other issues as well.   
Geography often created friction, especially in a party dominated by centers of 
power in the northern part of the state, such as Wheeling and eventually Elkins.  When 
U.S. Senator Nathan B. Scott (an Elkins ally) tried to secure a visit by then President 
Theodore Roosevelt to Wheeling, the Charleston Daily Mail complained “that is alright 
from the Wheeling standpoint . . . it creates more of a desire than ever for a [U.S. 
Senator] who will take an interest in this section of the Commonwealth.”47   
Serious clashes exploded on the local level from time to time, as in the 
McCormick-Dawson rivalry in Preston County during the election of 1888.  This conflict 
illustrated an example of the occasional interconnection of press and party infighting.  
The Dawson owned Preston County Journal and the Samuel P. McCormick allied 
Kingwood New Era served as the mouthpieces both sides used to attack each other, 
though both professed to be the true standard bearers of Republican belief.  The 
immediate reason for the rift lay in the Republican nominee for Circuit Clerk.  A 
longtime officeholder died, leaving the nomination open relatively close to election day.  
The background to this disagreement lies in a McCormick challenge to Dawson’s control 
over the county party apparatus.  McCormick actually chaired the county executive 
committee while Dawson at the time was finishing out his term in the state senate and 
seeking a state office in the party.  The county executive committee met and selected Dr. 
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James Cox as the party’s candidate.  Here the lines between kickers and regulars blurred.  
Although the technical party leadership lay with McCormick, Dawson still controlled 
many of the strings of de facto power.  Both sides claimed the status of “regulars” 
through their respective newspapers.   
The New Era called for all Republicans to support the ticket “rather than 
gratification of his own selfish schemes or prejudices.” He noted that, “Republican 
success is of greater moment than the triumph of any man or faction.”48  Depending on 
which side the reader takes, he or she could consider the call for party unity altruistic or 
self-serving, but it certainly served the purpose of reinforcing the legitimacy of the 
McCormick faction’s candidate.  As for the Dawson faction, the Journal accused the 
committee of overstepping its bounds because, as it asserted, the majority of the party did 
not “wish them to exercise such authority.”49  Instead, the faction called a special 
convention that nominated John W. Watson for the office less than two weeks before the 
election, a move “heartily endorsed” by the Journal.  The Dawson faction, however, 
admitted the irregularity of its own action in the defensive statement: “now we reckon it 
is just as bad to ‘pack’ a committee and try to forestall its action as it is to ‘set up’ a 
convention.”50  
Both sides appealed to state chair W. J. W.  Cowden, whose noncommittal replies 
did not clarify the state party’s position.  As a result, the papers pressed their cases 
against each other as furiously as against the Democrats and the attacks grew more 
personal. The New Era responded to charges that McCormick used his position as chair 
of the committee for his “personal benefit” by stating that the insinuation “comes with ill 
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grace from a man who has done that very thing for the past ten years . . . for eight years 
he played the dictator.”51  It reminded voters days later to “beware of kickers, bolters, and 
stirrers up of strife--McCormick and his followers are for the Regular ticket:  All 
insinuations and charges to the contrary are false.  Vote the straight ticket.”  In the same 
issue, the New Era accused Dawson of perpetrating voter fraud by printing false voting 
tickets in blue ink instead of black and called it “one of the most despicable schemes ever 
resorted to, to defeat the regular ticket.”52  The Journal vehemently denied that blue or 
black ink represented a legal obstacle to voting.53  Directly after the election results 
confirmed the Dawson candidate to be the victor, the New Era called Watson “a good 
scribe” but claimed “Dawson has been cracking his boss whip so long that he can’t quite 
quit the practice.”54  November saw a cessation of intra-party strife, at least between the 
newspapers, in the face of the impending struggle over the results of the governor’s race. 
When interested in doing so, another manner of preserving party unity lay in the 
development and maintenance of ideology with special attention paid to economic issues.  
First and foremost for Republicans lay the issue of preserving, and, if possible, expanding 
the protective tariff.  Since the days when the Founding Fathers sat as members of the 
new Republic, the tariff had provided the country with a divisive issue.  With few other 
ways open for taxation until the passage of the Income Tax Amendment, this was one of 
the main methods by which the federal government received money to operate.  Some 
sort of tariff had to exist; the question was how extensive.   
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Republicans created a permanent and powerful protective tariff.  This provided 
little help for Americans trying to penetrate foreign markets because of reciprocal 
measures by other industrial countries, but it did protect an American market that, at least 
at this time, seemed to be all that American industrial productive capacity required, so far 
as Republicans were concerned.  Nathan Goff expressed the Republican stance 
eloquently before the House of Representatives in April, 1888 when he stated “the 
moment one of our industries is self-sustaining, is in a healthy condition . . . then it makes 
thereby and receives the President’s [Cleveland’s] enmity and he at once suggests the 
paring knife of the tariff reformer.”55 
For Republican newspapers, it came down to a struggle between the Democratic 
Party and the industrial worker, and they were thrilled to play the part of defending the 
latter.  This did not mean that the ulterior motives of protecting West Virginia coal 
operators against competition from Canadians who happened to produce closer to the all-
important Northeastern market did not exist.  Stephen Elkins feared Nova Scotia 
operators getting control of the northeastern market and the rights to produce for Britain’s 
White Star Lines.56  One southern West Virginia paper’s devotion to this issue led it to 
actually call itself the Southwestern Protectionist.  A strong angle through which the 
press attacked the opponents of the tariff lay in constant attacks upon British industrialists 
whom they portrayed as exploiters of the workers in an effort to keep prices low.  The 
Kingwood New Era accused the Democrats of impure allegiances to Great Britain and 
that workers from that country fled to the United States to find better conditions.57  The 
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Intelligencer helpfully produced a small booklet by Republican leader and future 
governor George Atkinson that insisted “basically free trade with Britain ruins 
prosperous nations because they exploit workers for abysmal pay.”  He cited Turkey and 
India as examples.58  Atkinson also quoted the Bible as evidence to bolster his claims 
about the righteousness of protection when he cited “he that provideth not of his own 
household is worse than the infidel.”59   
This type of sentiment carried some weight with workers, at least for a time, as 
evidenced by the 1870 headline from the Miners’ Journal “Poor Man Read: Democratic 
Inconsistency: They Despise Poor Men.”60  Democratic rivals fought back and sometimes 
had fun with the almost obsessive attention granted to the subject of protectionism by 
Republicans.  Parkersburg’s Weekly Sentinel chided its crosstown rival, the Journal, by 
requesting that it reprint its “ponderous and oppressively dull potatoe (sic) editorial of 
last fall.”  It continued by referring to it as “one of the wondrous productions of the tariff 
campaign and we would be pleased if our contemporary would spare space for its 
reproduction at this time.”61 
Another issue that resonated strongly with Republican editors was the desire for 
development that many shared in West Virginia at the time.  Apart from agrarians, many 
West Virginians in the late 19th century had faith that development and modernization 
would lead to a guaranteed wealthy and prosperous future, and why not?  West Virginia’s 
vast natural resources above and below the surface seemed to give the state an advantage 
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in creation and retention of wealth.  Of course, the former was true while the latter proved 
false.62 It is understandable that the Intelligencer, financed by an investor in railroads and 
mineral extraction after 1888, would strongly support development even to the point of 
organizing a huge and successful economic development convention early in the year.  
Nationally, small town newspapers played the same role as a modern chamber of 
commerce.  They acted as community boosters, urging development, condemning 
transgressions of morality, and ignoring news that might curtail development.  Editorial 
selection meant that the papers could promote their agendas without lying or even 
stretching the truth.63   
Many promoters of development linked industrial expansion and prosperity with 
the growth of railroads.64  When rail entrepreneur Elkins moved permanently to the state, 
Dawson, neither an outsider nor an industrialist, praised the immigration of an 
“enterprising” man.65  When the railroad extended to Philippi in 1884, the Philippi 
Republican trumpeted that “no event will ever deserve a prouder place in her history than 
. . . the formal opening of the Grafton and Greenbrier Railroad.”  It went on to state that 
the railroad was “taking us out of the old ruts of a dead and past civilization and [was] 
placing us in the grand march of progress and advancement.66  Philippi’s Republican 
paper definitely implied a continued disdain for Old Virginia and all its works. The 
development faith did not confine itself to Republican papers.  Both the Charleston Daily 
Mail and the Democratic Charleston Daily Gazette blasted the owners of a railroad that 
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failed to promptly build a line to connect Charleston to Sutton.67  Some dissent did exist 
outside of Republican papers, and those Democratic publications strongly influenced by 
Standard Oil ally, Johnson Camden, and railroad magnate, Henry Gassaway Davis.  The 
Greenbrier Independent blasted railroad extension in a series of articles that claimed, 
among other issues, that the Chesapeake and Ohio “carried whiskey, killed chicken and 
cows, scared the horses, and threw teamsters out of employment.”68 
Political corruption was a specter that haunted West Virginia politics throughout 
the existence of the state, but it particularly ran strong in the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries.  W.S. Laidley lamented the state of politics in Kanawha County, but could 
have spoken about most areas of the state when he wrote “Kanawha politics  . . . became 
so bad that it was feared that elections could not be held.”  Laidley continued, “to be a 
good party man, a man must go to each election with his ticket in one hand and his nose 
in the other.”  He knew where to cast the blame, though; “the people are at fault and too 
many are willing for a dollar or two to vote as they are paid.”69  The partisan, however, 
generally placed the blame on the opposition.  The Barbour Jeffersonian accused 
“Republican managers” who endeavored “to buy, if possible, enough votes in West 
Virginia to make it a go.”70  Charleston’s Daily Gazette placed in front of its Democratic 
leadership the image of the corrupt Republican Hog Combine, asking “whether the 
county shall have government of the people, by the people, and for the people, or 
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government of the people, by the Hog Combine, for benefit of the Hog Combine.”71  The 
Daily Mail did not falter in accusations of Democratic fraud, exposing “Ring Rule in 
Boone: Democratic Families Again Succeed in Bagging all the County’s Nominations.”72  
Some Republican leaders skillfully used the press to advance their own causes, as when 
Goff responded to Democrats who questioned his vote count in the election of 1888.  He 
stated for the New York Tribune a claim he knew would electrify West Virginia state and 
local publications, that Democrats crying fraud “reminds me of Satan trying to rebuke sin 
. . . they are steeped to the eyes in fraud.”73 Of course, the Democratic press could not 
resist poking fun at Goff when the Legislature annulled his victory.   
The exchange of heated rhetoric between the Democratic and Republican press 
helped to maintain the spirit of both sides and provided real entertainment value for the 
readers.  The Barbour Jeffersonian stated that its rival, the Philippi Republican “would 
make a democrat out of most anybody.  Not withstanding it pretends to great liberality, 
its editor, like the ticket it supports, is made up of the most relentless, remorseless, 
redemptionless republicans on earth.”  It defended the Democratic record on prohibition 
and their party’s “anti-Catholic and anti-foreign born citizens’ record.”74  The Philippi 
Republican mined quotations from its rival that, out of context, made it look irrationally 
angry and ridiculous.  It printed “a few specimens of high toned extracts from our 
esteemed contemporary, the Jeffersonian: “’test oath’, ‘Registration’, ‘He made an ass of 
himself as a scholar’, ‘The Intelligencer’s correspondent from Philippi in Tuesday’s issue 
is a monumental liar’, What does our e.c. expect to accomplish by such choice 
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expressions?”75   Certainly this evidences the fact that even twenty years after the Civil 
War ended, it remained a powerful memory in the mind of the press and the people.  The 
Jeffersonian indeed called for “no more test oaths and registration for Barbour if you 
please” well over a decade after the Democrats removed such restrictions from the law.76 
If a reader may have been inclined to think of the Democratic paper’s statement as 
paranoia, its Republican rival printed earlier in the year a response to the Jeffersonian 
stating “somebody stir the rascals out.  They’ve gone to hoe.”  It printed “the editors of 
the Jeffersonian are not yet so old as not to remember the days when they stirred out the 
hornet from his nest with a stick.”77  In 1884 the Civil War was still a rhetorical conflict 
in Barbour County. 
Attacks could take the form of name calling, such as when the Charleston Daily 
Gazette developed a penchant for calling W. M. O. Dawson “Slippery Bill.” The paper 
concluded that “the trouble with the ‘Slippery Bill’ brand of harmony is that the people 
intended to be harmonized refuse to take the dose.”  It also applied the monikers “de 
facto Dawson” and “de jure White” to underscore a perception of the power relationship 
between state chair Dawson and Governor White. 78  The Charleston Daily Mail enjoyed 
using the word “inanimate” to describe the Daily Gazette and the Democratic Party.79  
Perhaps the most over the top barb was fired from the Democratic side which claimed in 
a rebuttal of a protectionism essay by Republican Lew Martin, “if there is anybody so 
stupid as the Mail it is Martin; if there is any other as inept as Martin, it is the Mail.”80 
                                                 
75 Philippi Republican, July 28, 1884. 
76 Barbour Jeffersonian, August 13, 1884. 
77 Philippi Republican, March 20, 1884. 
78 Charleston Daily Gazette, September 28,1902 and September 11, 1902. 
79 Charleston Daily Mail, September 5, 1902. 
80 Charleston Daily Gazette, September 4, 1902. 
119 
 
As the 19th century closed, many West Virginia papers did not always keep up 
with national trends.  Across the nation the public demanded more news and less 
editorializing.  Metropolitan papers could send writers to cover events almost anywhere, 
although as in the case of Hearst, Pulitzer, and others, the writers indulged the salacious 
at the expense of the factual.  Journalists struggled to create professional standards and 
ethics so that the readers might trust their contributions.  Editors’ decision making over 
story selection and wording often introduced a more subtle partisanship.81  West Virginia 
papers could not match the resources of the big city dailies and their syndicates.   
Although the West Virginia Republican press did not in many ways differ from 
that in other parts of the nation, it has not received a great deal of specific attention from 
historians.  Ambler mentions the 19th century newspapers in his textbook, but fails to cite 
the partisan basis of any of them, despite the fact that he does not fear discussions of 
politics in other spheres.82  Williams discusses how newspapers formed part of a broader 
scope of political mobilization in the late 1800s that also included mass meetings, printed 
circulars, and other devices.83 However the newspapers and their editors played a strong 
role in developing the state party as well as the government.   
W. M. O. Dawson, George Atkinson, Albert Blakeslee White, and others were 
first introduced to public life through their editorship of newspapers.  When Stephen 
Elkins wanted to finally enter state politics, he purchased a major interest in the state’s 
most prominent Republican paper.  These men and their party recognized the power of 
the press, at least in certain parts of the state, to help mold public opinion.  Although 
often the partisan newspapers stressed unity in the face of the Democratic opposition, at 
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other times certain papers chose to participate in rebellious kicker movements or local 
factional spats.  The partisan press was at its most enjoyable with its editors playing the 
role of bomb thrower against the opposition.  Their sarcasm saturated style accentuated 
with outright insult was certainly geared to not simply inform and maintain party unity, 
but also to keep the readership entertained in a time before television or talk radio.  Most 
towns of any size had papers representing each party and a few had more.  However, the 
papers’ influence in the outlying areas and among the illiterate was likely fairly marginal.  
Although sometimes inconsistent in its support of party leadership, it generally remained 
true to principles and values.  Sometimes it served the politicians and others politics 
served the purpose of the press; most of the time it was difficult to tell where the interest 
of the press ended and where that of party leaders began. The one constant thread running 
through all of these papers was an unrelenting commitment less often to Republicans 




THE ELECTION OF 1888 
 
For Republicans, West Virginia’s gubernatorial election of 1888 began as an  
opportunity and ended as a fiasco, at least in the short term.  Republicans tried to ride a 
national partisan surge on the tariff issue into power within West Virginia.  Despite the 
serious divide opening between industrial and agrarian Democrats, Republicans gained 
ground but failed to reach their goals.  In the long term, the ramifications of the election 
led to a change in leadership that took the state Republican Party to dominance in the 
next decade.   
Goff’s leadership helped to build the Republican Party in West Virginia from  
the early 1870s until 1889 and his grip on patronage during most Republican 
administrations seemed to create security for him in that role.  Patronage and a powerful 
public image built Goff’s career and it would be the loss of patronage control that undid 
him in the end.  This is all the more shocking in terms of his obvious popularity and 
abilities.  The year 1888 in West Virginia saw the black voter emerge as not only a force, 
but also a major issue.  Although many had their votes voided in 1888, Republican 
officials committed themselves to protecting their rights.  As election results grew tighter, 
the necessity of garnering every vote grew in importance.  The election of 1888 brought 
together a convergence of issues, such as the black vote and corruption, that grew in 
importance because of the expected closeness of the race in that year.  In 1888, close state 
races across the country led to corruption and post-election controversies and even 
fighting.  West Virginia’s experience in this year provides a good case study. 
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West Virginia’s twenty-fifth anniversary should have been an occasion to  
celebrate the establishment of its political tradition.   The Republican Party salivated over 
a golden opportunity to break their opponents’ sixteen year stranglehold on the 
governor’s office as the Democratic Party’s factional issues opened up publicly..  
Although the Republican effort suffered from division among its leadership, whether the 
factions centered on agrarianism or industrialism, they tended to show stronger loyalty to 
overall party goals.  When the governor’s race ended in only a slight advantage for Goff, 
it resulted in an investigation that exposed some of the serious corruption that 
accompanied the contest, and also explored the idea of what constituted a legitimate 
voter.  The controversy exemplified the changes taking place in West Virginia and 
marked a turning point in the development of the state Republican Party.   Although the 
GOP found short term defeat, the issues raised by this contest illustrated how that 
organization found triumph later. 
In 1888 protectionism emerged as the top national issue.  After his nomination for  
the presidency, Republican nominee Benjamin Harrison was urged to “let the bloody 
shirt drop” in favor of economic issues.1  After all, an entire generation had passed since 
the Civil War.  This indicated that Republicans had achieved another step in its maturing 
as a political party by dropping its early rhetoric and settling completely into 
contemporary issues.  Republican protectionists mailed thousands of pamphlets in a 
campaign of education, taught parrots to mimic the free trade Democratic slogan “tariff is 
a tax,” and spoke out against any reduction of the Hamiltonian panacea for promoting 
American industry.  For their part, Democrats held parades where participants mocked 
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so-called “infant” industries by waving baby rattles.2  Others at this same time wondered 
aloud whether or not the political parties were much different at all.  Looking back, one 
journalist wrote that “there was no choice between the two parties so far as their moral 
turpitude was concerned.”3  The electoral spirit ran high, but one expert described the 
differences between the parties as limited and defined by politicians and institutions.4  
However, issues did divide them in economics, religion, and society.  Political parties at 
this time remained a point of personal identification and definition for many.  Goff 
himself emerged as a powerful promoter of the protective tariff.  His advocacy for duties 
on coal aligned him with the interests of both miners and their employers.5  A wide 
variety of mining and manufacturing interests clamored for Goff’s attention.  Even the 
Wheeling Potters Protective Club implored Goff to “please exert an unusual effort to 
defeat the Pottery clause.”6 
  In 1888, West Virginia anticipated the end of four years of agrarian rule in the  
state.  Governor E. Willis Wilson, whom one historian described as “the most noted foe 
of corporate privilege during the Bourbon era,” led the agrarian wing.7  This faction 
included many of the old Copperhead and former Confederate elements who held 
moderate ideas on race during Reconstruction.8  His term of office ranged him among the 
foes of not only the Republicans, but also of powerful members of the Democratic 
hierarchy.  Agrarians formed wings in both the Democratic and Republican Party, but 
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they particularly alarmed Democratic leader Johnson Camden who had investments and 
other ties with the developing oil and gas industry as well as railroad construction.  He 
also represented the “Regular” faction of the party and waged relentless political combat 
against “kickers.”9   
Agrarian kickers rejected the idea that unbridled industrial development served 
the best interest of West Virginia, and “regarded the railroads as the major cause of their 
hardship.”10   They saw the combination of Camden and Davis as “monopoly and 
cohesive power of public plunder.”11 Special tax breaks combined with poor service and 
high freight charges irritated the farming class almost as much as the sparks emitted from 
locomotives that during the dry season tended to set aflame underbrush and crops.12  The 
unity of West Virginia Democrats also suffered from the independent stance of 
Charleston area Democratic lawyers referred to as the “Kanawha Ring.”  Although every 
county seat could claim a political clique, law firms in Charleston with members of both 
parties wielded significant political strength. This particular Democratic group clustered 
around such figures as Senator John Kenna and future governor William MacCorkle.13   
Wilson crusaded against what he perceived as discriminatory practices by 
railroads and also pressed for reforms that would combat voter fraud, pollution and 
school textbook problems, among other issues. Under the state constitution at the time 
Wilson could not run for reelection, although he did have senatorial ambitions.  Camden 
and his Democratic faction blamed the kickers, who according to one local leader, “in the 
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last Legislature [were] destructive of the party organization,” for the increasing rancor 
convulsing the party as it approached the election of 1888.14 Continuing conflict between 
Camden and his allies against agrarians and other factions for control of the direction of 
the Democratic Party convinced Republicans that their relatively unified organization had 
a strong chance to seize the office of governor in 1888.   
 Democratic struggles for party control illustrated an interesting sidebar to the  
year’s contest: who would become West Virginia’s next U. S. Senator.  Although 
primarily an intraparty struggle due to the expected composition of that year’s legislature 
and its constitutional role in selecting U. S. Senators, Camden feared that the “kickers” 
might amass enough strength to elevate Wilson to the Senate or, out of spite, perhaps 
even seat Goff there.15  This year seemed to be the perfect opportunity for Nathan Goff 
and his party to achieve some notable political success.  As one correspondent wrote to 
Camden about Democratic dissention leading to Republican gains, “This condition of 
things is just what the Republicans predicted in the session of ’87.”16 
As it turned out, 1888 was a year of transition in the West Virginia party system.   
Henry Gassaway Davis and Johnson Camden had formed a strong, if not unassailable, 
alliance within the Democratic Party since the 1870s, but in 1888 they felt rather 
“lukewarm” about Aretus Brooks Fleming, the Democratic nominee for governor.  
Conversely, Davis felt a strong friendship for Goff.17  This crucial election year also saw 
the grand entrance of a new force in West Virginia politics.  Although one historian 
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derisively referred to him as “New York’s first Senator from West Virginia,” Stephen 
Benton Elkins had plans to move into the state political and economic system and 
develop a strong power base.18  Elkins, because of his success in helping to orchestrate 
campaigns and nominations in 1884, was called the “brains behind the Republican 
National Committee.”  He had begun his career in New Mexico, but then moved east as 
he built his business and political influence.19  One coup lay in marrying the daughter of 
Henry Gassaway Davis, thus establishing a strong connection with the former Senator.  
Eventually, the partnership of Elkins and the former Democratic U.S. Senator assured the 
former’s political success in West Virginia.   
According to some historians, to serve his own ambitions, Elkins helped to  
orchestrate the nomination of Goff for governor in 1888 through his partial ownership of 
the powerful Wheeling Intelligencer.20  Goff did not want to serve as state governor, not 
in 1889, not ever.  His designs lay on a United States Senate seat.  With the influence of 
the Wheeling Intelligencer and one of its new owners, the ambitious Stephen B. Elkins, 
the state convention selected Goff to run for that office.  The constitutional change in 
1872, restricted the powers of the governor.  The Parkersburg Weekly Sentinel, a 
Democratic paper, chided, “Make Goff governor and it will break his heart.  He will have 
to give up his palace in Clarksburg . . . and during the next four years he could put in time 
appointing notaries.”21  Elkins saw that a Goff victory would pigeon-hole him in the 
office while a loss would diminish his prestige. 
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Demographic changes also altered the political landscape of the state.  Many  
immigrants moved into the state during this period, accepting work in the coal fields or 
the timber areas, quickly altering the makeup of certain key areas.  Camden had particular 
problems with Irish voters who felt left out of the patronage system that formed part of a 
“large army of the discontented.”22  MacCorkle noted that as an older generation of 
leaders passed, the younger Democrats had difficulty because they were “not able to 
exercise the same power in the state in politics as their fathers did.”23  All these factors 
coincided to make 1888 not only a bitter election on the surface between two political 
parties, but it exposed a complex kaleidoscope of shifting factions, leaders, and voting 
blocs.  Strikingly, the diverse factions in the Republican Party converged to support Goff 
while the Democratic division continued to bedevil their party efforts. 
A sad fact about the election of 1888 across the country was the prevalence of  
corruption.  Scholars disagree on how great a problem it was and the nature of it, but 
certainly West Virginia was not immune to the allure of using money to directly 
influence elections.  Election fraud constituted “flagrant crimes against the ballot box.”  It 
could have taken the form of false counting of ballots, multiple voting, registration fraud, 
ballot stuffing, violence at the polls, bribery, or employer influence.  Bribery and 
employer influence were most often utilized, or perhaps are the easiest forms to prove.24    
One study by Genevieve Gist indicated that 90% of Adams County, Ohio voters sold 
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their choice in the 1890s.25  The close nature of many races meant that strategic 
manipulation of a relatively small number of voters could put a candidate over the top.   
In 1888, one of the most overt years of election corruption, an Indiana Republican  
official named “Two Dollar” Dudley issued a statement infamous in the annals of 
political corruption.  He demanded that his people “divide the floaters into blocks of five 
and put a trusted man with the necessary funds in charge of these five and make him 
responsible that none got away and that all vote our ticket.”26  Corruption used a language 
all its own.  “Floaters” were voters not attached to a party line whether through principle 
or awaiting the best bid.  Money used for illicit purposes was called “boodle.”  
Democrats in Indiana praised their party’s efforts in 1888, stating in one partisan 
newspaper that “although the Republicans had lots of ‘boodle’ the Democrats got a good 
share of the [floaters].”27  The close nature of elections and the willingness of an 
opponent to cheat justified illegal or unethical activities, according to historian Mark 
Wahlgren Summers.28  Fraud provided a strong issue that each party used to mobilize its 
faithful.  To beat a cheating opponent, the party must work that much harder.  Also each 
party could claim that the people really supported their platform, but had been bought off.  
This lessened the incentive to adjust ideologies or tactics.29  
Journalist Allen Loughry cites additional factors contributing to West Virginia’s  
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political corruption, such as poor communications over rough terrain, an undereducated 
population, and the possibility of violence.30  A Jackson County Democratic official 
stated “We have done the best we could,” but then added, “our enemies are on the alert; 
have plenty of whiskey . . . and seem to have plenty of boodle.”  Republicans did not 
corrupt the process alone as the correspondent pointed out.  “’Democrats’ want to be paid 
money to move and to vote their own party ticket.”31  Future Congressman Alston 
Gordon Dayton, who served as a local Republican campaign worker in the 1880s 
promised congressional candidate John W. Mason that he could help secure certain 
sections of Barbour County.  Dayton assured Mason that “In order to fully meet the 
requirements we will need . . . about $75.”  A hundred dollars “will be used to good 
effect, especially in [the Democratic stronghold of] Glade.”32  The political culture of the 
time certainly suggested myriad ways to use $75 - $100 to good effect.   
Despite his public statements about not desiring the prize, Goff received the  
Republican nomination for governor on August 22, 1888, on the first ballot at the state 
convention in Charleston.  A Goff biographer credits the emphatic move as a sign of 
Republican unity and Goff did bring the spirit of the righteous underdog to the fight: “It 
is the world against the United States and I am for the United States.  It is the world 
against West Virginia, and I am for West Virginia.”  Goff notably added, “We appeal to 
the understanding and reason, not to ignorance and prejudice.”33   
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One of the most important voting groups in the election of 1888, especially for the 
Republican Party, was the black community.  Since the Civil War, West Virginia had 
shown some unease at times over black political participation.  Some opposed statehood 
if it meant emancipation, apparently unaware that the Civil War itself could mean 
emancipation.  By 1870 many Republicans felt uneasy about white former Confederates 
blocked from citizenship while blacks gained the right to vote.  Even some of those who 
supported black citizenship rights had difficulty arguing that whites should continue to be 
disabled while blacks gained full access.  The debate between the “let ups” and the 
Radicals disintegrated the old party. Meanwhile blacks struggled to find their place in the 
political system of West Virginia.  The Constitution of 1872 mandated segregated 
schools and laws mandated a minimum number of students before a new school could 
open.  On the other hand, Republican Booker T. Washington helped mobilize voter 
support for the relocation of the state capital to Charleston.34 
Blacks found themselves represented both as evil geniuses and buffoons in 
various parts of the South.  In Charleston, South Carolina the nomination of a black 
Republican to a judgeship inspired the headline CIVILIZATION IN PERIL.  Hysteria 
swept through some parts of the South where blacks had a high minority or a majority of 
the population.  These would be usurpers who, according to some people, tried to create 
“an African dominion,” also found themselves ridiculed at every turn.  Black legislators 
in parts of the South saw their speeches rendered to the public in almost impenetrable 
dialect and malapropisms.  They found themselves described as the pawns of northern 
Republicans.  Although they did defer to whites most of the time, they had an 
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appreciation of their potential power in places where the black population remained 
high.35   
Southern states opposed the 14th and 15th Amendments which granted blacks full 
citizenship rights.  Southerners determined to prevent black citizens from gaining power 
demonstrated an inability to appreciate the value and principles of “representative 
democracy,” according to a contemporary European observer. To justify their position, he 
wrote, they had to show that blacks as a group were not “capable of worthily maintaining 
and bravely defending a democratic constitution, which demands a rare self-control and 
manly energy.”36  West Virginia was considered southern by many in the 19th century 
despite its rejection of that section during the war.37  The state’s Republicans shared with 
Dixie-based party organizations the necessity of recruiting blacks to vote in large 
numbers for its candidates.  One historian commented that the Southern question was not 
just important, but “central . . . to the party’s sense of itself and its mission.”38   
West Virginia Republicans faced charges of black “colonization,” relating to the  
“illegal” importations of voters into certain counties to bolster GOP results.39  Most of the 
accused border crossers hailed from Virginia and worked for coal or other extractive 
industries in West Virginia counties.  Some companies specifically advertised better 
conditions in West Virginia, creating a “pull” factor that brought in blacks for reasons 
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other than simply perpetuation of voting.40 However, some West Virginia blacks had 
grown disenchanted with the Republican Party by 1888.  They felt that the GOP offered 
them just enough to ensure support while emphasizing “white” issues.41  Despite its 
relatively quick demise, the establishment of a Colored Independent Party loosely allied 
with Democrats showed that at least some black leaders had ceased to trust Republicans 
on issues they considered paramount.  Blacks had shown strong support for Goff 
personally, as in 1882 when conventions declared Goff “the unanimous choice of the 
colored people of the first district for Congress.”42  Thus, West Virginia black voters held 
in 1888 a potential key to victory. 
The situation of Virginia blacks was more challenging.  The post Reconstruction  
Virginia conservative Redeemers, made a concerted effort to regain control of their 
Commonwealth. This meant subverting the tenuous alliance among Republicans, poor 
whites and blacks and somehow defeating their leader, former Confederate General 
William Mahone.  Republicans in Lynchburg as well as poor blacks not far from the 
West Virginia border complained of persecution by authorities and vigilance societies.43  
By 1883, the resurgent conservatives had seized a majority in the Virginia General 
Assembly, causing the Democratic press to crow that “the good name of Virginia has 
been redeemed.”44  Their first salvo against Republicans and blacks took the form of the 
Anderson-McCormick Election Act of 1884.  It undermined Republicans’ ability to win 
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elections by placing appointments to local election boards under direct control of the 
Democratic legislature.45 
The issue of migratory lifestyles played a major role when the West Virginia 
Legislature’s Joint Commission met several months after the election of 1888 to discern 
legal from illegal votes in the governor’s race.  Black and poor white workers were much 
more migratory than their middle and upper class counterparts.  State boundaries meant 
little to those who made their living in the mines or the forests because laborers found 
irregular work on both sides of the Virginia-West Virginia line.  Workers might move 
when their job was over or to search for higher wages; as the majority of commission 
members appointed to recount the votes of the 1888 election decided, these blacks were 
nomadic in that they were “coming and going all the time” and that they had no intent of 
accepting permanent employment or staying in West Virginia to establish permanent 
residence.  They cited payroll records that showed lack of continual work over a several 
month period as proof.46  The minority on the commission contended that irregular work 
did not necessarily negate status of residence and that the laborers could have just as 
easily migrated from within the state.47  Black voters and their employers suffered 
accusations of abetting the Republicans in election fraud.  Almost certainly both the 
Democrats and Republicans had sullied their hands with election fraud in these 
nineteenth century elections.  The commission eventually found that the black voters had 
cast their ballots by mistake rather than by purposeful fraud.  It did them little good to 
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attend the polls in the Old Dominion.  Possibly the knowledge that their votes counted in 
West Virginia drew them there.   
Redeemers conquered the political systems of most Southern states as 
Reconstruction faded.  They changed voting regulations almost yearly, gerrymandered 
blacks into single districts or diluted their voting strength among several to reduce the 
number of Republican congressional representatives.  All the time they bashed the 
Republican Party as one of black advancement at the expense of whites.  For their own 
purposes, some Republican organizations turned away from civil rights towards issues of 
development throughout the South.  Protectionism and public education replaced a 
previous generation’s call for human dignity.  Every so often a Republican might sway 
Democrats on these issues, but in reality “Redeemers owned the South, lock, stock, and 
ballot box.”48  In South Carolina, for example, Republican rule collapsed “like a rope of 
sand” in 1877 when Democrats gained majorities and Reconstruction ended.  Ruthless 
investigation tactics of Reconstruction era corruption led some of the remaining 
Republicans to resign in protest, others abandoned politics out of fear.  Governor Wade 
Hampton’s moderation towards white Republicans co-opted more of that party and the 
black majority lost its political influence there as well.49  In comparison to West Virginia, 
opportunities for political expression in the South grew very bleak for blacks in the 
decade prior to the election of 1888 and only continued to worsen.  Consequently, it 
would not take much “boodle” or other forms of prodding to convince them to vote for 
Goff and other Republicans. 
National issues, especially the protective tariff, dominated the 1888 gubernatorial  
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election in West Virginia.  Goff stood with his party, backing the tariff and mixing some 
occasional traditional Anglophobia into his statements.  When commenting upon 
Democratic support of free trade, he said “It looks to me as if the Democratic Party has 
been caught again in bad company.  They are coquetting again with our enemies across 
the sea.”50  The partisan press also cited Great Britain as a source of nefarious 
machinations with the Democrats. The Kingwood New Era proclaimed that workers fled 
for the United States because of the protection given by the tariff, and blamed 
Democratic free trade leanings upon British influence.51  Except for some indirect effect 
upon the senatorial election, a West Virginia governor would exercise almost no 
influence on the tariff issue although Goff stated that a person should have knowledge of 
the subject “if he is a fit person to fill the office of Governor.”   Aretus Brooks Fleming, 
the Democratic nominee, spent more time addressing concrete state issues from the 
judicial bench than ruminating over national tariff policy.  This did not mean that the 
Democrats did not weigh in on the issue.  As mentioned previously, the Parkersburg’s 
Weekly Sentinel satirically requested reproduction of a “ponderous” editorial on the 
potato tariff from its Republican rival.52 
State Republicans sensed weakness and were determined to draw Fleming  
into a debate on the tariff.  Fleming’s advocates admitted the candidate’s lack of 
experience on the issue and parried by offering Congressman William Wilson of the 
second district and the House Ways and Means Committee, as an alternative.  
Democratic chairman T.S. Riley argued that Fleming’s isolation “from all active politics 
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and political discussions” placed him at a severe disadvantage.53  Although Republican 
Executive Committee Chairman W. J. W. Cowden insisted “there is no obligation on 
your part to meet Mr. Wilson,” Goff took up the challenge and agreed to a series of 
debates.54  They took place in Martinsburg, Wheeling, Montgomery, and Parkersburg in 
front of huge crowds.  Neither man lacked humor or emotional appeal, and both parried 
questions cleverly.  Wilson argued that the tariff equaled a tax on consumers and only 
benefited manufacturers, while Goff reiterated his belief that it protected workers from 
foreign, especially British, competition.  Both sides tried to paint their positions as 
beneficial to the American worker, targeting the growing industrial labor class as well as 
their bosses.55  It is difficult to tell whether these debates made much impact on the 
election, but they did give William Wilson a statewide forum and may have boosted his 
political visibility. 
In contrast to the eloquent and vociferous Goff, Fleming had a reputation as a  
quiet judge.56  He lacked the experience of connecting with a crowd that Goff had spent 
years perfecting.    A rural state campaign in those days was rather similar to those a 
hundred years later; candidates held barbeques, gave emotional speeches, invited national 
figures, marched in parades, and, in general, tried to present an image of triumph, 
celebration, victory, and fun.  Differences then or now lay in the occasional presence of 
liquor and of the “unnatural, scathing, sordid” tone of highly charged newspaper 
editorials.57  Fleming had some important political assets.  In particular, he had business 
connections with Camden and his supporters in the upper Monongalia coal fields.  This 
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network of friends balanced in some ways his deficiencies in public political 
campaigning.58 
As Election Day passed, complaints about fraud and irregularities increased.  
Theodore Lang of Baltimore warned his friend Goff about the common perception of 
southern state governments in that period, that the “Bourbons [will] fix up the returns.”59  
William McCorkle alleged fraud before the votes had even been counted.60  Allegations 
commonly centered on distribution of “boodle,” or money paid for each vote.  One 
Ravenswood resident complained to Johnson Camden, “We have all done the best we 
could and hope to carry this county; but our enemies are on the alert; have plenty of 
whiskey and been distributed all over the county and seem to have plenty of ‘boodle.’”61  
Local Republicans in southern West Virginia alleged that U. S. Senator “Kenna has had 
his henchmen in both counties . . . but it will avail nothing.”  They also claimed that 
Democrats sent $1,000 to Wyoming County and $500 to McDowell to influence voters.62   
Election fraud could also come from corrupt local election officials.  For instance, 
Joseph Barry of Martinsburg wrote “shameless partiality [was] exhibited on election day 
here by the Democratic Judges.”63  Hardy County Delegate Joseph Sprigg tried to alert 
Johnson Camden to fraud in his area.  Sprigg maintained, “if, however, one half we hear 
be true, he [Goff] should not be allowed to take his office without a contest.”64  A 
Jackson County resident also complained to Camden, “The most discouraging feature of 
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this campaign to us has been the discreditable fact that so many Democrats want to be 
paid money to move and to vote their own party ticket.”65  The most remarkable 
accusation came from Logan County where a Republican partisan claimed that 
Democratic voters were “taken to a House of ill fame and the tickets was [sic] handled by 
women of ill-fame.”66  Even more perplexing came the accusations from Preston County 
where rival Republican publications accused each other of fraud, especially in the case of 
“kickers” who perhaps illegally created false ballots in blue ink.  The Preston County 
Journal denied the charges and insisted that, regardless of ink color, ballots in a box 
cannot be discounted.67 
In the nineteenth century, election returns took time to count and assemble so  
even election day, supporters of both sides maintained shrill tones in the partisan press.  
Some combined victory celebrations with warnings of scheming; one headline read, 
“Goff Elected And He Will Take His Seat or Know the Reason Why.”  It was followed 
by one reading “The Democratic Determination to Cheat the People Through 
Manipulation of Returns-Democracy’s Last Desperate Kick.”68  These mid-November 
headlines anticipated the result of the canvas by nine days as Goff waited until November 
20 to proclaim victory. 
Democrats reeled from the apparent November defeat, one that initially  
seemed to complete the rending of the party.  An eastern panhandle editor blasted 
Johnson Camden by writing, “The virtual defeat of our party in the gubernatorial contest 
is humiliating enough.”  Worse, “when we reflect that it has been brought about by the 
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gross incompetency and unprincipled selfishness of our would be leaders . . . the situation 
becomes almost intolerable.”69  These recriminations came two weeks after the West 
Virginia Democrat confidently predicted that “the next time the Honorable Nathan Goff 
runs for Governor, it will be upon some other hobby than a War Tariff.”70   
Camden had prepared a strong response through the Parkersburg Weekly Sentinel.  
As November ended, the paper appeared to try and establish a high moral tone for the 
continuing controversy when the editor wrote, “We have no fault to find with the efforts 
of candidates to be elected . . . we do object to the ceaseless cry of fraud that is sent out as 
an excuse for the defeat.”  The Weekly Sentinel purported to fear how the accusations 
would affect the state’s already tarnished political reputation.  Despite the supposed 
victory, Republicans proved as eager as Democrats to report fraud to their party leaders. 
James Butt of Harpers Ferry wrote Goff in late November that “In addition to rejecting a 
large bunch of legal Republican voters, [Democrats] admitted a large number of illegal 
voters from Maryland and the District of Columbia.”71 At the same time as they 
advocated honest efforts to find the truth without calls for fraud, the Weekly Sentinel 
taunted Goff who, even if victorious, still would have to work with a Legislature with a 
majority of Democrats. “We hope some way will be found to give Goff the 
governorship,” it proclaimed “Make Goff governor and it will break his heart.  He will 
have to give up his palace in Clarksburg . . . and during the next four years he could put 
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in his time appointing notaries.”  Elsewhere it said, “Make him governor and bury 
him.”72   
Despite this “support” for Goff’s claims, the next week brought the first of two  
strong responses by the Democratic leadership.  First, the Democratic nominee, Judge 
Fleming,sounded a strong and defiant tone, “General Goff proceeds to claim without any 
qualification whatever that ‘we have carried the state’” despite incomplete and disputed 
returns.  Fleming then went on the attack, “This does not appear to me to be the attitude 
or the language or the spirit of a candidate who sincerely desires to arrive at the truth.”73  
Of course, Goff chose the correct course politically by proclaiming himself the victor on 
the apparent face of the returns, and any politician could appreciate that.  Fleming’s letter 
seems more a piece of political calculation than outrage.  Its close appealed, as usual with 
both candidates, on behalf of “the rights of the people” with Fleming’s declaration that “I 
do not intend to be bulldozed into a concession.”74 
The next Democratic response to Goff took full form in a “manifesto” issued by  
Camden and the Democratic executive committee a week after Fleming’s statement.  
Democrats went on the offensive with a powerful slate of accusations against Republican 
campaign efforts.  First, they alleged that the “Solid South” was to be “broken” by the 
purchase, as they put it, of West Virginia.75  It was no secret that the Republican national 
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leadership, headed by Matthew Quay, wanted to expand its electoral base and saw Goff’s 
candidacy as “a bold dash to break the Solid South.”76   
Tangible patronage support from elected officials diminished for Goff due to his  
support of James G. Blaine’s presidential aspirations, but Quay saw the former general as 
the Republicans’ best chance in the South.  Goff himself declared that his victory meant 
that West Virginia had at least cracked that concept.77  Despite the Weekly Sentinel’s 
request that accusations of fraud cease, it obligingly printed a list of alleged unsavory 
practices.  Republicans had supposedly “boldly advertised” schemes of black 
colonization, sent “paid agents” to ransack “every hamlet” looking for the “needy and 
distressed.”  According to the Democratic manifesto, “the Republican speaker and the 
Republican writer abdicated their functions in favor of the Republican boodler.”  Then, 
the committee presented the following “facts” that repeated, in part, earlier allegations.  
Men were hired to work for the Republican Party, a practice the Democrats referred to as 
“criminal bribery,” voted for the Republican ticket in counties where they had no right to 
vote, voted repeatedly, and encouraged non-residents to participate.  Additionally, 
Republicans were accused of inducing minors, paupers, and imbeciles to go to the polls.  
The combination of these amounted to a “widespread conspiracy to debauch the ballot of 
this state.”78  Although this represented the official Democratic position on the election, 
the West Virginia Democrat a week earlier offered other reasons for the poor showing of 
the party.   It blamed Congressional representatives who misused patronage (according to 
the rules of the day, this meant using it to bolster yourself and not your party), a state 
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convention packed against kickers, and the use of party machinery to “suppress the public 
will.”79 
Goff and many Republicans remained focused on the governor’s mansion.   
Republican correspondence reflects a concern with the reassessment of returns, 
particularly in Mercer, McDowell, and Wyoming Counties where George Thompson, 
editor of the Southwestern Protectionist, worried that affairs were “not in good shape” 
due to the failure of an official to promptly draw a counternotice of contest locally.80  
Although a slim opportunity existed for Goff to be chosen U. S. Senator in the upcoming 
session, the focus rested on the governor’s race, based upon his statements reported in the 
New York Tribune.  In the Tribune, Goff had attacked his opponents, claiming that 
Democrats crying fraud “reminds me of Satan trying to rebuke sin” for “they are steeped 
to the eyes in fraud.”  He promised that some would end up incarcerated as a result of 
their crimes, “Democrats assert that whenever a county which gave a Democratic 
majority four years ago gave a Republican majority this year there is prima-facie 
evidence of fraud.”81  Goff also remained in consideration for a cabinet post in the new 
Republican administration of Benjamin Harrison, backed enthusiastically by the 
president-elect’s son.  However, Goff “absolutely withdrew” himself from consideration 
and endorsed Stephen B. Elkins instead.82   
As 1888 ended and 1889 began, Goff ended speculation that he would accept  
another role, either in the President’s Cabinet or in the US Senate, stating “I would no 
more compromise this issue than I would pick a pocket . . . You are authorized to say . . . 
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that I am going to be the next Governor of West Virginia.”83  The legislature met in 
Charleston on January 9 with Democrats enjoying a thirty-two to thirty edge in the House 
of Delegates with three Union-Labor members, only one of whom had any affiliation 
with the Republicans.84  This combination foretold which way the House of Delegates 
would lean when the third party joined Democrats to elect a Speaker representing their 
party.  The Senate was divided between twelve Democrats, thirteen Republicans, and one 
Union-Labor, R.S. Carr.  Although Carr had originally received a Republican 
endorsement, clearly judging by the tone of his correspondence with Camden he now 
leaned in the Democratic leader’s favor.  Goff’s supporters tempered their hopes with 
pessimism, B. F. Martin Jr. wrote, “There is every reason to believe that the Democratic 
Party will do its utmost before the legislature to cheat you of the position to which you 
have been honestly and fairly elected.”85  Democratic control of the legislature certainly 
signaled a blow to the hopes of Goff winning the governor’s office. 
Initially, the battle centered on what to do with the returns that seemed to  
show Goff the winner.  Read into the Legislative record, it represented a victory, if only 
psychological and for public relations purposes, for Goff.  Republicans wanted all of the 
county results delivered by Secretary of State Henry Walker to the speaker of the House 
of Delegates, but Walker could not deliver Kanawha County returns because of a court 
injunction.  Results of the fifty-four counties outside of Kanawha delivered a clear 
plurality for Fleming.  The real measure of victory lay in convincing the speaker of the 
House of Delegates to open the returns which should have been done “immediately after 
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organization of the House and before proceeding to business.”  Then, according to the 
state constitution, both houses of the legislature should have been summoned to hear the 
results.  In the case of a tie, the legislature would have the power to appoint the next 
governor from among the candidates involved.86  In this case no one had asserted a tie 
had taken place, and the election fell through a crack in the law.  The problem lay in the 
fact that returns in some areas had been jumbled and disputed.  The election process, 
even in modern times, runs increasingly into gray areas the closer the vote count gets; in 
the absence of clear precedents, statutes and methods, confusion increases.  When this 
occurs, courts, legislatures, and candidates all engage in battles that help set precedents 
and dictate how future generations might handle similar situations.   
The joint assembly convened on February 1 to decide how to resolve the voting  
issues in the gubernatorial contest, not to record the results.  Democratic legislators relied 
upon the constitutional clause concerning disputed elections to fashion an implied power 
to investigate and determine the results of the returns before they read the final results 
into the record and declared a winner.  Goff’s proposition that the legislature declare him 
governor first and then investigate the returns failed to resonate with the Democratic 
majority.  He warned that “I will not yield one jot of their [voters’] rights and my lawful 
title.”87  Persistent dissention in the Democratic ranks kept Republican hopes alive, 
despite the fact that Democrats controlled the process.  One example was the January 
Democratic caucus machinations on the U. S. Senate race.  Some kickers had failed to 
support a return of Camden ally, John Kenna, to the Senate.  Although Kenna eventually 
triumphed over Goff, nominated by Republicans as a courtesy, the dissatisfaction of the 
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Democrats and third party legislators opposed to Camden helped to maintain Republican 
chances in the governor’s race.  Republicans could hope that Camden hatred among 
kickers might convince some Democrats to support Goff, just to spite their party leader. 
While Goff supporters glossed over the inability of Republicans to elevate him to the 
Senate, it was clearly a hard fought loss.  Republican Party chair and Goff ally W. J. W. 
Cowden observed a few weeks later that “our failure to elect Goff to the Senate was a 
great disappointment.  The party lines were more clearly drawn and the personal 
bitterness intense.”88  Drawing upon these Democratic divisions would continue to 
produce increasing optimism for Republicans until their 1896 takeover. 
Finally, the joint assembly decided to open and record all results for the statewide 
elections with the exception of the gubernatorial race.  “Gen. Goff’s fate as Governor of 
West Virginia was sealed today.  It was obvious the joint assembly would never declare 
him elected . . . his little majority will be swept away by the conclusive logic of a bare 
majority in the Legislature,” mourned the Wheeling Intelligencer.89  The Kingwood New 
Era sadly stated, “The deed is done and the Democrats have decided the Constitution 
doesn’t count.”90  A bare legislative majority was reflected in the joint committee 
selected to decide on the legitimacy of the contested votes; three House Democrats joined 
two senate Republicans.    
February ended with damaging revelations that would recur throughout the 
process.  Democratic Delegate A.B. Shelton of Lincoln County claimed that a Hamlin 
Republican, A.S. Ray, had offered him $1600 to leave the state and avoid sitting in the 
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Legislature and that another offered $1000 to vote for Goff in the senate election.  
Legislative investigators substantiated the first charge and dismissed the second.  Ray 
accused a Huntington Republican, who had long since escaped to Kentucky, of 
facilitating the attempted bribe.  Without mentioning Goff specifically, Democrats now 
had ammunition that implied Republicans’ willingness to corrupt even the state 
legislature to put their nominee into office.  March 4, the constitutional inauguration date, 
approached and signaled a day of decision for the contenders. 
In March, the gubernatorial contest took a turn for the absurd.  Goff announced 
his intention to take office, setting Democrats in the Capital city to fright.  Rumors 
swirled through Charleston that the former Union officer had pulled together an army to 
force a coup.  Indeed, the Wheeling Intelligencer advocated that he “call to his aid the 
military of the state.”91  A century and some decades later these fears may seem almost 
ludicrous.   However, in Arkansas rival groups smashed newspaper presses, intimidated 
reporters, burned businesses, and counted out votes.  Both political parties mobilized 
armed militias.  Texas, Florida, and Alabama all experienced the creation of rival state 
governments after bitterly disputed elections marked by accusations of fraud.92  This did 
not happen in Charleston.  Instead, Goff simply appeared outside the State Capitol with 
his supporters, gave a short speech, and declared himself the Governor of West 
Virginia.93  Wilson responded with a declaration that, since the state declared no winner 
and no one else was legally able to take office, he would continue until the problem was 
resolved.  Goff replied to Wilson that the election returns themselves signified he won.  
The Republican claimant’s assertion that he did not need the legislature’s affirmation 
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impressed no one.  Not long after Goff claimed the office, State Senate President Robert 
S. Carr claimed the office himself.  Carr interpreted the state constitution to read that 
since the office of governor had not been legally filled, it fell to the next man in 
succession. 
Goff looked to the courts for relief.  His lawyers applied for a writ of mandamus  
from the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals to direct Governor Wilson to turn over 
the instruments of the office to Goff, and, in essence, declare him governor.  The petition 
specifically requested that Governor Wilson “show cause why he should not be 
compelled to surrender to petitioner said office.”94  In Goff v. Wilson, Goff argued that 
the governor’s term by law ended on March 4 but that Wilson refused to surrender to 
office “and still holds and detains the said office, property, and insignia against the right 
and demand of petitioner and declares that he will continue to do so.”95  The Republican 
candidate insisted that, on the face of the returns, he ought to be governor and that the 
failure of the legislature to open and record the returns constituted no barrier to Goff’s 
rightful possession of the office.  Goff was asking the court to ignore Article VII Clause 3 
that necessitated the legislature’s sanction of the election results.96 
The court refused to follow Goff’s lead.97  It supported the legislature’s decision  
to defer a decision, stating that the result of prematurely approving a governor in such 
unsettled conditions “might be to place in the high and responsible office of governor . . . 
a person who had never been elected.”  The Court cited a circuit court injunction against 
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the opening of the Kanawha County results as an example later in the opinion.  Justices 
went on to call a claimant that prematurely took office potentially a “mere intruder 
because he had never been elected and was never legally entitled to the office.”  State 
constitution framers placed determination of elections in the hands of the legislature, and 
according to the court, that was where the decision would lay.98   
Nineteenth century courts tended to avoid ruling in cases that could be construed 
as more political than judicial.  Preferably, these issues were sent to the legislative 
branch; when the West Virginia Supreme Court did so, they simply followed the 
conventions of the times.  In denying the writ of mandamus and dismissing the petition, 
the Court delivered a sharp blow to Goff’s hopes.  It rejected his assertion that the 
legislature should place him in the office for the time being until the vote count could be 
established.  The Wheeling Intelligencer blasted the Court, reasoning that it “commanded 
the Speaker of the House not to perform his constitutional duty.”  It continued, “Mr. 
Wilson and the Democratic Party are to profit by the Democratic Party’s violation of the 
Constitution.”99  This sounded the death knell of Goff’s chances.  As John Alexander 
Williams has stated, “with Democratic control of the state courts and militia, there was 
little Goff’s supporters could do short of violence except wait out the Democratic 
maneuvers in the almost certain knowledge that he would be counted out.”100 
The Joint Contest Committee to review the disputed votes met first in Charleston  
in April, 1889.  It met not to declare a winner, but to investigate each disputed vote.  
Although Williams referred to the process as “further discreditable proceedings,” the 
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excessive length of the investigation at least provided the façade of thoroughness, if, in 
fact, the proceedings were inevitably a fait accompli for the Fleming camp.101  The 
Committee looked at several areas to determine the legitimacy of a vote.  First was the 
problem of polling places established in areas not specified in the law; they decided early 
that this did not disqualify the votes cast there.  It was not seen as a denial of the right to 
vote or an intentional fraud.102   The Committee took most of its time examining the 
residency qualification using company payrolls and the testimony of witnesses as 
evidence.  To be considered a legal resident, one must have lived in the county for sixty 
days or in the state for one year.  Definition of residence was established as making a 
home in a given place for the requisite amount of time.   Voters were disqualified based 
upon the idea that migrant work habits precluded the establishment of a permanent 
residence.  The committee also rejected votes from those who lived permanently in one 
county, but voted in their county of employment.  By this point in his allegations, 
Fleming dropped the inflammatory rhetoric about Republican fraud advanced in 
December; his charges now centered upon improper votes.103 
With a Democratic majority on the Joint Contest Committee, the result  
was inevitable.  As the group moved from Charleston to Grafton to Terra Alta to escape 
the sweltering summer heat and the scrutiny of the candidates, the state moved on to 
other business.104  By fall it had become reasonably clear that the committee would 
declare Fleming the winner, which it finally did in December of 1889.  In January, 1890, 
the legislature made it official and Wilson stepped aside for Fleming to serve an 
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abbreviated term.  Some press outlets heaped criticism on Goff.  The New York Times 
concluded that “the obstinate contest which the Democrats of West Virginia made a year 
ago . . . seems to be fully justified by the result of the investigation.”  It was called an 
“outrageous fraud” that blacks had been imported and induced to vote “without a shadow 
of right.”  The paper chastised Republicans for “sorry political training in fraud and 
corruption” and “evil methods.”105  It appeared the West Virginia Republicans and Goff 
had staked a great deal of legitimacy and good reputation on this contest and lost in some 
circles.  This could also reflect Republican journalists’ impatience with boss type figures. 
 With the Democratic opposition divided, the election of 1888 provided an 
opportunity for the Republicans to win the governor’s race.  The state might handily elect 
a Republican president or representative to Congress, but the occupant of the governor’s 
mansion, along with party control of the legislature, more accurately demonstrated where 
a party stood with the people of West Virginia.   Republican gains in 1888 likely reflect a 
weakening confidence in the Democrats in many areas of the state.  From a Republican 
point of view, they offered a former congressman and Secretary of the Navy in contrast to 
a provincial judge who could not debate Goff on one of the pressing national issues of the 
day, the protective tariff.  On the other hand it may be asked whether that was a relevant 
issue to many voters.  Political leaders and newspaper editors expressed their opinion, but 
little evidence exists about how those people in Hacker’s Valley and other hamlets felt.  
Did they even care?   Although Goff may have seen the mastery of the tariff issue as a 
strength to carry him to Charleston, more likely it was the man himself and his powerful 
manner of speaking as well as his Civil War service that impressed the electorate the 
most.  Fleming did not impress many as a strong speaker, but he could count on a still 
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powerful, if divided, party to provide enough loyalty to the Democratic ticket to give him 
the slightest of edges.  The election controversy only temporarily brought Democrats 
together under their party banner to beat Goff.  However the next governor, Democrat 
William McCorkle, once again demonstrated opposition to the unbridled industrial 
growth supported by Camden. Divisiveness finally ended the rule of Bourbon era 
Democrats.106   
 Why did the election produce such a close result?  Ronald Lewis has suggested 
that by the 1880s, both political parties fell under the dominance of “big business.”107  
This characterization might lead one to conclude that the parties offered non industrial 
voting blocs very little while providing an explanation for the narrowing gap between the 
two on election day.  Ambler emphasized the high level of corruption that accompanied 
1888’s voting.  It created intense bitterness, but also spawned reforms in the process 
designed to place obstacles in the way of illegal or unethical party influence over 
voters.108  Significantly, Goff made protection an important part of his campaign and the 
Democrats responded by promoting William Wilson as a debating partner instead of their 
own gubernatorial candidate.  According to historian Charles Calhoun, the Republican 
Party made a concerted effort, beginning in 1884, to use the protective tariff to gain 
support in the state.  At the same time, the national campaign abandoned references to the 
Civil War.  Republican willingness to concentrate on 1880s issues rather than 1860s 
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conflict tried to slice away at West Virginia and other Southern states’ animosity against 
the Republican Party.109   
In the election of 1888 across the country, party competition drew closer.  Grover 
Cleveland actually outpolled the winner Harrison by .8% of the vote, but Harrison 
received two more states and sixty-five more electors.  Peter Argersinger’s article about 
Gilded Age election fraud asserted that instances of fraud reflected specific tactical 
considerations more than general practice.  Party officials expected close results in 1888 
and went to great lengths to turn out as many votes as possible.110  The national party’s 
emphasis on economic issues drew those involved in extractive industries to support the 
Republican Party; dropping the bloody shirt made this easier for those with old ties to the 
rebellion to vote for their jobs as opposed to the Confederacy and long dead restrictions 
on its adherents.  Between 1880 and 1888 the disparity between Republican and 
Democratic presidential ballots cast narrowed with each election until 1888.  Advancing 
industrial development combined with a consistent and focused protectionist message 
from the GOP helped to wear down a fractured Democratic Party and erase its 
dominance. 
 The West Virginia Republican effort may not have emerged victorious in  
1888, but it showed a party with more strength and vitality than it had demonstrated since 
the refranchisement of ex-Confederates.  The bitter and close contest of this election 
showed increasing dissatisfaction with Bourbon Democratic rule.  Although Republicans 
once again lost in 1892, they captured the governor’s office in the same sweep that 
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brought William McKinley into the White House four years later.  The Republican Party 
as a whole embraced industrial growth without the opposition of a large and disruptive 
agrarian faction and this enabled them to find increasing success as the nineteenth 
century came to a close.  Victory did not unify the Democrats in any real sense.  
MacCorkle later complained that in 1889 “we who were doing the real work [of 
advocating for the Democratic candidate in Kanawha County] without Judge Fleming’s 
knowledge were cavalierly left out and other people for political effect placed in charge.”  
He claimed that he resented this action and that it led to his own victorious candidacy for 
governor.111   
 Eventual party triumph came without the state Republicans’ long time chief.   
Nathan Goff belonged to an older political generation defined by Civil War heroism that 
could almost completely define a candidate’s character.  Despite the immense amount of 
respect felt for Goff, some decided that West Virginia needed a new Republican leader.  
In the early 1890s, President Benjamin Harrison favored an industrialist who had only 
recently become a West Virginian.  Stephen B. Elkins developed a variety of industries 
within the state and established strong political connections with people in both parties.  
Harrison’s federal appointments within West Virginia increasingly showed favoritism 
towards men loyal to Elkins rather than Goff.112   
The struggle for Republican leadership in West Virginia was based more on style 
than values.   Goff and Elkins differed little in ideology; both supported protectionism 
and industrial development in West Virginia.  Both men supported James G. Blaine; Goff 
did so on the state level while Elkins worked to advance his cause on the national stage..  
                                                 
111 MacCorkle, Recollections of Fifty Years (New York:  G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1928), 439. 
112 Williams, “Davis and Elkins of West Virginia: Businessmen in Politics”, 150. 
154 
 
Goff had an advantage in his polished oratorical skills, but Elkins demonstrated more 
talent in organization. As an insider, Elkins could move within Republican circles with 
more confidence about which way the political winds blew.  Early in 1888, tired of 
presidential politics, Blaine urged Elkins to support Benjamin Harrison, “the one man 
remaining who in my judgment can make the best run.”113  This gave Elkins a distinct 
advantage over men such as Goff while endearing himself to the future president early in 
the election.   
Goff’s descent came in a very overt display of his loss of control over patronage.   
When Harrison returned the Republican Party to the presidency in early 1889, competing 
factions of the state organization backed different choices for the most important 
patronage prize, that of United States Attorney.  Goff had served ably in that role for 
many years and he expected to have the prerogative of having Harrison name his choice 
to office, long time party chair W. J. W. Cowden of Wheeling.  Supporters of Goff 
dutifully packed Cowden’s application with descriptions of his tenure as party chair.  
Delegate J. W.  Kirk of Putnam County informed the President that, during his time 
administering the party for Goff, “the Democrats have been consistently losing ground” 
and that their “magnificent majorities of a few years ago have been wiped out.”114   
Cowden’s recommendations emphasized his hard work in the party organization.   
Very few discussed his talents as a lawyer.  In comparison, the letter written by Elkins to 
Harrison reflects an almost calculated appearance of disinterest.115  Certainly the two had 
a chance to discuss matters in person.  Elkins outplayed Goff by selecting a man with 
strong legal and political connections and experience, making it relatively easy for 
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Harrison to ignore Goff’s frantic pleas.  George Sturgiss practiced law in Morgantown 
with an established firm and had run as the Republican nominee for governor in 1880.  
Elkins could easily obtain this appointment for his friend because he had an insider’s base 
that allowed him to maneuver in Washington more effectively than Goff.   
Goff sent a barrage of letters in the spring of 1889 to Harrison, pleading with an 
unusual tone of desperation, “if you have not done so, I trust you will appoint Cowden at 
once.”116  Goff leaned on his friends, such as Pennsylvania Republican boss Matthew 
Quay, asking his personal attention to get Cowden appointed.117  Goff’s enemies did not 
miss a chance to undermine his choice.  Pierpont, who had found himself removed from 
the collectorship a few years earlier at Goff’s request, pronounced Cowden “unfit” 
(which, experiencewise, may have been true.)  Pierpont endorsed Sturgiss as a “friend of 
all and popular in the state.”118  Elkins communicated little in writing to Harrison, but 
worked to organize his allies around West Virginia.  He explained to Mason that Goff’s 
crusading damaged state Republican influence with the President.  Elkins suggested that 
Mason “get some understanding.”119  Atkinson tried to back the old warhorse with his 
own letters and telegrams supporting Cowden, but, in the end, Elkins’ position as a 
national insider and friend of Harrison won out.120  Goff tried to depersonalize the 
conflict later in the year by soothing relations with Sturgiss, writing that he told the 
president that “your appointment will not be distasteful to our people, but will be most 
acceptable to our friends.”121   
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 During the battle over the U. S. Attorneyship, both sides vied for the goodwill of 
Mason, who also played a role in the higher stakes battle over a Cabinet post.  Elkins 
corresponded about placing a West Virginian besides Goff into Harrison’s Cabinet, 
assuming Goff’s possible gubernatorial victory would leave him uninterested in a 
position.  Elkins clearly had patronage in mind, explaining to Mason that “all our friends 
could be taken care of without much effort.”122  Mason seemed to gravitate towards 
Elkins, who felt comfortable enough with his authority by December to issue marching 
orders to refrain from sending a delegation to Harrison over the Cabinet issue.  When one 
went anyway, Elkins complained that they had created “hopeless confusion.”123  Within a 
month, Elkins received an answer on the Cabinet issue from Harrison himself that 
seemed to indicate Elkins had lobbied for Goff to go to the Cabinet after all.  Harrison 
curtly informed Elkins that he would not appoint “our friend, “explaining that “Cabinet 
officers are not to be State bosses.”124  Proponents of civil service reform believed 
Harrison would bring a return to spoils politics. However, the president was concerned to 
prove himself sympathetic to reform.125  
 Goff’s rapid fall from power demonstrated the fragile nature of party authority.  
One shift in the political landscape could dump a boss through the cracks.  Control of 
state patronage built up during the Grant years faltered somewhat during the time of 
President Hayes.  However, neither the reforming Hayes Administration, a hostile Arthur 
presidency, nor the Democratic term of Cleveland permanently harmed Goff because no 
Republican alternative was available.  Then came Elkins, and Harrison switched to the 
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more palatable option.  Goff’s renowned speaking abilities, popularity, and electoral 
victories could not help him in the end.  It came just as suddenly as the self-inflicted 
political suicide some years earlier of Roscoe Conkling, although Goff was a victim of 
being outmaneuvered.  Goff and Conkling did share an imperious nature that grated on 
the nerves of many above and below.  The West Virginia boss’s haughty tone in letters 
about patronage, his “reluctant tribune” posturing, and his treatment of the statemakers 
must have created silent enemies.  Nor did Goff disappear completely from the stage.  
Elkins found him an honorable position as a federal judge on the Fourth Circuit while 
never ceasing to worry about him.  Goff occasionally corresponded with Elkins on 
political issues, including in 1891 about their mutual friend “Major McKinley” (future 
President William McKinley.)126  He never did leave his name on the West Virginia 
landscape in the same manner as Stephen Elkins, Henry G. Davis, or Johnson Camden, 
but his work helped to build a West Virginia Republican Party capable of competing for 
power. 
 Despite his fall from state authority, Goff remained a national figure among 
Republicans.  He became a spokesman for a proposed national law to regularize and 
clean up local elections, stating “honest men of all communities shall write in requesting 
honest men to see that an election is honestly conducted.”127  Additionally, he served in 
executive positions in Republican clubs and leagues and continued to support his favorite 
issue, the protective tariff.  Typically, as Goff traveled and spoke, groups remembered the 
failure of 1888 by introducing him as the “elected Governor” of West Virginia.128  He 
spent much of his time after defeat tending to business affairs and actively participating 
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in that industrial thrust sponsored by men like Elkins that powerfully transformed West 
Virginia in these years.  In late 1891 Elkins and Harrison decided to remove Goff from 
state politics by granting him a respectful alternative, appointment to the federal bench.  
If Goff felt resentment at being moved aside for the ambitions of younger men, he may 
have reflected upon his own ascension to power.  His mouthpiece, the Clarksburg 
Telegram, only radiated admiration for Elkins, stating that he had been doing “wonders 
for the state” and was “one of the great Americans of the age.”129  Interestingly enough, 
long after the death of Stephen Elkins, Goff returned to become a power broker in the 
West Virginia party after the First World War.  He did not wither away. 
History does not simply record the final tally of an election in numbers of voters 
for candidates, but the overall effect of that event in subsequent years.  Although in the 
short term it appeared to have been a disastrous defeat for the state Republican Party, the 
1888 defeat exposed the competing factions among Democrats that could only reconcile 
in extreme difficulty and then only temporarily.  History records the fact that 12,000 
more voters cast their ballots in that election than were actually enrolled at the ballot box.  
Williams commented that this represented “the most corrupt and fraudulent” election in 
West Virginia history, certainly a tremendous feat.  The Democratic Party exerted great 
efforts to carry this election, “Elkins’ forces were more sinned against than sinners.”130  
Republican rejuvenation of party and organization prepared it to exploit Democratic 
factionalism eight years later and then take a commanding role for most of the ensuing 
generation.  On a personal note, the defeat also signaled the end of Goff’s reign as party 
leader, although that took some time to develop as well.   
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Goff remains a fascinating figure in state history.  His stock with the people lay in 
his military deeds and his political abilities in contrast with Elkins, who, like Camden and 
Davis in the opposing party, was above all an organization man.    Elkins and his 
colleagues in the Democratic leadership wanted to blend politics with the needs of 
industrial development.  For them the idea of a constituency included Standard Oil and 
the B&O Railroad as much as the people who cast ballots.  In their thinking, this made 
sense.  They believed that development would bring a prosperity that benefitted 
everyone.  Only time would tell if this new era in political thinking for West Virginia 




STEPHEN B. ELKINS AND MANAGEMENT STYLE LEADERSHIP 
 
 Stephen B. Elkins exploded into West Virginia Republican politics with the 
power and suddenness of a Mongol horde, but prefaced by the quiet subtlety and 
maneuvering of a medieval papal election.  Like those feared horsemen of the Middle 
Ages as well as the political figures inspired by Machiavelli in early modern times, 
campaigns planned well in advance marked out the arrival of the irresistible conqueror.  
Elkins emerged in West Virginia at a crucial moment in the state’s history as well as his 
own life.  In the 1880s Elkins, a man with a “round, innocent face” like an “aging baby,” 
had made his name as a power broker on behalf of the popular James G. Blaine.1  He 
represented a new breed of political organizer, more inclined to the soft sell, less 
flamboyant, and more dedicated to building a party rather than personal loyalty.  History 
does not always embrace the industrialist bosses affectionately, but they do bring 
substantial strengths and flexibility to the position.  Flexibility and organization helped 
Elkins take advantage of the changing nature of the West Virginia economy and the 
financial crisis of 1893 to oust the Democratic Party from its position of dominance.  
Eventually, he ascended to the United States Senate, joining other Republican political 
authorities such as Tom Platt and Mark Hanna. 
Elkins helped to drive a Republican Party trend away from powerful chieftains 
such as “Lord” Roscoe Conkling of New York or Nathan Goff in West Virginia.  To the 
new breed of industrial era organizer, the Civil War existed as a memory rather than an 
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issue.  Such men would eventually bleach out the political bloody shirt.  They also 
generally put party above personal position.  This new generation preferred friendly 
persuasion to ruthless confrontation.  It did not always create a party fearful of its leader, 
as Elkins saw during most election cycles, from the time he took over until the day he 
died.  It did provide for a smooth transition, at least publicly, between powerful figures.  
Tom Platt eased Conkling back into full time corporate law in New York City; Mark 
Hanna of Cleveland outmaneuvered and displaced die hard bloody shirt wavers such as 
Joseph “Fire Alarm” Foraker; and Stephen Elkins managed to kick Goff upstairs to a 
federal judgeship in West Virginia.  Historian John Alexander Williams referred to this as 
Elkins’ greatest success.2 
 Elkins appeared in West Virginia politics with a much different perspective.  A 
native of Ohio, Elkins moved west as a young man.  He claimed Civil War service, 
although his brief stint in the pro-Union Kansas militia did not define a large portion of 
his personal identity as was the case with Goff.  In many ways Elkins represented the 
new Republican Party.  By the 1880s, men like Elkins held a deep respect for those who 
had sacrificed for the Union, but the Civil War and its aftermath no longer provided their 
main issues.    A long string of state and local leaders in the 1870s and the 1880s served 
as Union officers or had some kind of other military distinction.  Goff’s prisoner of war 
status was one such experience.  By the 1880s West Virginia politics centered more 
around the debate over industrialization rather than memories of a conflict two decades in 
the past.  For Elkins, business provided a model through with which he operated in the 
world.   
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 Elkins’ defining activities occurred after his service.  After earning a law degree 
from the University of Missouri, he went to New Mexico and made a fortune in land 
speculation.  For Elkins and many other politicians in both parties during this era, 
business and politics formed a tight relationship.  The loose ethical standards and legal 
codes encouraged situations that would in later times be seen as conflicts of interest.  
Johnson Camden’s combination of work for Standard Oil and leadership in the 
Democratic Party raised few eyebrows outside of the Agrarian politicians.   
 Elkins commenced both of his careers in New Mexico Territory prior to the end 
of the Civil War.  By 1864 he won election to New Mexico’s House of Representatives, 
and, within a few years, served as attorney general for the territory.  From 1873 to 1877 
he served in the United States Congress as a representative from that state. Meanwhile, he 
invested money in resource-bearing lands that helped to make him a wealthy individual.  
At times Elkins took advantage of disputed claims inherited from the chaotic Mexican 
and Spanish grants.  Similarly, West Virginia had problems with property claims due to 
Virginia’s shoddy organization in land grants and sales, both as a colony and a state.  In 
1875 Elkins moved east and married Hallie Davis, daughter of Henry Gassaway Davis of 
Piedmont.  He then settled in New York and worked his way into national politics.  
Elkins supported James G. Blaine’s multiple attempts at the presidency.  Both men 
shared a belief in the power of capital to improve the condition of the United States and 
its citizens.  Blaine detested slavery and secession and the rest of his life associated the 
Democratic Party with those twin evils.  As a Speaker of the House in the postwar years, 
he consistently supported the interests of business and felt no reason to hide his 
admiration of wealthy Republicans.  Unfortunately for him, he also accepted gifts from 
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those entities, such as the Little Rock and Fort Smith Railroad, which benefited from 
legislation he supported.3   
The personality of Elkins reflected a personal magnetism and charm shared by 
Blaine, and they enjoyed the exchange of ideas.4  He and Henry Gassaway Davis readily 
helped Blaine establish contacts with such industrialists as Andrew Carnegie.  A genius 
of organization, Elkins constructed highly effective campaigns for Blaine.  He brought to 
these organizations a set of capable subordinates who managed the “Plumed Knight’s” 
political career with an aggressive, but tactful style.  However, Blaine could not 
overcome his own reputation when engaged in presidential elections.  Even when other 
candidates later fought for the nomination, Elkins was a prized ally.  As a “Blaine man,” 
he could produce supporters for men such as Benjamin Harrison when “the Plumed 
Knight” was no longer a serious contender.  During the election of 1892, Blaine saw his 
own candidacy as damaging to the Republican Party, so Elkins threw his support to 
Benjamin Harrison.  Blaine followed Elkins’ rise with much interest, for instance, 
complimenting the West Virginia boss on his “address at Morgantown” which “was 
really admirable.”5 
Elkins helped Blaine gain entry into an important center of influence in  
American finance and politics, Henry Gassaway Davis’ Deer Park.  This resort near 
Oakland, Maryland entertained some of America’s premier political and economic 
figures in the late 1800s.  Central Appalachia’s ridges rise to around 3,000 feet or more, 
but generally have very level tops.  In summer, the temperatures range from five to 
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almost fifteen degrees cooler than nearby lower elevations, and the humidity generally 
remains in a more comfortable range.  This made Deer Park a pleasant escape from one 
of the industrialized world’s most unpleasant summer capitals.  Deer Park consisted of a 
luxurious hotel with cottages hidden around the grounds.  Elkins had his own cottage as 
did B&O official John Garrett (whose name was affixed to the surrounding county in 
1872.)  Deer Park had the aura that surrounds any establishment frequented by the 
wealthy and/or powerful.  It was a center of action.   
 As he grew into a powerful figure in the national Republican Party, Elkins turned 
his financial attention to the home state of his father-in-law.  Davis and Elkins combined 
to construct railroads that pushed deeper into the resource rich mountains and hills of 
West Virginia while connecting those regions to markets.  These feeder railroads did not 
have the same legendary national reputation of a Baltimore and Ohio, but they earned 
profits for their builders.  Davis constructed the Western Maryland, referred to as “an 
engineering feat.”6  Elkins meanwhile built the West Virginia Coal and Coke.  This 
railroad did not merely pass through the state in a pattern that connected east to west; it 
concentrated on linking cities within the state.  This enabled better communication 
between the state capital and other regions while helping institutions such as West 
Virginia University gain more usefulness.  Elkins and Davis enjoyed good relations with 
the Baltimore and Ohio until 1888 when it passed under the influence of the 
Consolidation Coal Company, a competitor with their interests. 
Elkins entered West Virginia politics in the late 1880s although, according to 
Williams, as late as 1884 he still had not seriously considered West Virginia as a possible 
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political home.7  However, Elkins established useful connections within the state party 
well before his 1888 entry.  Elkins wrote John Mason, former Union major and mid level 
West Virginia Republican figure, repeatedly in 1880.8  In 1883 Mason received an 
invitation to meet Elkins.9  Elkins may have started implementing his plans to enter West 
Virginia politics in 1887 when he summoned Mason to meet with himself and Davis.10  
He invested in the Wheeling Intelligencer and started making appearances.  On January 2, 
1888, he spoke to the Parthenon and Columbia literary societies at West Virginia 
University.  Charles Burdette Hart of the Intelligencer arranged to hold a prosperity 
convention at Wheeling early in the year and earnestly sought Elkins’ presence.  “You 
will fit in very snugly.  This thing you must do,” Hart assured him.11  
Elkins brought to the West Virginia Republican Party experienced and skilled  
leadership.  Management of presidential bids and strong connections with the most 
powerful in the party gave him advantages in obtaining patronage for his supporters.  In 
1889, Elkins had the ear of President Harrison and the selection of his lieutenant to the 
prized office of U. S. Attorney confirmed it.  To achieve this, Elkins had to unseat a wily 
and entrenched Goff and also manage to gain the support of local leaders.  Goff’s power 
base relied very strongly on his ability to deliver jobs to his friends. Once he lost that, he 
remained well known and popular, but without authority.  Republicans respected him for 
past achievements, but Goff held little real authority within the party.  Elkins worked 
over the years, especially after his election to the U. S. Senate in 1894, to broaden his 
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power beyond patronage, anticipating the moves of later holders of that office from West 
Virginia in trying to increase federal investment in the state.12  For a time, Elkins had to 
remain wary of Goff.  During the remainder of the 1880s and into the 1890s Elkins and 
Goff circled the West Virginia political ring as heavyweight prizefighters.  Always 
reluctant to engage each other directly, Elkins constantly sought out ideas on Goff’s 
motives or actions.  He remained prepared for Goff to rebel against the subordinate 
position in which Elkins had boxed him, but this never happened, at least overtly.   
Managing a state political party resembles in some ways the herding of cats 
because of its disjointed, almost feudal structure.  A state party chair has titular authority, 
but county executive committee chairs wield considerable strength, and county party 
organizations have their own priorities. Obtaining support can prove difficult when 
interests conflict, such as when Goff received the nomination for governor in 1876, but 
faced anger from the Berkeley County Executive Committee because he had taken it 
from their favorite son candidate.  Many counties, then and now, see their situation as 
pivotal and requiring special attention from party leadership.  George Work, the 
Sistersville postmaster, urged Elkins to go to his county, stating that “it is necessary for 
you to make a trip here as soon as possible and get the boys in line.”13  Some counties 
resented what they saw as dictation from party and elected leaders.  E. J. Allen of Taylor 
County informed Elkins that “(U. S. Congressman) Dayton has withdrawn that ugly letter 
he sent me and admits I was right in my opinion relative to allowing the Republicans of 
Taylor County to have free expression and not undertake to pack the convention.”14   
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The divided power structure created difficulties, but not impossible obstacles.  
When patronage failed to deliver enough jobs, qualified men could often find 
employment with Elkins or one of his networks of industrial allies.  Goff also lacked 
direct connection to the network of friends that Elkins had created.  Personality, patience, 
and sound judgment finished the job.  Goff relied upon occasional access to patronage, 
political skill, reputation, and charisma.  Elkins had great political abilities plus money.  
His victory over Goff for control of the state party was not inevitable, but Elkins held a 
strong hand.  Elkins’ ascendency into Harrison’s Cabinet as Secretary of War in 1891 
gave him prestige and further nationalized his outlook.  Later as U.S. Senator, Elkins 
faced real difficulties in balancing national, state, and local priorities.   
Elkins could not gain power through sheer financial largess; he needed allies 
among Goff’s former supporters.  Party operatives perceived that in Elkins they had a 
much more powerful distributor of patronage than Goff.  Patronage applicants generally 
assembled a packet of letters of recommendation from local and statewide figures.  
Before 1896 some writers simply put “to whom it may concern,” or addressed letters to 
the Cabinet secretary or president himself.  After 1896, almost all letters of 
recommendation went directly to Stephen Elkins.  When L. D. Thaft wrote to Elkins in 
support of Gordon Gibbens receiving a marshalship, he bluntly stated “it is generally 
conceded that you will control the appointment for U. S. Marshal for this state.”15  Elkins 
controlled every Justice Department appointment and most people reasoned that he had 
direction over all other jobs as well.  There were just as many positions as before, but 
Elkins had more control in his time than Goff enjoyed previously. Applicsnts included 
the ambitious Nathan B. Scott and the popular George Wesley Atkinson.   
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The supporters that Elkins eventually won over testify to the breadth of his 
influence.  When Elkins eventually assumed control, he relied upon state party chair and 
former newspaper editor William Mercer Owens Dawson. Dawson acted as a cipher for 
Elkins to an extent.  But Dawson did not fit the mold of a party hack; instead, he was a 
man who served out of conviction.  Over his entire career, he showed a strongly 
progressive nature by advocating for government investment in good schools and roads.  
In 1881, Dawson became the youngest man at that point to be sent to the State Senate.  
There, he supported a resolution calling upon West Virginia’s congressional delegation to 
support railroad regulation.  Eight years later he wrote that “Mr. Elkins is the sort of man 
West Virginia needs.  He is not only enterprising, but aggressively so . . . he is a sound 
protectionist, a Republican, a student, a scholar, and a gentleman.”16 Later, as governor, 
Dawson supported raising taxes on corporations, bringing “great howls from the 
industrialists.”  He also complained of mine guard “outrages.”17  After his death, he was 
remembered as “just about as rugged an individual as you’ll ever find and his life was 
just about as rough as his beard.”18  Elkins did not shrink from relying on an independent 
man of conviction to help him organize and run the state GOP.  It helped Elkins 
considerably that the official face of the state Republican Party was a man who had spent 
the previous two decades perfecting his craft of communication and backing reforms of 
improvement for the state. 
 Goff did not recede quietly or quickly.  Party faithful and leaders alike continued 
to look to Goff for leadership for years after Elkins actually gained the upper hand in  
political authority.  Charleston lawyer Hugh Boggs sent his appreciation to Goff for his 
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employment as an abstractor with the 1890 Census, but later harangued him for a better, 
permanent position.19  A better position was also exactly what Elkins and his allies had in 
mind for Goff.  His senatorial ambitions remained strong, but they conflicted with Elkins’ 
own plans.  Goff also found limits on his influence over patronage, such as when the 
Treasury Department refused to dismiss an agent at his request.  The agent in question 
benefited from a “strong appeal” from Henry Gassaway Davis.  The Treasury Secretary 
described Davis’ “kindly feeling toward our party in West Virginia” and explained that 
“it would be unpleasant to me, personally, to utterly disregard his wishes, as you request, 
and it seems to me it would not be good politics just now.20  Goff’s defeat was complete 
when he found that a Democrat received preference at the Republican patronage trough 
over himself. 
The unmentioned factor of that letter was obviously Davis’ son in law, Elkins.  
Elkins had similar problems in that President Harrison did not wish to challenge Goff 
directly.  The two men finally met at Davis’ Baltimore office to determine how to 
proceed.  Neither wanted an open break that could lead to conflict just as the state party 
had clawed its way back to dominance.  Goff also remained popular in the state and 
national party and some continued to try to use him as a counter-balance to Elkins.  
Charleston interests seeking to consolidate that region’s Republican newspapers sought to 
play Goff and Elkins off each other to draw financial support.21   
 Goff would not achieve his dream of a Senate seat until well into the next century 
after the death of his rival, but Elkins did ensure that Goff received an honorable and safe 
position.  The appointment to the federal judiciary removed Goff from active 
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involvement in politics while granting him his due as the man who rebuilt the party.  His 
acceptance of the position brought congratulations that fell short of enthusiasm.  The 
hyperbolic Atkinson, now a member of the House of Representatives, explained that “the 
people are generally mad because you go out of active politics and they say we can not 
do without you.”22  For Atkinson and other long time Goff supporters, the disappearance 
of their benefactor may have appeared ruinous, but Elkins had no intention of freezing 
out all of his former rival’s men.  Atkinson won the governor’s office in 1896 and served 
adequately, promoting industrialism but also limits on child labor.  Others looked for new 
champions to fight against the increasing dominance of Elkins.  A Kingwood Republican 
recognized the tightening velvet-gloved grip of Elkins and tried to spur his congressman 
into action, complaining that “General Goff is ignored.”  Congressman Alston Gordon 
Dayton tried to remain aloof of controversy involving the Republican leader and his 
allies.23  Nevertheless he tried to remain on good terms with Elkins’ allies such as George 
Sturgiss and John Mason.  However Sturgiss relayed to Mason that Dayton was 
“sensitive, fiery,” and “indiscrete [sic].”24   
 Elkins had powerful allies aiming to build his base of power in West Virginia.  As 
Nathan Goff benefited from an appointment to the Cabinet, so would Elkins.  Goff held a 
very brief and almost ceremonial tenure as Secretary of the Navy while Elkins controlled 
the Department of War between 1891 and 1893.  Nathan B. Scott, elected to the U. S. 
Senate not long after Elkins, advised President Harrison in 1891 that appointing Elkins to 
the Cabinet would invigorate West Virginia Republicans to continue the gains made in 
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the 1880s.25  The appointment unsettled those still committed to seeing James G. Blaine 
as president because they understood Elkins and perhaps Blaine himself had abandoned 
that notion.   Although Elkins had a good reputation for congeniality, relations between 
Harrison and himself grew more prickly over time, which could have proved difficult had 
the president won a second term.  Harrison readily admitted his shortcomings in personal 
situations.  Although a magnetic speaker, he often acted coldly or rudely toward allies.  
Before going to a political function, his friend John New advised, “For God’s sake be a 
human being down there.  Mix a little with the boys after the meeting.”  Harrison had to 
admit later that he had tried and failed.  Tom Platt, New York’s famous “Easy Boss” 
expressed uneasiness with Harrison, saying “Those who did the most to please Harrison . 
. . found him a marble statue when they asked for recognition of their services.”26  Elkins 
later expressed in frustration, “God Almighty’s overcoat would not make a vest for 
Harrison.”27  As a state level manager, Elkins had to satisfy and conciliate not only 
restive lieutenants, but also important figures on the national stage. 
Elkins was more than just a party boss looking for prestige.  When he achieved 
high level positions, he looked for ways to advance positive changes.  Secretary of War 
Elkins pushed to raise the salaries of non commissioned officers while expanding the role 
of the Division of Military Intelligence.  Elkins gained broader perspective on America’s 
place in the world while serving in the Cabinet, noting to Andrew Carnegie that “the 
Atlantic Ocean is only a wide river.”  He also formed a geo-strategic philosophy in which 
he foresaw sixty years before it occurred world domination by “Anglo-Saxons,” Russia, 
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and China.28   Elkins also voiced concern over the political power of the great monopolies 
after Standard Oil influenced a congressional committee vote on tariffs; “This has excited 
a great deal of criticism in Washington, people question how these great corporations can 
succeed while others fail.”29  Such statements further contradict the contention that Elkins 
formed part of a monolithic network of businessmen seeking to gain political power and 
economic control at all costs.   
Goff did not cease to trouble Elkins after ascending to the judiciary, however.  
Three years after Goff’s appointment, Elkins still feared his influence.  Relations between 
the two ranged from amiable to strained.  An 1891 letter from Goff advised Elkins in an 
almost friendly manner about the rise of an Ohio politician, Major William McKinley.30  
Regardless, they remained rivals for the U. S. Senate.  Elkins stated to Mason that Goff 
was maddening and possibly still longed for a seat.  Elkins had to balance that against the 
ambitions of his own sometimes troublesome lieutenant, Sturgiss.31  In 1894 Elkins had 
aimed to secure the prize for himself.  By December of 1894, once again Goff and Elkins 
came to “understand each other perfectly.”  Goff instructed his Harrison County friends 
to vote for Elkins, an effective silent endorsement.32  According to Elkins, Goff also 
agreed to abstain from running for the U. S. Senate.  In return, Elkins ensured that Goff 
received consideration for the vice presidency.33 Sturgiss sulked at not receiving any 
positive mention, but did not rebel. 
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While fulfilling his duties as United States Senator, Elkins never let his attention 
waver from the details of running the state party.  His first term in the Senate saw the 
United States enter war with Spain.  Elkins enjoyed good, if not warm, relations with the 
president and dutifully supported his policies.  He owned a stake in the conflict in that his 
son, Fred, had received recommendation for an officer’s commission from General 
Joseph Wheeler.34  Elkins supported an aggressive policy, partly out of fear that the 
German Empire had designs on territory in the Western Hemisphere.  Some of his 
colleagues disagreed with the administration.  Massachusetts Senator Henry Cabot Lodge 
feared that seizing the Philippines gave the Democrats “a line of attack where we cannot 
meet them.”35  Elkins gradually gained a respectable grasp on national issues that placed 
him in line, by the early twentieth century, to possibly succeed William McKinley as 
president. 
Elkins, according to some sources, may have promised to match other Republican 
campaign contributions dollar for dollar in 1892 in exchange for the US Senate seat.36  
Dawson managed the money and distributed it effectively.  All did not always work 
perfectly because Dawson did not exercise complete control over all party officials.  In 
November 1896 he wrote a stinging letter to John Mason, asking him to find out what 
happened to contributions made specifically from Mason’s home county of Marion.  Two 
middle men named Fleming and Showalter had received $1,000 total including $600 
from Elkins himself, but only reported $150 to the state executive committee.  Dawson 
fumed that a donor named Dobbins had refused to send any more money to Marion 
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County “until that matter is straightened up and the money accounted for.”  Dawson 
condemned the laxity of the Marion County organization, claiming that Dobbins “spoke 
about this thing happening once or twice before in reference to Marion County . . . 
Money should not have been ‘used’ in a private way.”  He summed up by informing 
Mason that “a great deal of money has been wasted in this campaign by having been 
given without the knowledge of the State Committee.  I do not know why our people 
insist on doing business in this way.”37 
Dawson, a future Republican progressive leader in West Virginia, sought to clean 
up some of the electoral process.  In 1896 he wrote a scathing letter to Congressman 
Dayton, a resident of Philippi, about his home county’s electoral practices.  Dawson 
regretted “very much the condition of affairs in Barbour County.”  He recommended that 
Barbour County receive no more money than absolutely necessary for “legitimate work.”  
Barbour County had, according to the state chairman, fallen into corruption via “lavish 
use of money, whiskey, and other ‘abhorrent forces.’”  He contrasted Barbour against the 
apparently relatively pure conduct of Preston and Monongalia.  Dawson contradicted the 
conventions of his time when he told Dayton that “no political party can be permanently 
built up by methods that have been pursued in Barbour since I have been Chair of the 
State Committee.”  He then asked Dayton to suggest changes in election laws.38  
Although part of the outrage certainly had genuine origins in the progressive mindset of 
Dawson, likely the parsimonious Elkins also despised the utter waste of cash.  Later, 
when he sponsored the landmark act preventing the issuance of rebates by railroads, 
Elkins probably combined virtue with saving money. 
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Elkins continued to maintain a strong presence in the state.  One of the twentieth 
century’s greatest politicians explained that “you can be the most important congressman 
in the country, but you had better not forget the people back home.”39  He continued to 
make speeches in isolated county seats such as Moorefield and courteously received 
letters from local political figures and job seekers.  The Tyler County Sheriff was quick 
to explain the slight Republican majorities to Elkins in the election of 1898, blaming 
them (typically for most localities) on discordant elements.  However he credited Elkins 
for holding meetings in Middlebourne and Sistersville that “did much to harmonize 
differences and put the boys into active service for the party.”40 
The close loss of the Republican Party in the election of 1888 thus set the stage 
for the party’s later success.  Elkins rose into a leadership position, using his managerial 
style to reorganize the party while addressing the concerns of many who had supported 
Goff.  Elkins, however, did not wrench this political ship in a new direction without some 
help from the political currents of the time.  Economic disaster on the Democrats’ watch 
made the economic arguments of the Republicans much more relevant to voters.  In the 
years leading up to 1896, Republicans within West Virginia and around the country 
worked to build their party and educate voters.  In that year, they wrenched formerly 
Democratic states into the GOP column and laid the foundation for the latter party’s 
dominance for a generation. 
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ELECTION OF 1896 
 
The Republican Party hit a watershed year in 1896.  Across the country people 
turned out to vote William McKinley president of the United States.  It marked a turning 
point for the party, the country, and the world.  Throughout McKinley’s administration 
activist groups pushed for a stronger U. S. presence in foreign affairs.1  The European 
balance of power was about to shift, even as it claimed ascendancy over almost every 
continent and ocean.  Meanwhile America, Germany, and Japan moved closer to the day 
when they would project their own power beyond their shores.  Historians often mark 
Theodore Roosevelt as the first modern president, but McKinley really marks the 
beginning of twentieth century America.  His election resulted from a basic shift of states 
and constituencies from the Democratic to the Republican column.  West Virginia 
participated in this movement by evicting Democrats from legislative control in 1894 
joining fellow border states Maryland, and (except for one elector) Kentucky to vote for 
McKinley in 1896.   
 The 1890s marked the climax of a long term shift in the Republican dynamic, 
both in West Virginia and across the nation.  It gravitated away from bosses specializing 
in personal authority to corporate style managers.  It also almost completely abandoned 
the bloody shirt and embraced a cohesive economic platform.  Meanwhile Democrats 
split on issues such as the tariff and currency policy.  In West Virginia the splits almost 
formed into schisms and left the party defenseless to a concerted GOP charge. West 
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Virginia’s Republican momentum grew during the late 1880s and 1890s owing not only 
to its own work and message, but also as a result of the  slow breakdown of the 
Democratic Party.  Where the Republicans generally had very clear leadership between 
the early 1870s and the early 1900s, their opponents suffered increasing divisions.  
Agrarian Democrats embraced what many called at the time conservative values, 
opposing industrialism.  Other Democrats shared some of the same development goals 
for the state trumpeted by Boreman when he was governor, following that party’s 
industrialists.   
 Economic crisis in the early 1890s confirmed in the minds of some voters the 
wisdom of Republican economic philosophies, particularly the emphasis on 
protectionism.  Murmurings of economic crisis circulated in the border state and 
Southern regions in 1892.  In November, representatives of the major Southern oriented 
railroads met in Chattanooga to address the issue of a “demoralized condition of rates 
throughout the South.”2  Davis’s Western Maryland railroad sent its president, John B. 
Hood.  Kentucky boss and Louisville and Nashville Railroad president Milton Smith also 
attended.  The group agreed to try and halt the decline in rates, taking control over pricing 
from “a few shippers.”3  By the beginning of 1893, pessimism set in as domestic and 
international factors weighed on the minds of investors.  Agricultural produce fell short 
of expectations and Europe showed “deepening poverty,” partly related to a cholera 
plague.  Some held out hope that a rise in stock prices might show an increase in 
prosperity, but that did not occur.4  Instead, economic panic set in.  By May the New York 
Times reported that “The number of failures last week, as reported by the commercial 
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agencies, was surprisingly large” and described a serious contraction of available credit.5  
This economic crisis took place during an explosive decade of American production.  The 
United States produced 143 million tons of coal in 1890, but increased that total by 100 
million tons at the end of the century.  Steel production more than doubled in the same 
time span.6  These events coincided with the rise in power of labor organizations, such as 
the United Mine Workers of America which launched strikes in Kentucky, Alabama, and 
Tennessee using populist style rhetoric.7   
The infamous Pullman Strike of 1894 illustrated the growing problems and social 
divisions.  George Pullman’s paternalistic company community erupted into violence 
after a 70% cut in pay and little corresponding relief at the company stores.8  The strike 
and resulting violence shocked the nation and even some labor sympathizing voters in the 
next elections saw maintenance of rule of law as a priority.9  The United States economy 
had collapsed, and it threatened to drag the social order down with it in the minds of 
many.  Voters believed that the Republican Party offered possible answers to the troubles 
afflicting the nation in 1894 and 1896 and voted accordingly.  Hard times during a 
Democratic presidential administration combined with rising organization and political 
skill in the Republican Party both in West Virginia and around the nation to produce a 
context that explains GOP gains in the mid 1890s.   
 This period contrasted with politics over the preceding twenty years.  For much of 
the 1870s, Republicans featured Ulysses S. Grant and Roscoe Conkling as two of their 
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main driving forces.  Grant, like many nineteenth century presidents, did not bring a 
grand vision to the White House, but instead reacted to events as they occurred.  Fellow 
senator Chauncey Depew concluded that Conkling’s “wonderful gifts were wholly 
devoted to partisan discussions and local issues.”10  In 1880 a Texas delegate in 
convention asked “What are we here for?” He then answered his own question with “I 
mean that members of the Republican Party are entitled to office, and if we are 
victorious, we will have office!”11  Economic difficulties and financial scandals in the 
1870s gave weight to Democratic arguments of Republican maladministration.  
Especially in 1872, GOP malcontents were only too happy to help Democrats assault 
Grant style leadership.  In the midterm election of 1874, twenty-three of thirty-five 
contested states voted Democratic.  Their chief asset lay not in their dynamic ideas for 
bringing back prosperity, but in the fact that they were not Republicans.12  The 1890s saw 
a reversed dynamic.  The Democratic Party divided over economic issues of the tariff and 
the gold standard as a financial and economic crisis spread throughout the nation.  
Republicans also supported the expansion of pensions for Union soldiers.  Some 
Democrats, such as Henry Gassaway Davis, split temporarily from their party to support 
ideologically similar Republicans.13  The GOP’s response in 1894 to the onset of crisis 
proved more effective than the Democratic assault on Republicans twenty years before.  
Republicans in the 1890s articulated a powerful alternative vision based on sound money 
and protectionism and wedded it to a modern style political organization to overturn their 
opponents’ control of both Congress and the White House.  
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 The buildup to Republican success in West Virginia in the early 1890s did not 
occur without addressing intraparty obstacles.  Some irritation over the elevation of 
Elkins and his lieutenants still appeared from time to time and factionalism constantly 
remained an issue.14  One of the up and coming political figures trying to navigate these 
shoal ridden seas was Alston Gordon Dayton.  Dayton, whose father, Spencer, was a 
prominent Democrat, served as prosecuting attorney of both Upshur and Barbour 
Counties.  Born in 1857, he came from a generation which knew the Civil War as history, 
not a first-hand combat experience.  Dayton’s emergence into Republican politics 
demonstrated West Virginia’s general drift towards the Republican Party in the years 
leading up to the great electoral shifts of 1896.   
 In 1890, Elkins’ men had started to move the pieces into position while 
continuing to test the political winds.  George Sturgiss worked closely with Dayton, 
asking advice on state Supreme Court candidates, while urging him to allow others to 
obtain the GOP nomination because “as to congressional matters, we are still at sea.”15  
However they still tried to cultivate Dayton as a candidate.  Dawson complimented him 
on a series of speeches made in 1890 in support of the campaign and promised to “pay 
you back so far as I can in my feeble way.”16  Dayton in1890-91 managed to maintain 
good working relationships with all the particulars, including Mason and Goff.17 
 By 1892, evidence emerges of a prickly side to Dayton’s nature.  Future state 
Supreme Court Justice Ira Robinson had served as a legal partner to Dayton.  Upon the 
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dissolution of that arrangement, Robinson still owed Dayton $24.  Within three weeks, 
Robinson wrote Dayton a stinging letter describing an incident where Dayton requested 
to stay at Robinson’s home.  Robinson refused, so Dayton asked his wife and she 
assented, resulting in Dayton’s making “a convenience of us . . . until forbearance on our 
part ceased to be hospitality.”18  Later that summer, Robinson noted an “insulting letter” 
and responded that “I do not feel the least intimidation from your threats.”19  Dayton’s 
explosive temper earned notice from other Republican leaders in the months leading up 
to the 1894 election.  Sturgiss warned Mason that “Dayton is sensitive, fiery and 
sometimes indiscrete [sic] and . . . must be handled with care.”20  Such minor issues did 
not derail Dayton’s campaign, however. 
 By 1894, Dayton was ready to push for the nomination, but found opposition in 
former gubernatorial candidate, United States Attorney, and Elkins supporter, George 
Sturgiss.  Early in the summer Sturgiss mused that he, Mason, or Elkins should get the 
nomination, feeling that an Elkins campaign for the House of Representatives would help 
his Senate ambitions.21  By August, he “reluctantly” informed Mason that he would be 
willing to have his name advanced as a candidate.  Sturgiss asked Mason to help build 
party harmony and worried about both a “fiasco” and “ill-feeling.”22   John Alexander 
Williams asserts that Dayton’s nomination over Sturgiss represented an example of 
Elkins’ policy of bringing new men into state politics, “bypassing older and more 
independent leaders.”23  Some saw Dayton as a vote against the patronage system though.  
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J. F. Harrison of Piedmont assured Dayton that he wanted a Republican victory, but “we 
do not propose to let some of those fellows who have been feeding for time immemorial 
at the public ‘crib’ dictate.”24  Dayton and Sturgiss both had delegates lined up to support 
them at the 1894 congressional nominating convention, but Mason continued to lurk as a 
possibility to steal the prize.25   
 One of the key issues in the congressional election of 1894 was the tariff bill of 
William L. Wilson.26  Henry Gassaway Davis requested that Dayton come to confer with 
him in Elkins and assured him of his brother Colonel Thomas’s support as well.27  Since 
the passage of tariff revision at the behest of Wilson and other free trade advocates, the 
Representative from the Second District had found himself politically and ideologically 
separated from figures such as Fleming and Davis.  This kind of opposition, combined 
with the Republican surge during the economic crisis, meant that one of the congressional 
leaders on tariff reform faced serious trouble in his re-election efforts.28   
Davis expected Dayton to serve as a protectionist voice in Congress and shared 
those sentiments with Intelligencer editor Charles Burdett Hart who exclaimed “Above 
all things, I want Wilson whipped!”29  The Republican Party nationally viewed the 
Second Congressional District in West Virginia as pivotal.  William L. Wilson served as 
the House leader of tariff reformers.  A strong rebuke from his own constituency not only 
would remove the well-spoken leader of free traders, but might undermine the entire 
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movement, bringing “a great national reverse to the enemy.”30  Others wrote to Dayton, 
encouraging him to believe that all Democratic hopes rested on Wilson, who may have 
received financial support from British manufacturing interests.  Republicans certainly 
believed that he did.31  The struggle against Wilson and the tariff temporarily united the 
party; Sturgiss sent Dayton a strong letter of encouragement and advice.32   
The politics of the period were driven by the powerful changes transforming the 
nation.  During the thirty years following the end of the Civil War, industrialization 
affected the country as a whole as well as West Virginia itself.  It introduced accelerated 
development during a time of impressive economic expansion.  From the start of the 
Civil War until 1914, American imports expanded from $334 million to $2.365 billion.  
At the same time imports increased at a much slower rate, from $356 million to $1.896 
billion. This occurred during a period in which the United States for the most part 
embraced protectionism. The European colonial states could not compete with cheap 
American food while Britain struggled to compete with the ever expanding production of 
industrial goods.  European tariffs only slowed the imbalance somewhat.  Europeans, 
especially Kaiser Wilhelm II’s Germany, resented the trade imbalance and American 
hoarding of gold supplies.33 
All those finished goods made of steel, along with all the rails and ships that 
carried those goods to market, required more production of coal.  Railroad penetration 
into West Virginia’s hills and valleys started in earnest during the 1870s.  These 
originally branched from the main lines of the Baltimore and Ohio and Chesapeake and 
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Ohio Railroads.  Some of the most important grew from the investments and work of 
Camden, Davis, and Elkins.  These originally replaced the old and destructive methods of 
getting timber out of the mountains, but they also quickly grew into convenient ways to 
ship out coal.  In 1880 West Virginia mines produced 1,680,000 short tons of coal.  By 
1890 that figure expanded to 7,394,000 and doubled from that number by 1897.  The year 
1880 also saw 472 sawmills operating in the state.  Nearly a thousand processed state 
lumber by 1899.34  These activities did not replace agriculture, but they certainly eclipsed 
the old standards of wealth in the state and created new conditions.  Increased production 
did not simply benefit the North as many states in the former Confederacy experienced 
growth in the production of iron and consumer goods to supplement traditional 
agriculture.35 
Advancing industrialism forced changes in the Bourbon caretaker state  
established by the 1872 constitution.  The Weston State Asylum was supplemented by 
facilities elsewhere and the state built a reform school at Pruntytown.  This relieved the 
county jails of the burden of housing the insane and minors.  Farmers lost the ability to 
allow their livestock to graze freely outside their own property as extractive industries 
required more land.  Medicine received its first regulation on the state level as well in the 
1880s.  This decade formed the foundation for the more significant changes that would 
occur during the years when Republicans dominated state politics.  Historian Mark 
Wahlgren Summers points out that a natural dislike for government power developed in 
the 1870s due to bossism and Reconstruction, but that this did not prevent the growth of 
interventionism across the country in the 1880s.  Additionally tangible results followed 
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an increase in government activity.  William M. O. Dawson had advocated for good 
roads from the time he was a Preston County editor until he assumed the governorship of 
West Virginia.  Free transportation, hospitals, and schools had very few able opponents.36  
Summers also described the constituency of wealth as divided.  Camden’s complaints 
about steel oriented Wheeling Democrats pushing for reduced tariffs on coal illustrate the 
point.   
  Charles Ambler, John Alexander Williams, and many others create an image of 
business class interests taking hold in this decade.  Ambler rued the idea that low tax 
rates prevented “the richer flowers of culture” from blossoming and blamed industrialists 
and their supporters for the problem.37  Williams accused leaders such as Camden and 
Davis (and by extension other capitalists such as Elkins) of using rail passes, patronage, 
and “the barrel” of favors to sway influential locals.  These men supported their leaders 
and advanced their interests, or so it seemed.38  Some extraordinarily cordial exchanges 
between Stephen Elkins and Johnson Camden in 1892 and 1894 would seem to back up 
these claims.  Elkins needled Camden about the ineffectiveness of his senatorial 
colleague, Charles Faulkner Jr., on the stump while requesting a higher tariff rate on coal 
and even asking him to get the Wheeling Register to tone down its attacks on Elkins!39  
Again, the Democratic industrialists had to fight difficult ideological battles over 
economic policy with factional leaders.  The establishment of links in 1896 with 
protectionist and “goldbug” Democrats made sense for the Republican leadership 
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whether those connections occured with leaders or significant numbers of registered 
Democratic voters.  Without a crossing of party lines, whether temporarily for voting or 
permanently in registration, the West Virginia Republicans could not have achieved 
power or maintained it for long. 
 The tariff discussion dominated the late 1880s and the first half of the 1890s.  
Nathan Goff garnered a national reputation with his eloquent defense of the protective 
tariff.  Industrial concerns feared competition with the British Empire and other nations 
which presumably could undersell American products at home, especially during a time 
of economic crisis.  West Virginia coal barons in particular lost sleep at nights over the 
potential market influence of coal from Nova Scotia.  Democrats, on the other hand, 
argued that tariffs increased prices and hurt farmers purchasing finished goods.  Few as 
yet discussed the negative impact of lessened competition on U. S. industry.  The 
Wheeling Register drove industrial Democrats and Republicans to distraction with its 
constant drumbeat against the coal tariff.  William Wilson pushed hard for downward 
revisions and criticized the “renaissance of ultra-Federalism.”40  The tariff backed by 
Republicans such as Dayton sought to protect and promote the Second Industrial 
Revolution and the changes it brought to the United States. 
 Dayton carried the race.  Republicans won all of West Virginia’s congressional 
districts and the state legislature.  The New York Times trumpeted “Democrats Lose 
Heavily All Over the Country.”41  Preston County’s J. C. McGrew delighted in the 
results, stating “now is the winter of our discontent made glorious summer.”42  Elkins’ 
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part in the unfolding electoral drama came next.  The West Virginia Legislature had the 
opportunity in 1894 to choose a United States Senator.  Elkins expected the party he 
helped to achieve this resounding victory to reward him with the seat.  His first fear, 
naturally, was that Goff might resurrect his old ambitions, but doubted a challenge would 
emerge from that quarter.  “I don’t think he is in the raw,” Elkins mused to Mason.43  
Rumors about Goff unsettled Elkins, who asked Dayton later in November to have some 
“friend” talk to the former boss to dissuade him.44  From an unexpected direction came 
resistance to Elkins’ march to the Senate.  Sturgiss declared his candidacy shortly after 
the election. 
 Why did Sturgiss declare against the man who obtained for him the lucrative U. S. 
Attorney position some years before?  Sturgiss obviously did not see the former county 
prosecutor Dayton as a serious challenger for the nomination.  A comparison between 
Sturgiss and Dayton on the surface tends to favor the former, who ran for governor and 
faithfully served as U. S. Attorney.  Sturgiss also worked loyally for Elkins and assisted 
in his rise.  Elkins did reward him, but Sturgiss likely expected more.  The loss to the less 
experienced and younger Dayton must have stung Sturgiss and the best explanation 
likely, as Williams pointed out, lay with Elkins.  Elkins wondered if Sturgiss “wants 
somebody to promise him something,” but later concluded that “his purpose is to get in 
line for the next time.”45  Elkins continued to fret, despite New York Times reports that a 
canvass of Republican legislators concluded that he would carry the election.46  In early 
January several regional leaders, such as Charleston’s John B. Floyd, floated their 
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candidacies and expressed a willingness to stand behind Goff, but the anti-Elkins moves 
failed to coalesce.47  Republicans across the country reveled in the victories of that year, 
crediting good organization and a strong commitment to the protective tariff.  In the next 
two years another issue would emerge that tested the fragile resurgence of the GOP, the 
issue of free silver and its champion William Jennings Bryan. 
Coming fast to the national forefront in the 1890s was the issue of inflationary 
currency.  US money remained “good as gold” in those days, but western silver mining 
interests combined with indebted farmers to push “bimetalism.”  This, its advocates 
argued, would inflate the currency and provide debt relief for small and middle sized 
farmers.  Support for it swept the Midwest and South, but not the Grover Cleveland 
White House.  The national fissures reflected the now decades old splits that had already 
disrupted the West Virginia Democrats.  “Gold Democrat” Henry Gassaway Davis 
occasionally, albeit privately, supported sound money Republicans such as Dayton in 
1894.  “The boy orator of the Platte,” William Jennings Bryan thundered across the 
prairie into the hearts of agrarians everywhere with his consistent and powerful call for 
silver currency.  Bryan unashamedly affirmed the divisions among the Democrats by 
claiming in his famous “Cross of Gold” speech at the 1896 Democratic National 
Convention that “Old leaders have been cast aside when they refused to give expression 
to the sentiments of those whom they would lead.”48  Bimetalism, to those not converted 
to its benefits, confused (and undoubtedly bored) many voters as much as it confuses 
undergraduate history students today.  Factory workers saw little benefit to inflating the 
currency when they understood better than anyone that wages lag behind prices during 
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such a cycle.  Personally, Bryan struck some as the same old politician, “a lively sense of 
his ability to influence people individually and in the mass by charming manners, 
meaningless courtesies, pleasant words, outworn phrases.”49  The journalist William 
Allen White recalled Bryan’s nomination; “I was moved by fear and rage as the story 
came in.  I had never heard of Bryan.  To me, he was an incarnation of demagoguery, the 
apotheosis of riot, destruction, and carnage.”  A fellow Republican reporter shouted to 
White, “Marat has won!”50 
Historian Mark Wahlgren Summers claimed that, “The more Bryan spoke, the 
less clear it became what, besides free silver, he had to offer.”51  He speculated that 
Bryan looked like a relic more so than the leader of a modern movement. The Democrats 
ran a one trick pony Jeffersonian in 1896 against one of the best organized campaign 
machines assembled to that point in US history.  Historian Bruce Felknor analyzed the 
increasingly common question in 1896 as to whether or not Bryan suffered from insanity.  
The New York Times questioned five experts in the field of mental illness, two of whom 
agreed that “Bryan has, perhaps, undertaken a task too great for himself.  He may break 
down physically.”  Another claimed Bryan was “dangerous, because he appears to be 
both ignorant and sincere.”52 The questioning of Bryan’s sanity coincided conveniently 
with the paper’s promise “to intensify its devotion to the cause of sound money.”53   
What seemed insane to a New York City publisher sounded like logic to many 
trying to survive in agriculture during the Industrial Revolution.  The transportation 
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revolution, combined with higher tariffs, led to a situation where highly productive and 
hard working American farmers flooded the domestic market with more and more 
produce.  A quarter–century agricultural depression, starting in 1873, brought farmers 
“from relative prosperity to perennial hard times.”  It did not help that corporate America 
expanded its wealth, prosperity, and power during much of the same period.  In West 
Virginia and other places, credit opportunities for farmers declined while they continued 
to pay more than their fair share of taxes.54  Furious farmers blamed railroads for part of 
their plight, seeing rate discrimination as part of the problem.  This rage helped to elevate 
E. Willis Wilson to the West Virginia governor’s mansion in 1884.55  The Populist 
movement emerged from a climate of fear and anger over the fate of farmers, and 
selected the charismatic Bryan as their deliverer.  In 1896 the Democratic Party tried to 
tap into this mass of discontent to retain control of the presidency. 
Many Democrats strategically considered that the Cleveland White House offered 
little alternative to the Republicans that they opposed. They also feared losing their 
faithful to a third party in rural areas.  To maintain the cohesiveness of their party, they 
felt a need to turn in a radical direction (at least for that time and place).56  Cohesiveness 
remained an important, but nearly impossible goal in 1896 because of the Democratic 
absorption of the People’s Party along with the nomination of that party’s most visible 
leader.  Meanwhile in West Virginia, some formed a Democratic splinter to support 
sound money.  This went hand in hand with Henry Gassaway Davis’ strong support of 
high tariffs.  Eventually Camden and former governor A. B. Fleming joined those 
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rebelling against Bryan’s ideology.  The “Goldbug Party” supported the Democratic State 
ticket and William McKinley for president.  Davis eventually abandoned the gold 
movement and attached himself warmly to the regular Democrats.   West Virginia did 
already have an independent Populist Party and a Farmers’ Alliance prior to 1896 which 
fused with the Democratic Party.  Upon the Republican victory in 1896, these movements 
disappeared.57All these confusing developments, combined with a divisive headline issue, 
helped to strengthen Republicanism in West Virginia in the buildup to the election of 
1896. 
Meanwhile, Republicans spoke loudly for what they called “sound money” based 
upon using only gold.  Thomas Platt took the credit for adding the gold plank into the 
Republican platform that year, later calling it “my greatest triumph.”58  The brief plank 
asserted that “The Republican Party is unreservedly for sound money.  It caused the 
enactment of the law providing for the resumption of specie payment in 1879; since then 
every dollar has been good as gold.”59  “Sound money” policy had domestic and foreign 
aspects.  Inflating the currency by including silver would certainly help pare down the 
debts of plains farmers, but that would give them a competitive advantage over 
agriculture in other parts of the country.60  Bryan accused diabolical financiers of wanting 
to crucify mankind on a “cross of gold,” but many supported using silver if this matched 
policy emanating from the financial center of the world, London.  Debasing American 
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currency needlessly in the face of British competition was, to gold standard supporters, a 
recipe for a needless obstacle in the game of international competitive commerce.61 
Alongside the trumpeting of sound money for a solid economy, the Republican 
Party nominated William McKinley for president.  McKinley moved from Ohio to the 
national stage in 1892 while stumping for Benjamin Harrison.  His amiability in intimate 
surroundings with Republican officials and supporters contrasted favorably with the 
socially awkward president.  McKinley and Hanna had to have realized that this 
comparison would leave a lasting impression on potential delegates in 1896.  He needed 
to impress the rank and file party men because McKinley had no intention of currying 
favor with the bosses to win nomination.  In the spring of 1896, McKinley’s campaign 
skirted the bosses and appealed to the delegates.  This irritated leaders such as Elkins and 
also created rifts between bosses and the McKinley enthused middle men of the party.   
Continual focus on economic issues bore fruit.  Many voters lost confidence in the 
Democratic Party’s ability to restore prosperity following the economic collapse of the 
early 1890s.  A journalist of the time explained that the silver issue promised hope to 
those in debt because they wanted to inflate the currency.  Eastern creditors naturally 
wanted money to retain its value.62  Across the South and the border regions, the 
depression hit railroads particularly hard.  Except for the Louisville and Nashville, every 
southern rail line fell into bankruptcy.  That included the Baltimore and Ohio which 
succumbed in 1895.63  Coal prices by 1894 reached their lowest level in two decades.64  
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The collapse of coal and railroads made debates over tariffs and the gold standard more 
than academic.  At a time when the Democratic Party divided over economic solutions 
for the nation, Republicans presented a plan of action.  In the months leading up to the 
convention, the main question was whether or not the likely nominee would stand behind 
it in its entirety. 
Opposition and resistance from Thomas Platt and others simply made McKinley 
and his campaign “against the bosses” that much more popular.65  Platt later dismissed 
McKinley as being “not a well-balanced man of affairs.  He is simply a clever gentleman, 
much too amiable and much too impressionable to be safely trusted with great executive 
office.”66  What Platt really disliked was the influence of Mark Hanna’s liberal approach 
to industrialism and lukewarm commitment to gold.  According to Platt, Hanna the 
politician wanted to see McKinley back away from a solid gold stance to placate 
southerners and westerners.67  Although McKinley did eventually back the gold plank, 
the ambiguity of his campaign’s stance that spring earned the bosses’ displeasure and 
reflected the age old political struggle between ideology and the need to meet what the 
people want.  When McKinley finally played his card and supported gold, he worked 
hard not so much to meet what the voters thought they wanted, but to educate them on 
what he thought they needed.   
McKinley’s preconvention assault, especially on the border states, bore fruit in 
getting him the nomination.  Voters in these states also followed him in the general 
election as well, signaling a shift towards the Republicans especially in West Virginia.  
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This came not as a result of a sudden change of heart, or because of McKinley charisma, 
but from long term adjustments in the political landscape.  Republican hard work and 
Democratic factionalism both created the 1896 GOP triumph in West Virginia and across 
much of the nation.  More than one contemporary cited economic reasons for the 
McKinley sweep.  Although Mark Hanna directed the most costly presidential campaign 
in history, it succeeded in persuading the middle class that a gold standard protected their 
savings.  Workers believed that Bryan’s agrarian policies would result in the shutdown of 
American industry.  The “debtor states” of the South and West favored Bryan.  He 
retained enough of a war chest to present his case, but only those that benefited from a 
debased currency favored it.68   
Some Republicans later identified as Progressive disliked the Hanna pamphlet 
blitz.  Theodore Roosevelt, prior to his own presidential campaigns, commented that 
McKinley’s manager “advertised McKinley as if he were a patent medicine.”69  Historian 
Bruce Felknor describes the 1896 contest as one of marketing and sees McKinley’s effort 
as being one of the forerunners of modern campaigns run by Eisenhower, Kennedy, and 
others. Felknor interprets such “appeals to democracy” with dismay.70  On the other hand, 
candidates that stuck to abstract principles and avoided appealing to the people in some 
fashion tended to lose national campaigns.  The campaign approach of Hanna kept 
McKinley on his front porch to give speeches, but took the message of the candidate and 
his party to as many homes as possible.  Changes wrought by the industrial revolution, 
such as higher rates of literacy and less expensive means of printing and distributing 
materials, helped Hanna mimic the success of the news media in reaching more and more 
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homes.  George W. Julian bemoaned what he saw a degeneration of American politics, 
comparing 1896 to the presidential election of 1852 when he alleged that “nothing is to 
be deplored more than the statesmanship which employs its time in finding out which 
way the wind blows and trimming its sails accordingly, instead of bravely appealing to 
fundamental principles as its never failing guide.”71  The organization of the national 
campaign helped to boost other Republican candidates as well.  It must be remembered 
that elections for state legislatures had national implications because of their selection of 
Senators.  That meant that issues such as the tariff had meaning even in House of 
Delegates and Senatorial elections. 
McKinley’s preconvention campaign in West Virginia produced strains within the 
state party.  Political organizations rarely work with precision.  The people involved have 
their own ambitions and sense of their proper place in the grand design.  Often this 
conflicts with the vision of the organization and its leadership.  The presidential election 
of 1896 illustrates this point.  Elkins’ stature as a first term senator was unusual.  House 
Republican leader J. M. Cannon saw Elkins as a key part of his plan to organize enough 
votes to gain the speakership.72  Elkins’ support in the election of 1896 was seen as 
significant by the major contenders, although he himself desired to see Harrison return.73  
Harrison presented a safe choice in a field crowded with fellow US Senators, but he 
decided not to run.   
Meanwhile support at the lower levels swelled in favor of William McKinley, a 
Union Army Major and a popular Ohio politician.  McKinley held a lot of strong cards in 
terms of his aspiration for the presidency.  He had few real enemies because of his great 
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charm and talent for avoiding controversy or confrontation.  McKinley also had an 
energetic organization man clearing the road for his nomination.  Marcus Alonzo Hanna 
had taken full advantage of the opportunities presented during the industrial revolution to 
construct a respectable business empire around Cleveland, Ohio.  Harold Ickes found him 
“a likeable man” and Hanna preached cooperation instead of conflict.74  Hanna was one 
of the first major industrialists to bargain in good faith with his workers and tried to pay 
his workers above the industry standards.  He prided himself on having an open door 
policy.  Hanna also worked devotedly for the younger William McKinley, making his 
ascension to the presidency his life’s ambition.   
Hanna worked doggedly to secure support.  McKinley refused a potential deal 
brokered between Hanna on one hand and Platt and Quay on the other, replying “Mark, 
some things come too high.  If I were to accept the nomination on those terms, the place 
would be worth nothing to me and less to the people.”  Undeterred, Hanna helped his 
candidate craft a “People Against the Bosses” campaign for the nomination.75  This 
signified a break from the old alliance between Republican presidential candidates and 
urban or state bosses, forcing Elkins as a man of ambition and authority to adjust to the 
changing political mood.  Despite the friction between the McKinley campaign and 
Elkins, relations warmed quickly.  Mark Hanna arranged for aid to West Virginia 
Republicans, writing Elkins that “some of my friends in Pittsburgh have agreed to help 
Dayton” and “I have sent Scott a personal contribution.”76 
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By March of 1896 Elkins’ West Virginia allies found themselves swept up in the 
strong momentum towards a McKinley nomination.  The candidate’s campaign officials 
actively cultivated such close Elkins lieutenants as Mason and Hart.  To the dismay of his 
allies, Elkins refused to join the McKinley bandwagon.  Elkins explained to Mason that 
“McKinley is making great strides, but his nomination is not yet assured.”  He wanted 
Mason to recruit “sensible” delegates that remained “unpledged and uninstructed.”77  
Pressure continued to build among McKinley supporters and Elkins’ allies remained 
confused about his unwillingness to commit on the future president.  Reluctance to side 
publicly with McKinley made Elkins appear as one of the bosses on the wrong side of 
history as far as this election was concerned.  Likely, Elkins saw no point in alienating 
men such as Platt or Quay.  Platt said McKinley was “not a well-balanced man of affairs” 
and “much too impressionable to be safely trusted with great executive office.”78  Then 
again, McKinley had refused to cut deals with men such as Platt, so the criticism should 
be taken with a grain of salt.  Elkins held a confidential position that he did not want 
West Virginia delegates instructed as to whom they ought to vote for when they attended 
the 1896 Republican National Convention.  Only a few were privy to Elkins’ wishes on 
this point. 
The McKinley campaign successfully sowed friction in the state party.  McKinley 
men accused Elkins of preventing West Virginia, Kentucky, and New Mexico delegates 
from joining the movement.79  Before the onset of primary voting, most conventions had 
an aura of uncertainty.  Like a papal conclave, the favorite often did not get the prize.  
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McKinley wanted a convention stacked with pledged delegates and even exerted direct 
pressure to try and recruit them.  A personal letter from the likely future president 
combined with constant haranguing by campaign officials often produced the desired 
effect.80  Mason, Hart, and White constantly badgered Elkins to change his mind on 
McKinley. 
By April, Elkins grew frustrated.  His allies concluded that Elkins refused to agree 
to an instructed delegation because of a continued flicker of hope that Blaine might win 
over the St. Louis convention.81  An increasingly annoyed Elkins granted different 
explanations to different allies.  To White he explained that West Virginia “has not been 
instructed since 1880 and I think it is well to keep up our traditions.”82  Elkins himself 
received no support in earlier election cycles when he tried to get delegations instructed 
for Harrison while a member of his Cabinet.  Why should he allow what was not 
permitted to him?83  Elkins later wrote that he did not oppose McKinley, but feared that 
his friends would raise his name against McKinley in the convention.84  As a U. S. 
Senator and former Secretary of War, such a nomination did not lay outside the realm of 
possibility, but Elkins wanted no part of the presidency despite speculation from the 
Washington Post.85  
Mason received a more plausible explanation.  Elkins, like future senators from 
West Virginia, saw economic value in federal investment in his state.  A first term U. S. 
Senator must scratch and claw for appropriations.  In the spring of 1896 he successfully 
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battled for a major appropriation to improve the Monongahela River between Fairmont 
and Morgantown.  The original proposed appropriation of $20,000 would be raised to 
over $1 million if the government bought a series of privately owned dams.  Eventually 
the money spent on the project topped $1.13 million.  Elkins explained that the Senate 
contained more presidential hopefuls than simply McKinley and asked, “Do you think 
under the circumstances it would have been wise . . . to put in rousing instructions for 
McKinley?”86  Mason found himself in a challenging position between two political 
titans because the pressure filled correspondence from McKinley continued.  It worked 
because Elkins continued to defend his position throughout April and May.  During the 
Second District convention Mason acknowledged that Elkins did not want instructions, 
causing the senator to erupt in angry sarcasm.  Elkins wrote, “I am sure you will agree 
after what I said above and what I have said and wrote to my friends, you among the 
number, that you had no right to [complain.]”  Furthermore, he assured Mason that he 
was “glad to say our appropriations has passed the conference, the only fear now is that 
also you might tell our friends.”87  He soon swallowed his rage and on May 19, Elkins 
told Mason that the issue now was “to get votes for McKinley.  That is before us; the 
other is behind us.  What is before us we must now attend to loyally.”88  Elkins used a 
pragmatic leadership style that focused on the big picture, but also forgave subordinates 
for not necessarily comprehending his strategy.   
In the end the convention passed on instructions in lieu of a resolution, a 
compromise proposed by Elkins.89  White played a rather disingenuous role, approving of 
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instructions when corresponding with Mason in April, but expressing impatience to 
Elkins over Hart’s role in pushing McKinley’s agenda.90  The tensions created during the 
election of 1896 showed how easily outside interests could manipulate even long-time 
cogs in the political machine.  The allure of close relations with a future president caused 
Mason to drive Elkins to distraction and the two never returned to their previously warm 
relationship. Although the McKinley campaign reassured Mason that the president would 
remember his friends in West Virginia, he experienced a disappointing blow when denied 
a lucrative patronage job in 1897.91   
Mason blundered because he failed to understand his position.  McKinley knew 
how to boost the ego of the long-time local political operator.  Personal letters and pleas, 
some of which implored Mason’s confidentiality, bolstered Mason’s sense of importance.  
McKinley trusted in the self-interest of Mason.  In this manner McKinley’s campaign 
pried him away from Elkins’ influence.  By 1897, McKinley had ascended to the position 
of a political star around which Elkins’ planet would have to orbit.  Elkins dutifully 
aligned himself.  Mason forgot that he remained a satellite of Elkins in this manner of 
describing the political system.  After demonstrating his lack of loyalty in the spring of 
1896, he still expected Elkins to help him achieve his goals.  From his position in Marion 
County he could not understand the political landscape as Elkins did.  The senator had to 
balance his goals as political leader of West Virginia with his role as United States 
Senator.  Elkins did not have the luxury of ignoring those considerations, and to his 
credit, he placed the needs of the state over the needs of his political party.  He continued 
to turn federal dollars towards West Virginia, as in the 1898 establishment of a weather 
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station at Elkins.  However, Elkins showed too much reliance on the idea of loyalty and 
obedience and expressed frustration when his chieftains followed what they perceived to 
be their own self-interest.  Returning to the fold proved painful for Mason.  McKinley’s 
people inflated his sense of self-importance and reality set in cruelly.   
Elkins treated Mason with patience and fairness despite his irritation. Instead of 
confronting those who disagreed with him, Elkins preferred to remain above the fray, 
dispatching subordinates to handle work that might cause discontent or controversy.  
William Mercer Owens Dawson served as one of Elkins’ trusted right hand men running 
the Republican Executive Committee.  In this post the former Preston County editor 
administered the party but did not lead it.  He maintained an almost encyclopedic 
knowledge of people, places, and their proclivities, advising but never seizing real 
initiative.  Dawson also helped to manage issues of patronage and money, at times a 
thankless task.  Williams credits Dawson for giving the state Republicans a modern 
organization in 1892 for the first time.92 His reward eventually came in the form of the 
governor’s mansion.  John W. Mason, friends with Elkins even before his move to West 
Virginia, also worked to advance his program at least most of the time.  Mason could 
often be more trying as a friend than others were as enemies.  If the Elkins organization 
had a fundamental principle, it seemed to lie in keeping people as content as possible.  
This reflected other political authorities at the time.  As Mark Wahlgren Summers 
explained “A smart boss couldn’t boss.”  In all fields they had to give, or at least give the 
appearance of providing everyone an honest hearing.  The multiplicity of government 
officials at all levels made a single leader more, not less, essential.93  A strong 
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organization at the state level working with an increasingly assertive, well-funded, and 
focused national party helped the Republican Party achieve its goal of disseminating its 
message. 
 The role of these voters remains vital.  People tend to determine what their 
interests are on an individual basis, then make political decisions based upon them.  
Individuals make choices based upon a variety of reasons; even those responding to 
social pressures have to make a choice to submit, instead of reacting against them.  By 
the 1890s the splits in the Democratic Party, social unrest, and hard times pushed their 
voters towards the Republicans.  The early 1890s witnessed West Virginia Republicans 
developing a clear message as well as a strong organization.  The national clarion call lay 
in “sound money.”  In early 1896, the Wall Street Journal quoted an unnamed 
industrialist who clamored for such a candidate.  Discounting Democratic prospects, he 
promised to “buy stocks freely” upon the nomination of a sound money man.  The 
platform made no difference to him.94 
In 1896, the GOP returned to the Governor’s Mansion for the first time in two 
decades.  Some of Goff’s former supporters now had grown entrenched into the Elkins 
camp.  These included the ambitious Nathan B. Scott and the popular George Wesley 
Atkinson.   Atkinson’s pure conventionality in all fields combined with his prolific 
writings make him an ideal case study.  The local color movement of late nineteenth 
century American literature saw middle class writers from major cities write tales of love, 
conflict, and scenery in what they considered the exotic Appalachians.  Travelers into the 
Appalachians found resorts featuring all the modern comforts plus breathtaking scenery.  
These combined with visions of lifestyles and poverty that they believed formed a 
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different social world than theirs (despite the fact that most of these people lived fairly 
close to urban poverty that they generally ignored).  The apparent surrealism inspired 
both writers and audiences to ponder the existence and meaning of the supposed 
Appalachian way of living.  Atkinson’s contributions included the epic poem “Maid of 
the Cumberland or The Sad Fate of the Moonshiner’s Daughter:  A Legend of the 
Cumberland Mountains.”  Atkinson drew upon his experiences as a revenue agent to 
produce this work that would probably today carry the caveat “based on a true story.”  
Local color writers generally play upon the cultural differences between “mountain 
people” and “outsiders.”  Here Atkinson uses a typical device with a twist.  These stories 
often portray romantic attachments between a local girl and a “civilized” outsider.  In this 
case it is a revenue agent working undercover trying to infiltrate a moonshine ring.  He 
courts a naïve young woman who brings him inside their circle.  Once the agent obtains 
the secret location of the still, he leads the raid.  Dramatically, Atkinson wrote “On, on 
they rode at rapid gait/To vindicate the laws of State.”  It would not be local color if he 
failed to mention the scenery, “above were peaks where Nature hung/ And crags and 
cliffs that Pluto flung.”95   
Atkinson’s work never had the impact of John Fox Jr. or Mary Noailles Murfree.  
Historians often point out the influence that Fox’s writings had on early 20th century 
sociologists as well as influential amateurs such as Harry Caudill, but Atkinson was both 
a local color writer and a state governor.  He came from a party that supported industrial 
expansion, but also drew inspiration from the scenery of the region and his own 
experiences battling the illegal whiskey trade.  Although a West Virginian, Atkinson held 
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the kinds of middle class American values that led to the belief that “backwards peoples” 
could be uplifted by both the profit and missionary motives.96  Politicians waxing 
romantic through prose did not strike the Victorian mind as odd.  Lord Beaconsfield, born 
Benjamin Disraeli, led the British Conservative Party, served as Prime Minister, and 
wrote flowery novels. 
Although living on the precipice of the Progressive Era, Atkinson trusted the 
individual over the collective but could not always escape political contradictions.  His 
treatises on ethics and psychology emphasized the worthiness of the disciplined 
individual over the degeneracy and naiveté of the masses.  This conclusion taps into a 
tradition of political philosophy running from Aristotle through James Madison into the 
Second Industrial Revolution.  Democracy to the ancient Greeks meant mob rule.  
Madison feared that an unchecked “pure democracy” was “incompatible with personal 
security or the rights of property.”97  This conflicted with the predominant Jacksonian 
natural rights ethic of Atkinson’s region, but not as often the middle and upper classes, 
many of whom gravitated towards positivism, partly through Charles Darwin’s theories 
on evolution and their impact upon science.98  The influence of Darwin and American 
writers such as Edward Livingston Youmans in the decades after the Civil War formed 
the foundation of some theories explaining human development.  Darwin stated that no 
difference existed in the base emotional or mental functions of humans and other 
mammals.  Youmans built on this by asserting that the basic emotional nature of human 
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beings explained “quackeries of the platform, the bar, the state house, and the pulpit.”99  
Social Darwinism meant that each individual has his destiny in his own hands and must 
ensure his own “survival.”   
Atkinson’s works combined social science with American Protestant morality 
based on such assertions as “God allows every human being to do as he pleases, but holds 
him accountable for his acts.”100  For this work the future governor actively sought the 
advice of Alston Gordon Dayton, whom he asked to “rouse up all your old symptoms of 
scholarship” while pleading “I don’t want any taffy.”101  His statement that “man has a 
triple nature, body, soul, and spirit” places him in a similar intellectual tradition as 
Youmans, but he quotes 1 Thessalonians 5:23 rather than psychology pioneers as 
proof.102  To Atkinson, psychology exists as a way to do as Socrates preached, “know 
thyself.”  It is an “investigation for one’s self” that “develops self-control.”  When an 
individual develops self-control, he forms good character, which Atkinson argues is 
essential to happiness.103   
Historian Heather Cox Richardson described how similar social theories gained 
popularity throughout the United States at this time.  Atkinson seems to be influenced by 
William Graham Sumner who preached lasseiz-faire for individuals, but government 
activism to benefit business.  A popular professor of economics and sociology, Sumner 
argued that each man controlled his own effort and choices and deserved to reap the 
results of each.  Social planning only ended with poor results and increasing burdens on 
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the producers.  He supported a completely lasseiz-faire system free of government 
interference on behalf of both individuals and also monopolistic corporations seeking 
public assistance to maintain themselves.104  Sumner’s unnamed hero was the “Forgotten 
Man” whose taxes paid for the “paternal theory of government.”  Sumner taught that the 
only sound plan for Americans lay in the concept of “mind your own business.”105   
Atkinson’s philosophical treatise Don’t: Or Negative Chips From Blocks of 
Living Truths, shows him at possibly his most pompous and preachy.  It is a moral 
inquiry into the word that forms the title of the book and shows the future governor 
straining hard to be considered an intellectual as well as a moralist.  Those who “sow sins 
. . .  reap sins.”  This includes people who drink alcohol and gamble.  Their “harvest” 
includes “red eyes, red noses . . . misery and woe” as well as “loss of property and 
reputation and good name and influence.”106  The 1880s saw a splinter break off of the 
Republican Party when it refused to endorse prohibition.  Statemaker Republican Thomas 
Carskadon ended his long affiliation with the Republicans over the issue.  Atkinson’s 
works show that a strong prohibitionist stream remained in the GOP despite the 
breakaway movement.   
According to Atkinson, the happiest people live “a life of earnest toil,”  
while those who do little find existence “enervating and exhausting.”107  While most 
people are “honest, conscientious, and true,” -Atkinson painfully confesses that “the great 
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multitude of people . . . never pretend to think for themselves.”108  In this work, he writes 
on one of his favorite themes of self-reliance, asserting that if everybody develops 
themselves to their own fullest potential, society as a whole benefits.  “There is a vast 
difference between selfishness and a proper appreciation of self-interest.”  Atkinson goes 
on to explain that the selfish “have exclusive regard for their own interests or happiness” 
however “if any provide not for his own and specially for those of his own house [he] is 
worse than an infidel.”109   
The philosophy that emerges reflects the convention of the times.  To some 
modern ears the sentiments expressed appear idealistic, yet self-serving.  Idealism rarely 
survives the fire of real world trials and these works are no different.  Atkinson’s 
employment in 1900 of Detective Willliam Gibboney Baldwin (feared in some criminal 
circles as “the Terror of Bluefield”) to ferret out “kickers” might strike some as more 
along the lines of bare knuckled politics than an idealistic tactic.110   Even some of his 
more jaded contemporaries in state Republican politics seemed to see “Brother Wesley” 
as “something of a ninny.”111  His letters at times suggest an almost hysterical 
emotionalism. Atkinson’s philosophy comes from an individualist tradition that 
emphasizes free will, but reaches toward conclusions that form the foundation of the 
Progressive movement.  Human beings have the capacity for good or error, but often 
choose wrong.  Atkinson embraces a very black and white viewpoint common to many at 
the time.  For example, it is not overindulgence in alcohol or gambling that causes 
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problems, but engaging in these behaviors at all.  In Don’t, he clearly states “from every 
cradle to every grave, two roads lead out . . . one of these roads is right, the other is 
wrong.  One leads to success, the other ruin.”112  Atkinson’s works reveal an inner 
conflict between rugged individualism and his pious Methodism.  All humans have the 
natural right to make choices and the responsibility to live with them, but people too 
often make the wrong choices.  Atkinson sees the individual as responsible for imposing 
discipline, but a reader does not get the feeling that he trusts that faculty in every person.  
The doctrine of his times, however, blocks him from moving towards the Progressive 
ideal of mass action.  Certainly history demonstrates that mass action, as Madison feared, 
can lead to great evil as well as good.  These insights into Atkinson’s personal belief 
system give more context to his political life. 
Atkinson enjoyed popularity among the people, if not always other state level 
political figures.  He did not fit snugly with political operator lawyers like John Mason, 
men of capital such as Elkins, or even the former newspaper editors in the mold of 
Dawson.113  Atkinson elicited expressions of flat out irritation from A. B. White.  He first 
proclaimed that he would remain neutral in a dispute over a patronage office that White 
desired, but then told White that his appointment would “be a serious mistake.”114  
Atkinson brought a quixotic and professorial mindset into politics that irritated some and 
was tolerated by most.  However, as governor Atkinson demonstrated political 
pragmatism, such as when he appointed some “Gold” Democrats into state 
government.115  He also fought to strengthen laws to protect game and fish.116  
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Interestingly Atkinson blasted Southern race policies, condemning one who opposed 
black education as a man seeking to “vent his narrowness.”117 This complex man carried 
the statewide banner for the Republican Party and won in 1896.  He summed up nicely 
the sentimentality of the time, but also the contradictions.  Atkinson comfortably 
preached lasseiz-faire government and sometimes spoke in optimistic terms about the 
power of the individual for good, but also strongly distrusted the masses and he felt that 
they needed improvement despite themselves. 
The election of 1896 marked a milestone in both state and national politics.  
Neither George Wesley Atkinson nor William McKinley fully embraced the kind of 
expanded government activism that characterized state and federal executive branches 
forty years later, but it took its first steps on their watches.  Republicans won nationally 
because of a program that unified the party and other voters behind popular figures and 
defined principles.  Large numbers of people across the nation could understand the 
apparent value of sound money and even protectionism.  The Democratic platform 
appealed to a large, but dwindling minority of farmers while striking many others as 
wrong-headed, or at worst boring and incomprehensible.   
Within this apparent avalanche of triumph lay signs that boded ill for the future of 
both the national and the state parties.  Those calling themselves, depending on the 
generation, Liberal Republicans, Mugwumps, or later, Progressives still felt a strong 
sense of unease regarding the authority of state and urban boss type figures.  Richard 
Harding Davis referred to the McKinley inauguration as a “big family gathering.”  He 
wrote positively about the “victory of sound money and principle” but looked with 
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distaste upon organizations bringing banners carrying the names of Platt and Quay which 
“suggested not a republic of free voters but a feudal barony with serfs and retainers.”118  
Theodore Roosevelt’s rise started the final descent of the national Republican Party into 
the painful schisms of 1912.  Elkins faced his own state level revolt in 1900. 
West Virginia’s transition from Democratic to Republican dominance reflected 
changes occurring throughout the region marked out by the Potomac, Ohio, and Missouri 
rivers.  Kentucky and Maryland saw a resurgence of Republican activity that did not last 
while West Virginia and Missouri showed marked Republican tendencies.  This border 
state region saw the GOP achieve its best successes with its late nineteenth century 
strategy of appealing to the preponderant public interest in prosperity and development.  
Development concerns and Democratic division defined politics in these states.  Their 
similarities marked them as an almost separate region in American history, distinct from 
their Southern and Appalachian brethren.   
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The bloody shirt symbolized the opening years of the Republican Party in West 
Virginia.  Civil War memories of secession, warfare, and political reprisals shaped much 
of the political climate of the new state for a generation.  As those memories faded, the 
great questions of state politics would be settled more often by the question of iron and 
other aspects of the Second Industrial revolution. 
The 1896 election did not simply bring a Republican president to the White 
House and governor to Charleston.  It reoriented American politics for a generation and 
West Virginia’s even longer.  The Mountain State had looked to the Democratic Party for 
leadership after the collapse of the West Virginia Republican movement in the early 
1870s.  In 1896, voters turned once again to the party that proudly claimed to have 
created the state.  Since the state’s creation, the Republican Party had changed its 
leadership, style, and issues.  West Virginia Republicans saw party leaders come and go 
while increasingly promoting industrial development and protective tariffs as a solution 
to both business and labor woes.  Stephen Elkins helped to engineer the 1896 shift, but 
his work came after years of patient effort by Nathan Goff.  For Elkins and his party, 
triumph in 1896 brought challenges, but also saw the state emerge as an important force 
in the national political conversation.  Victory and dominance encouraged some of those 
who chafed under the leadership of Elkins as the Republican Party itself braced for the 
coming of the new century. 
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The culture itself changed as well.  America’s Second Industrial Revolution 
produced a much wider variety of diversions towards the end of the 1800s.  People who 
were entertained by political speeches or who followed political melodrama in the 
newspapers could now go to baseball games or seek other diversions.  Given the presence 
of disposable income, one could gain a sense of belonging by pulling for the Cincinnati 
Red Stockings or the West Virginia University Mountaineers almost as much as by 
involving oneself in a political party.  Political parties adjusted to the reality that they had 
to compete for the attention of voters with non-political distractions.1 
The Republican Party did seize victory and dominance in voter loyalty by the 
mid-1890s, but they failed to corral all of the factionalism.  Given the nature of American 
politics and the parties that operate within the political system, cohesion was very likely 
impossible.  Elkins tried to assert authority in patronage and in the backing of candidates, 
but still faced challenges, both large and small, to his managerial style.  For instance, 
Elkins faced one seemingly minor challenge came from a dispute over the location of a 
post office while he confronted a full blown rebellion against his favored nominee for 
governor.  This caused tremendous strain on the party itself as well as the eventual 
nominee and victor, A. B. White.2  Clearly a change of leadership and overwhelming 
success did not end the restiveness and divisiveness that had often plagued the party. 
Between 1872 and 1896, the GOP struggled throughout the country to define and 
establish its identity.  The United States was one of the few democracies to see its 
political parties not only survive the Industrial Revolution intact, but also thrive.  One 
must admire the staying power of the party of Jefferson which survived the usually 
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damning tarnish of treason, although it took years to regain the trust of voters in certain 
key parts of the country. From the beginning, Republicans in most of the country tried to 
mix financial and progressive impulses, struggling to find the right balance between the 
two.  An uneasy dynamic developed within the party between the victory minded bosses, 
the idealists, and the party’s voters.  Oftentimes one must lump the grassroots and mid-
level party officials with the voters because they sometimes jumped on the bandwagon of 
charismatic candidates themselves.  Moneymen and bossism in the party alienated 
intellectuals and idealistic journalists, but not enough to cause a permanent break in the 
1800s.   
The party also tried to navigate through a period in which the parties increasingly 
tried to break down their divisive characteristics, especially localized power structures 
and build a more effective national organization. In most instances, the man liked best by 
the people could overcome opposition by the intellectuals or the bosses. The voters and 
bosses wanted Grant in 1872 while the Liberal Republicans hankered after the odd choice 
of Horace Greeley.  Some in the middle, a prime example being the Wheeling 
Intelligencer, abandoned Greeley when he moved too far away from his Republican 
roots.  McKinley and Hanna gained control of the process in 1896 by making bossism 
itself an issue and appealing directly to the people, making a public virtue out of their 
“disobedience.”   
 As much as the turn of the century looked like a new beginning for the West 
Virginia Republican Party, it relied upon foundations and structures put in place during 
the previous three decades.   Elkins’ successes in the 1890s could not have happened, 
regardless of the economic climate, without the diligent work of those who toiled before 
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he arrived in the state.  Nathan Goff shoved aside the statemaker generation, in part 
because their reliance on prohibitions against former Confederates had lost public 
support.  They could not adapt their vision of West Virginia to compete with the 
Democrats in the early 1870s, many of whom backed the expansion of West Virginia 
mining and industry.  Initially, Goff built a party based upon personal appeal and his 
ability to deliver federal jobs during Republican administrations.  West Virginia 
Republicans also relied on loyal press outlets to keep the voters and activists mobilized 
and interested.  This mimicked other state boss efforts in the 1870s, especially during the 
Grant presidency.  Principle often played a subservient role to politics nationally. 
Goff did build a solid opposition party in this fashion.  He used patronage to 
recreate the structure of the organization.  Goff’s abilities and influence gained him 
national recognition through his brief appointment to the cabinet.  He also helped to lead 
the battle for the protective tariff once elected to Congress.  West Virginia      
Republicans led by Goff could not convince state voters to restore their party to power.  
The Republican Party in West Virginia and across the nation eventually had to change its 
focus, increasingly emphasizing economic issues.  Economic development had been part 
of the message before, but was sometimes overshadowed by Civil War rhetoric on both 
sides.  Also the Democratic Party in the 1870s championed industrialism in a stronger 
fashion than their divided version in the mid to late 1880s.  The 1880s in both the state 
and the nation were characterized by political deadlock between the Republicans and 
Democrats as election returns became increasingly close in many areas.  West Virginia’s 
gubernatorial race in 1888 reflected the almost equal appeal of the two parties within the 
state.  Republicans had already started to emphasize protective tariffs as the answer to 
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build American industry and protect its workers simultaneously and Goff emerged as one 
of the issue’s most passionate advocates. 
Goff led the West Virginia Republicans for a generation, but could not fend off 
the stronger appeal of Stephen Elkins when the latter decided to enter state politics.  
Elkins brought national connections and organizational experience to West Virginia that 
attracted many state party leaders.  He also enjoyed the advantages that come from his 
enterprises spread across the nation and strong ties to West Virginia’s industrialists.  
Elkins used a leadership style that minimized confrontation and encouraged cooperation 
while still leaving no doubt about who was in charge.  The party enjoyed some success in 
his first few years of leadership.  That being said, the economic crisis that struck the 
nation in 1893 pushed voters into paying more attention to the Republican economic 
vision.  Did West Virginia’s eventual return to Republican dominance have more to do 
with Elkins or the economic problems sweeping the nation?  Republicans had gained 
ground for several years in the late 1880s and early 1890s, but the breaking of political 
deadlock around the nation likely helped to push the Mountain State over the top. 
West Virginia’s exodus from the ranks of Democratic states came at the same 
time as other border states.  Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri also saw their Republican 
parties gain more influence and win elections.  This helped to push the Republican Party 
into power for a generation across the country.  Within West Virginia, Elkins 
consolidated his authority but still faced challenges to his position and party unity until 
his death.  Most significant to the Republican triumph was the message.  Contrary to 
some     popular beliefs, voters do not follow the candidate spending the most money and 
they do not simply vote as they are told.  Voters by and large vote based upon their self-
216 
 
interest, which is not always monetary.  They might vote for candidates that promise to 
create better opportunities.  Voters might also find satisfaction by supporting a party that 
actively works to advance racial justice.  These issues can be defined as self-interest as 
well.   
Republicans triumphed in West Virginia and elsewhere because their message 
coincided with the voters’ interest in 1894 and 1896.  The Democratic Party offered their 
take on free trade and little else while the GOP advanced a program that promised to 
benefit workers and business alike. Economic disaster amplified the need for some kind 
of vision and the development of more sophisticated party structures helped to get the 
message to more voters than ever.  As for the message itself, protection made logical 
sense, and happened to coincide with the return of prosperity.  The GOP’s success in 
reversing the poor economic trends cemented their constituency for a generation.  
Generally speaking, from 1896 until today the United States has witnessed its most 
dramatic electoral shifts during times of strong economic dislocation.  
But the message did not end with economics.  Within West Virginia, Republicans 
broke with many of the southern state parties by working to ensure black access to the 
vote.  They also expanded commitments to infrastructure and education.  Governor 
Atkinson in particular supported women’s suffrage.  Often, the men Elkins backed for 
governor agreed.  Elkins himself put his name on an act that ended corrupt manipulation 
of rail rates to promote monopolies.   
Organization, money, and leadership therefore only answer part of the question of 
why people voted to return the state to the Republican column.  This research and study 
into this tumultuous period of the West Virginia Republican Party’s development 
217 
 
demonstrates that the message must resonate with the people, addressing the issues that 
most concern them.  West Virginia’s Republicans built an organization, adapted the 
national message, and presented it effectively and at the right time despite a potentially 
disruptive change in leadership.  With its success, West Virginia took part in a major 
electoral shift that broke a partisan deadlock and shaped the national debate on 
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